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PART I 
THE PROBLEM OF INTERPRETING 
COLLINGWOOD'S PHILOSOPHY 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: COLLINGWOOD AND HIS INTERPRETERS 
1. Collingwood: His Life, His Writings, and His Era. 
Robin George Collingwood (1889-1943) was the youngest 
of four children and the only son of W. G. Collingwood (FYC, 
6). His parents were artists, amateur archeologists, and 
friends of John Ruskin. The elder Collingwood was first 
Ruskin's student, later his personal secretary and confidant, 
and after Ruskin's death in 1900 he became his biographer. 
The young Robin grew up in an atmosphere heavily influenced 
by the Ruskinean ideal of the universal man (FYC, 1, 17-36, 
143-46). 1 Like Ruskin himself and also the young J. S. Mill, 
Collingwood was educated at home until he was thirteen (par-
tially due to the poverty of his parents); and also like Mill, 
he was started on classical languages at an early age--Latin 
at four and Greek at six (A, 1). He was able to read the 
English proofs for his father's books by the age of five (FYC, 
7), and by the time he started at Rugby at thirteen he could 
1An appreciation of the degree to which Collingwood 
valued Ruskin's thought can be gained by a reading of Colling-
wood's own assessment of it in his early essay, "Ruskin's 
Philosophy," delivered as an address at the Ruskin Centenary 
Conference, 1919, but published in 1922 and reprinted in EPA, 
1-41. 
1 
read and speak German and French almost as easily as English 
(A, 6). At Rugby he taught himself enough Italian to read 
Dante in his spare time (A, 7). As a child he also accom-
panied his parents on archeological expeditions: he claims 
to have attended his first "dig" as a three-week old infant 
--in the toolbag of his parents (A, 80). 
From Rugby Collingwood won a scholarship to Univer-
sity College, Oxford, which he attended from 1908 until he 
graduated in 1912 with "Firsts" in both Classical Moderation 
and Literae Humaniores. He was hired as a tutor at Pembroke 
College while still wearing his scholar's robes from final 
examinations. 2 By 1913 he was given an independent hand at 
excavations on Roman ruins in England, and was already being 
regarded by Haverfield (his Oxford mentor in the subject) as 
his successor. After the outbreak of war in 1914 he entered 
2 
the British Admiralty Intelligence where he remained until the 
end of the war in 1918. During this time he wrote the manu-
script for Religion and Philosophy, which was published in 
1916. 3 In 1918 he married Ethel Graham, moved his quarters 
to a country house, and began an extremely active academic 
life as lecturer and tutor in both philosophy and Roman and 
British History. In 1934 he was relieved of some of this bur-
den of tutoring and teaching when he was appointed to the 
2R. B. McCallum, "Robin George Collingwood," Proceed-
ings of the British Academy, XXIX (1944), p. 463. 
3Ibid., p. 464. 
3 
chair of Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy. From 
1918 to 1934 he published four books--Roman Britain (1923, re-
vised edition in 1934), Speculum Mentis (1924), The Archeology 
of Roman Britain (1930), and An Essay on Philosophical Method 
4 (1933)--and numerous short articles and monographs. 
The last-mentioned book was produced during a leave 
of absence from his teaching responsibilities in 1932, due to 
a prolonged illness (A, 117-18)--the beginning of the ill-
health against which the remainder of his life was to be an 
heroic struggle (FYC, 12). Between 1935 and 1941, when here-
signed his professorship, Collingwood managed to find time to 
do the writing on archeology, history and philosophy that form 
the bulk of his later published writings--Roman Britain and 
the English Settlements (1936, with J. N. L. Myres), The Prin-
ciples of Art (1938), An Autobiography (1939), and An Essay 
on Metaphysics (1940). 5 
Most of the material posthumously published as The 
Idea of Nature (1945) and The Idea of History (1946) was also 
written during this period, in the form of lectures (IN, v; 
IH, v-vi). The New Leviathan (1942), the final work published 
during his lifetime, was written under extreme stress, Colling-
4T. M. Knox, "Notes on Collingwood's Philosophical 
Work, with a Bibliography," Proceedings of the British Academy, 
XXIX (1944), pp. 469-75. 
5Ibid. 
4 
wood's state of health rapidly deteriorating, and England 
being torn by war; its final chapters, he notes, were writ-
ten during the bombardment of London (NL, v; LPC, 316). · In 
1939 Collingwood felt well enough to sign on as First Mate on 
a sailing yacht, the Fleur de ~' for a trip from the coast 
of France to Greece and the Greek islands--the other members 
of the crew being mostly Oxford students. His account of that 
journey--the First Mate's Log--was published in 1940 by Oxford 
University Press in a limited edition. In 1942 his marriage 
with Ethel Graham was dissolved at his wife's request (they 
had two children, a son and a daughter), and he married Kath-
leen Frances Edwardes, who bore him a daughter (EPH, x-xi). 
But his health never fully regained its vigor, and he was 
forced to retire to Coniston, to the house he inherited from 
his father, where he died in 1943 of pneumonia. 6 
The years through which Collingwood lived and worked 
at Oxford were among the most violent and revolutionary that 
Europe has seen, and certainly the most profoundly threaten-
ing that England has endured. His work spans the first half 
of the twentieth century, bracketed at one end by the First 
World War and the Russian Revolution, and at the other by 
World War II and the Fascist holocaust. At Oxford the in-
tellectual climate was no less subject to violent upheavals. 
When Collingwood began there in 1908, the 19th century British 
6McCallum, p. 468; cf. IH, xxi. 
5 
idealist movement begun by T. H. Green, with F. H. Bradley 
and B. Bosanquet its most respected spokesmen, had just about 
spent itself, and a realist reaction headed by Cook Wilson was 
already in full swing (A, 15-21). By the time he retired his 
professorship in 1941 realism had given way to logical posi-
tivism (A, 52). H. J. Paton writes that at Oxford, in the 
period between the wars, "Collingwood and I were the only re-
presentatives of our generation--a slender bridge between pre-
decessors at least ten years older and successors at least 
ten years younger." 7 
In his Autobiography Collingwood corroborates this re-
mark when he writes that in the area of archeology he was the 
only remaining Oxford resident trained by Haverfield as a 
Romano-British specialist, and therefore felt an obligation to 
keep alive that branch of studies which was left vacant when 
Haverfield died in 1919, because most of his students had died 
during World War I (A, 120). 
In such highly troubled waters Collingwood felt him-
self to be the vessel not only of Oxford Romano-British arche-
ology but also of philosophy. In philosophy the burden was 
even greater, and in carrying it (alone, he felt) Collingwood 
was buffeted by all the prevailing winds of his era. Conse-
7H. J. Paton, "Fifty Years of Philosophy," 
~orary British Philosophy, Third Series, ed. by H. 
New York, 1956/1961), p. 345. 
in Contem-
D .. Lewis 
quently even though his early works (Religion and Philosophy, 
Speculum Mentis, and even the Essay on Philosophical Method) 
have led to his rejection by contemporaries as a latter day 
idealist, the body of his later writings continues to arouse 
the interest of people of very different philosophical per-
suasions--perhaps because many of the sources of these per-
suasions were also influential on Collingwood himself. 
Thus in the last of his books published during his 
lifetime, The New Leviathan, one finds evidence relating him 
6 
to most of the major contemporary schools of thought. For 
example: (1) pragmatism: "Reason is always essentially prac-
tical; because to be reasonable means to be interested in 
questions beginning with 'why'; and this happens because people 
crave for reassurance against the fallibility of their know-
ledge" (NL, 14.31); (2) phenomenology and existentialism: 
"Man as mind is whatever he is conscious of being" (NL, 1.84; 
emphasis his); (3) linguistic analysis: "Language is not a 
device whereby knowledge already existing in one man's mind 
is communicated to another's, but an activity prior to know-
ledge itself, without which knowledge could never come into 
existence" (NL, 6.41); and (4) even Marxism: "Is there no-
where such a thing as 'purely theoretical thinking'? There 
is; but it is not real thinking, and it does not lead to real 
knowledge . . Real thinking . . . always starts from prac-
tice and returns to practice; for it is based on 'interest' 
in the thing thought about" (NL, 18.13). 
7 
Perhaps because such diverse inclinations are reflected 
in his philosophy, he has been claimed for, and damned by, most 
of these same schools of thought--and this is reflected in the 
diversity of interpretations concerning his philosophy in the 
growing body of secondary literature about him. Here one finds 
him claimed not only by representatives of the traditions just 
mentioned, but also (incredibly enough) logical positivism, 
radical empiricism, idealism, cultural anthropology, and sys-
tems theory. His roots have been located in Ruskinean moral-
ism, German Hegelianism, English and/or Italian idealism, and 
Cook Wilsonean realism. Affinities have been found between 
his philosophy and that of Ryle, Strawson, Wittgenstein, Dewey, 
Husserl, Kierkegaard, Barth, and Sartre. And his best work 
has been said to be in history, the philosophy of history, 
esthetics, the philosophy of mind, metaphysics, ethics, epis-
temology, and the history of ideas. 
In spite of all these affinities, and in spite of the 
remarkable breadth of his interests in this age of specializa-
tion, he fits neatly into none of the contemporary schools of 
thought, and succeeded in developing no appreciable following 
of his own (cf. MHD, vii-viii, and FYC, vii, 137-46). This is 
at least partially a matter of choice on Collingwood's part: 
he sought no following, refused to engage in public debate, 
and preferred taking his case in writing directly to the pub-
lic (A, 56, n. 1, and A, 118). It is also partly due to the 
8 
circumstances of his life: with positivism and analytic phil-
osophy coming into prominence in his own university, and 
Fascism and Communism vying for dominance in the political 
arena around him, Collingwood's attempts to steer an inde-
pendent course led to his estrangement from nearly all of his 
contemporaries. Even those close to him felt a little irri-
tated at him for being "rather too quick in claiming all know-
ledge as his portion" 8 and often those who disagreed with him 
to his face were told, as it were, to "bathe in Jordan." 9 
And finally, his isolation is very much the result of the di-
versity and incompleteness of his output, which makes it dif-
ficult to find a single insight that unifies all of his multi-
faceted output, or even to find a capstone to complete the 
arch. 
But whatever the reason for the difficulty in achiev-
ing a clear focus in the surviving portrait of Collingwood's 
thought, a portion of the blame for this difficulty must be 
shared by the first interpretative authority to reflect on 
the whole of Collingwood's output, and to this problem we must 
now turn. 
8 Paton, p. 345. 
9 McCallum, p. 466. 
9 
2. T. M. Knox and the "Radical Conversion Hypothesis." 
Before Collingwood died in 1943 he named T. M. Knox, 
a friend and former student, as his literary executor. 
Collingwood's will authorized his executor to publish only as 
much of his unpublished writings as met high standards--thus 
leaving to Knox's judgment what the public should see of the 
unfinished works (IH, v). This material included Collingwood's 
lecture notes on the philosophy of history, the philosophy of 
nature, and ethics, and essays on philosophical theology and 
cosmology with which he closed lectures on ethics and on the 
philosophy of nature respectively (IN, v; IH, v-vi; CRM, 397). 
In addition to this material there was an incomplete sketch 
of The Principles of History which Collingwood hoped to be 
his magnum opus, but which is now forever lost--and a large 
number of other unspecified materials, not available for pub-
1 . . . 10 1.c 1.nspect1.on. 
10In 1969 I wrote to the Delegates of the Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, for information about the status of these manu-
scripts. They forwarded my letter to Collingwood's widow (his 
second wife), who replied to me as follows: "Dear Mr. Shipley, 
The Clarendon Press, Oxford, has passed your letter on to me. 
There are a considerable number of unpublished papers of R. G. 
Collingwood in my possession. Within the next year or so I 
hope to deposit these in the Bodleian Library, Oxford. A num-
ber of manuscripts will be reserved for some years. The in-
c~mplete, unpublished Principles of History is lost. Yours 
S1.ncerely, Kate Collingwood." In May of 1972 I received word 
from the Bodleian Library that they still had not received any 
of the manuscripts promised to them by Mrs. Collingwood, and 
stating that they had been unable to contact her by mail. In 
June of 1979 I received word from the Bodleian Library that 
they had recently received the manuscripts from Mrs. Colling-
wood, and that they filled the~uivalent of five boxes 
10 
Under the titles of The Idea of Nature and The Idea 
of History Knox published only the nearly completed lectures 
on cosmology and history. He appended a part of The Prin-
ciples of History (actually only a portion of the first 
third of what Collingwood had planned to write (IH, vi) and 
several completed essays (delivered originally as lectures) 
as "epilegomena" in The Idea of History, but omitted doing 
the same for The Idea of Nature on the grounds that Colling-
wood seems to have become dissatisfied with it: for the 
sketch of his own cosmology which had closed his original 
lectures, Collingwood had substituted a shorter concluding 
passage when he set about revising these lectures for publi-
11 
cation sometime after 1939 (IN, v. ). 
measuring 14 x 11 x 4 inches "and are packed tight." A par-
tial listing of their contents included translations, letters, 
lectures, and notes on everything from idealism and realism 
to the epistemology of logic and English folklore. Most of 
the material is open to inspection by scholars but, according 
to the terms set by Mrs. Collingwood, is not to be photo-
copied. 
11There is something odd about Knox's editorial judg-
ment in this matter. Knox argues (as we shall see in a moment) 
that Collingwood's best work was done between 1928 and 1936, 
and that after his radical conversion to historicism between 
1936 and 1938 his judgments were unsound and not to be trusted 
in matters philosophical. On these grounds Knox published the 
lectures on the philosophy of history and the philosophy of 
nature, and included the terminal essays on history that form 
the "epilegomena" to The Idea of History. But on these 
grounds the essay on cosmology-which closed Collingwood's 
lectures on the philosophy of nature in 1934 and 1937 is a prod-
~ct of his mature, middle period. But instead of publishing 
~t as an "epilegomenon" to The Idea of Nature Knox accepts 
Collingwood's later, possibre-judgment (which is supposedly 
unsound) to omit this terminal essay. Instead Knox published 
the short concluding piece which argues that science "depends 
When Knox published The Idea of History in 1946 he 
he added an "Editor's Preface" in which he not only ex-
11 
plained significant editorial details about the manuscripts, 
but also proposed an interpretation of the whole of Colling-
wood's philosophy, on the basis of which he evaluated the 
posthumously published works, and placed them in their setting 
within the context (as he saw it) of Collingwood's entire pub-
lished output. Therefore the significance of the totality of 
Collingwood's published works to date has rested upon Knox's 
judgment in both constitutive and retrospective senses: con-
stitutive because two important works, including their present 
form, were directly due to his editorial labors; and retro-
spective insofar as his account of Collingwood's development 
is both (a) the only evidence that the public has for the 
"high standards" that Knox used in deciding which works should 
be suppressed and which deserved publication, and (b) the only 
justification of these standards, based on the interpretation 
of the group of writings that Collingwood did publish in his 
own lifetime, that Knox offered for extending that total out-
put. 
Knox's interpretation of Collingwood's development can 
be outlined as follows: 
~n historical thought for its existence" (IH, 177). But this 
1s inconsistent with the editorial policy of The Idea of 
History. --- ---- --
(1) Dividing Collingwood's writings into three 
groups, Knox finds in the "juvenilia" (Religion and Phil_-
osophy (1916) and Speculum Mentis (1924) evidence of seep-
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. d d . 12 ticlsm an ogmatlsm: religious scepticism insofar as re-
ligion is described (in Speculum Mentis) as an erroneous mis-
taking of imagining for thinking, and philosophical dogmatism 
insofar as only philosophy is asserted as providing the full 
truth for which religious assertion is only the symbol (IH, 
xiv-xv). Knox says that the shift from the earlier work (in 
which religion, theology and philosophy are identified) to 
the position in Speculum Mentis marks the ascendancy of a 
dogmatic strain in Collingwood's thought which "affected its 
content and ... was linked with a change in his attitude to 
religion, always one of his strongest interests" (IH, xv). 
(2) By 1932, during the "middle period" (as in Col-
lingwood's masterpiece, the Essay on Philosophical Method of 
12 Knox does not specify what he means by dogmatism 
and scepticism. But it seems that for Knox (1) one may un-
derstand by "dogmatism" the imposition of an external source 
or standard of truth on the internal doctrines of a body of 
knowledge; and (2) "scepticism" to mean the failure or re-
fusal to provide a criterion for truth or falsity within a 
body of knowledge. That is why historicism is a scepticism 
for Knox: history cannot provide a criterion of truth or 
falsity for philosophy. Therefore any criterion of truth 
which proceeds from, or is grounded in, presuppositions which 
are themselves unquestioned and/or unquestionable, is dogmatic; 
and any body of knowledge resting on presuppositions which can-
not themselves be judged to be true or false is sceptical. 
Cf. IH, xvii. 
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1933) the mature and undamaged mind of Collingwood embraced 
metaphysics as a separate and distinct study of the one, the 
true, and the good (IH, xi). This would have allowed for a 
truth-criterion (hence escaping scepticism) not itself based 
on the unquestioning acceptance of religious doctrine (hence 
not dogmatic). Knox thinks this much is indicated in Col-
lingwood's essay, "Faith and Reason," which in assigning in-
dependent functions to each faculty escaped the ascription of 
a monopoly of truth to any discipline (dogmatism) as well as 
the denial of a truth universal and valid for all thought 
(scepticism) (IH, xvi). 
(3) But in the 1940 Essay on Metaphysics (and the re-
mainder of his later philosophy, his third period) Colling-
wood lapsed back into the latent scepticism and dogmatism of 
his youth by denying the independent status of metaphysics 
(which is reduced to history). His "reform of metaphysics" 
is based upon reducing the metaphysician's task to the his-
torical work of discovering the "absolute presuppositions" 
of science in a given era. Since these absolute presupposi-
tions were characterized by Collingwood as (a) themselves 
neither true nor false, and (b) religious in nature, they in-
dicate a radical change in Collingwood's mature position. 
This time Collingwood proposed a philosophical scepticism and 
a religious dogmatism. Absolute presuppositions are dogmatic 
as unquestionable and religious (that is, held by an act of 
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"unquestioning acceptance" or of "natural piety"--i.e. faith); 
and they indicate a kind of scepticism insofar as they ~est 
on no higher criterion of truth and are themselves neither 
true or false (IH, xv-xvi). 
Knox groups The Idea of History and The Idea of Na-
~ in the second, mature period, and The Principles of Art 
overlapping the second and the third. He claims to have doc-
umentary evidence that in Collingwood's second period he 
still held that metaphysics as an autonomous branch of know-
ledge was possible, and that in the third period not only is 
metaphysics declared to be an historical science, but "phil-
osophy as a separate discipline is liquidated by being con-
verted into his tory" (Ill, x; cf. xi-xii) . 
Unfortunately the work from which these quotations 
are taken is The Principles of History which was never com-
pleted, never published, and is now lost and so incapable of 
being publicly examined; so there is at present no documen-
tary evidence to verify these statements. Even assuming that 
Knox is a reliable authority, it is impossible to evaluate 
these fragments without the full textual context--to see in 
what ways Collingwood meant them to be taken, or qualified 
them, or posited them as provisional assertions to be later 
corrected and modified, etc. In future chapters we shall 
find direct evidence in Collingwood's writingR that he often 
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employed a dialectical strategy of positing a remark as a 
starting point, then modifying the remark, and finally con-
tradicting it altogether--all in the span of one essay. Un-
less we are to remain "scissors and paste" historians, and 
therefore show that we have not learned even the first lesson 
that Collingwood wished to teach us, we cannot take Knox's 
fragments from Collingwood's "nachlass" manuscripts uncri-
tically. 
We are therefore left with Knox's arguments, based on 
available evidence, concerning Collingwood's radical change 
of mind--which Knox says occurred somewhere between 1936 and 
1938 (IH, xi). The failure to acknowledge this change of mind 
is one of the reasons Knox rejects Collingwood's Autobiography 
as a reliable account of his development--the other being 
that in the Autobiography Collingwood seems to wish his read-
ers to believe that he had worked out his theory of absolute 
presuppositions and the purely historical character of meta-
physics prior to 1932 and the Essay on Philosophical Method. 
Regarding the latter point (1) Collingwood made no such claim 
in the Autobiography--he says only that "these ideas . . . 
became clear to me soon afterward," i.e. after returning to 
Oxford in 1918, and he says nothing about any reduction of 
philosophy to history (Knox even hedges by calling the claim 
about the dating of the discovery of absolute presuppositions 
an "inference" that Collingwood wished his readers to make 
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from the text); and (2) even if the claim were made, it is 
arguable that it has its roots in doctrines already present 
not only in his early period, but in the works of his mature 
middle period as well. 
Supposing that one were to have unimpeachable evidence 
that there was a radical change of mind as Knox says there 
was: what reasons does Knox assign for it? In his "Editor's 
Preface" he gives no less than three: (1) Collingwood's mind 
changed (beginning in 1932, "tiny blood-vessels began to 
burst in the brain, with the result that the small parts of 
the brain affected were put out of action" (IH, xxi); (2) he 
changed his mind himself (he came to think, like Croce, that 
"philosophy as a separate discipline is liquidated by being 
converted into history" because "the sceptical and dogmatic 
trends, present in Collingwood's earlier thought, triumphed 
over the temporary defeat they had sustained between 1932 and 
1936" (IH, xi)); and (3) Collingwood was an inconsistent, 
even fickle 13 thinker ("Collingwood believed in the coinci-
dentia oppositorum, as many passages in his writings testify. 
I am suggesting that his own later philosophy provides a 
striking illustration of this phenomenon" (IH, xvii). "He 
brought a powerful mind to bear on whatever happened to be 
engrossing his energies . . . and he seems to have been in-
13Knox does not use the term, "fickle." The term 
is mine; the accusation is Knox's. 
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clined to draw the conclusion that philosophy was simply iden-
tical with whatever he happened to be studying most intensive-
ly at the time" ( IH, xv)). 
None of these reasons are acceptable. (1) The ad 
hominem "brain pathology" explanation, while certainly veri-
fied by documentary evidence, is not detailed enough to make 
any accurate assessment of what portions of Collingwood's 
brain (to say nothing of his mind or judgment) were affected. 
The evidence in fact seems to point to brain damage in the 
motor areas: writing to Croce in January of 1939, Colling-
wood says that "just a year ago . I was partly paralyzed 
by a stroke which deprived me of the power of speech . . . . 
I am making~od recovery: I can use my hand and foot moder-
ately well, and can speak now well enough for the purposes of 
my profession" (LPC, 316). Even if we were to assume that 
Knox's acquaintance with Collingwood was so intimate that he 
could detect hemorrhagic capillaries in Collingwood's brain 
as early as 1933, why should we accept such an account as 
philosophically relevant? Why indeed, when Collingwood was 
healthy enough to write the "second book in his series," 
~ Principles of Art (the first being the 1933 Essay on Phil-
osophical Method) prior to his first debilitating stroke in 
1938, and healthy enough after his stroke to act as First 
Mate on a sailing schooner which voyaged for some months in 
1939 in the Mediterranean--and to write a lively account of 
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the experience? And why again when he was clear-headed enough 
to write not only the Essay on Metaphysics, which so scandal-
izes Knox, but also The New Leviathan, a work which many crit-
ics felt would alone earn him a respected place in philosophi-
cal literature? John Passmore's two-sentence estimate of the 
situation is worth quoting: 
It is sometimes suggested by Idealist admirers of Colling-
wood that the brain disease from which he began to suffer 
in 1933 is reflected in his ultimate heterodoxies. When 
one contemplates the speculative freedom of these later 
works, one can only wish that his contemporaries could 
have been similarly afflicted.l4 
(2) Asserting that Collingwood's youthful scepticism 
and dogmatism ovenv-helmed his better judgment is less a change 
of mind than a relapse; interestingly enough, Knox suggests 
that both Collingwood's earlier and later philosophy repre-
sent lapses into a youthful realism, while it is only his 
middle period which steered clear of the "shoals of scepti-
cism and the billows of dogmatism" (IH, xviii, xiv). But the 
clear evidence of the Autobiography is that as of 1939 Col-
lingwood interpreted the whole of his philosophy as a re-
sponse to the threat of "realism." It is incredible to think, 
therefore, that his literary executor could seriously enter-
tain the hypothesis that in the end he merely surrendered to 
its doctrines. Since Collingwood was an historian of unim-
peachable ability, who knew well how to use evidence, and was 
14 John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy (London, 
1957), p. 306 n. 1; quoted by Rubinoff, CRM, 376 n. 17. 
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fully aware that autobiography is history in which the sub-
ject happens to be oneself, if no radical change of mind is 
recorded in the Autobiography it is unlikely to be because of 
a lapse of memory, but rather because Collingwood meant to de-
ceive his readers. For what reason? Knox fails to provide 
us with any. 
(3) Knox's accusations of deliberate inconsistency 
and vacillation by preoccupation also cannot go without chal-
lenge. While it is easy to find passages which discuss the 
coincidentia oppositorum (e.g. SM, 197-98, 249), there are 
others which confine it to the scientific level of thought, 
where it is contrasted with the synthesis of opposites (e.g. 
SM, 310). If by a "coincidence of opposites" Knox means 
the simultaneous affirmation of a pair of contradictory 
statements, then if Collingwood asserted this he did in-
deed, as Knox charges, turn traitor to his profession as 
philosopher. But the burden of proof for this is on Knox: 
charges of "dogmatism and scepticism" do not constitute suf-
ficient evidence for the simultaneous acceptance of a pair 
of contradictory statements. But if by "opposites" Knox does 
not mean contradictories but contraries, then what sense does 
the charge make that his later philosophy is a prime instance 
of it? For it is just as true that Collingwood accepted a 
coincidence of opposites as contraries in his mature middle 
period--e.g. in the Essay on Philosophical Method, where the 
"overlap of classes" is described in terms of relations of 
opposition and relations of distinction (EPM, 74-75). 
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Furthermore the charge of inconsistency by preoccu-
pational vacillation (what I have called "fickleness") is 
self-refuting. Knox prefaced this remark with the observa-
tion that it was the power of Collingwood's mind that caused 
him to become so engrossed in his subject matter that he sim-
ply identified philosophy with whatever he happened to be 
working on at the time. But the charge does not bespeak a 
powerful mind but a weak one--drifting this way and that ac-
cording to what "happens" to occupy it. This suggests an er-
ratic and drifting route for Collingwood's rudderless vessel. 
Opposed to this charge (perhaps the most insulting that Knox 
levels at him) we have Collingwood's autobiographical account 
of the logic of his philosophical program, which leaves little 
room for topics to merely "happen" to occupy his interest. 
He writes there that he planned a series of books, begin-
ning with the Essay on Philosophical Method and continuing 
with The Principles of Art, and that he planned (as of 1939) 
to devote all his remaining time and energy to completing 
the series (A, 117-19). The interpreter faced with a choice 
between Knox's version and Collingwood's own account of the 
development of his thought might prefer Knox's, but then he 
must supply convincing reasons for rejecting Collingwood's. 
But Collingwood's version promises to be systematic, and Knox's 
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to be haphazard and disjointed. Therefore an interpreter can-
not be blamed for choosing Collingwood's on these grounds 
alone. 
But when stripped of its pathophysiological banalities 
and uncritical appeal to unexaminable evidence, there is a 
positive service that Knox's Preface performs. Knox shows 
that one of the crucial problems in Collingwood's mature phil-
osophy, one that may lie deeper than the more apparent prob-
lem of the relationship of philosophy to history, is the is-
sue of the functions and autonomy of metaphysics and religion; 
Knox's "scepticism-dogmatism" argument rests precisely on the 
relative priority or independence of reason and faith. We 
shall see in the next section how Collingwood's views on re-
ligion and metaphysics set his interpreters at odds with each 
other. We have Knox to thank for calling attention to this 
dimension of the problem. 
Since Knox's Preface, three principal interpreters of 
Collingwood's mature philosophy have grappled with its central 
paradox. Of these three, one--Alan Donagan--accepts as deci-
sive Knox's conclusion that Collingwood's thought suffered a 
drastic reversal sometime between 1936 and 1938 (LPC, 1). 
But Donagan rejects Knox's "brain-damage" reason for this re-
versal, and argues rather that philosophically acceptable rea-
sons must be found for it (which he claims to provide) (LPC, 
12-18). Of the other two, Louis 0. Mink comes close to 
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acknowledging a radical change of mind, insofar as he accepts 
a greatly reduced version of the reversal and locates it much 
earlier--between 1916 and 1924, when Collingwood discovered 
"dialectic," first applied in Speculum Mentis (MHD, 20). 
Lionel Rubinoff, on the other hand, roundly attacks what he 
aptly calls "The Radical Conversion Hypothesis" initially 
woven by Knox and later embroidered by Donagan (CRM, 21). 
Rubinoff dismisses Knox's reference to Collingwood's illness 
as being "of no philosophical relevance" (CRM, 18), and ap-
pears to be the only major interpreter to take the Autobiog-
raphy seriously. 
In the next section we shall take up the interpreta-
tions offered by these and several other notable commentators 
on Collingwood's philosophy, and in the final section of this 
chapter we shall try to sketch how the interpretation that 
will be offered in succeeding chapters differs from theirs. 
3. Collingwood's Interpreters: An Overview. 
In 1972 there appeared a collection of fourteen es-
says (all previously unpublished) entitled Critical Essays on 
the Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood, edited by Michael Krausz 
and published by Oxford University Press. Aside from its con-
tents (which represent fairly well the current state of the 
question concerning his philosophy), the mere appearance of 
this book could not help but both please and displease the 
late Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy. 
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On the one hand it defies his express wishes on the 
matter. Towards the end of his life Collingwood's ill health 
forced him to recognize the possibility that he might n~t be 
able to finish all the projects that he had set for himself. 
He therefore wrote his Autobiography "to put on record some 
brief account of the work I have not yet been able to pub-
lish, in case I am not able to publish it in full" (A, 118). 
In it he wrote this request not to be the subject of scholar-
ly inquiry: 
I am nearly fifty, and cannot in any case hope for more 
than a few years in which I can do my best work. I take 
this opportunity, therefore, of saying that I will not be 
drawn into discussion of what I write .... Some read-
ers may wish to convince me that it is all nonsense .. 
. . Some may wish to show me that on this or that detail 
I am wrong. Perhaps I am; if they are in a position to 
prove it, let them write not about me but about the sub-
ject .... And if there are any who think my work good, 
let them show their approval of it by attention to their 
own. So, perhaps, I may escape otherwise than by death 
the last humiliation of an aged scholar, when his juniors 
conspire to print a volume of essays and offer it to him 
as a sign that they now consider him senile. (A, 118-19). 
The appearance of this volume of essays indicates that it was 
only by death that Collingwood escaped that "last humiliation." 
But on the other hand the book is scarcely a humili-
ation to the memory of the late Collingwood. On the contrary 
it illustrates to a surprising degree the extent to which Col-
lingwood's thought is still very much alive--a liveliness that 
could not have but pleased the philosopher-historian who argued 
so eloquently for the notion of history as a process of re-
thinking past acts of thought still living in the present 
(IH, 218). The contributors to this volume realized that 
they were defying his wishes, but as students of his phil-
osophy they found his works, as one of them so succinctly 
put it, "too incisive to dismiss and too unclear to adopt" 
(Mink, in MHD, vii) and therefore demanding interpretation 
to an unusual degree. 
To a reader familiar with Collingwood primarily as 
the author of The Idea of History, and who accepts the ac-
count of Collingwood's development as given by T. M. Knox 
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in the Preface, this collection of critical essays would 
come as something of a surprise. He would be startled at 
the wide range of topics on which Collingwood wrote syste-
matic treatises of some brilliance and originality: besides 
philosophy of history, the topics discussed in essays in 
this volume include esthetics, philosophy of mind, philo-
sophical method, philosophy of religion, metaphysics, philo-
sophy of nature, ethics, social and political philosophy, 
and even philosophy of education. He would also be surprised 
to find no less than half of the essays dealing with Colling-
wood's views on metaphysics: as we have just seen, Knox had 
found these views dogmatic, sceptical, and in general scandal-
ously inferior to Collingwood's best efforts in philosophy 
and history (IH, xv-xvii). He would also be startled at the 
evidence presented by some of the authors for Collingwood's 
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anticipation of issues the importance of which have only re-
cently begun to be appreciated: a case in point bein~ Stephen 
Toulmin's essay comparing Collingwood to Thomas Kuhn, whose 
essay, The Structure of Scientific Revolution, is still being 
seriously debated by philosophers and historians of science 
(CEPC, 201-21). The central thesis of the latter was dis-
cussed by Collingwood some twenty years earlier in An Essay 
on Metaphysics (cf. EM, 48, 74-76). 
But it is disconcerting to encounter the evidence, 
cited by many of the contributors to this volume, supporting 
Knox's argument for the ultimate inconsistency of Colling~ 
wood's philosophy. What is disconcerting about it is that it 
still appears to be impossible for the reader to assume any 
consistent or even comfortable posture toward this prickly 
and ill-assimilated man. As represented by his three prin-
cipal interpreters (Donagan, Rubinoff, and Mink) he remains 
something of a puzzling figure. Did his attempts to work out 
a reconciliation between philosophy and history fail insofar 
as at various times he subordinated the one to the other--
especially in his final, allegedly historicist phase? Are 
Collingwood's earlier "idealist" reflections on the nature of 
philosophical thinking truly "repudiated" by his final analy-
tic philosophy of mind? Was his revolutionary logic of pre-
supposition, question and answer really at variance with con-
temporary logic? Or is there some comprehensive framework 
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detectable in Collingwood's writings--a context which he 
sketched out in his youth and into which all his later, more 
detailed writings fit as parts of a systematic whole? 
A case in point is Collingwood's views on religion--
the subject of his earliest publications and by most accounts 
one of Collingwood's deepest and most enduring interests. We 
have seen that in Knox's view the place of faith and religion 
is of prime importance in evaluating Collingwood's alleged 
dogmatism and scepticism. In the lead essay of Krausz's col-
lection, however, Collingwood's views on the religious doc-
trine of the fall and redemption of man are singled out by 
Alan Donagan as "less blasphemous than laughable" when used 
to interpret what "any ordinary Christian believes that Chris-
tian redemption is redemption from" (CEPC, 19). The passage 
Donagan cites is from Speculum Mentis, and in it Collingwood 
is using the fall as a metaphor symbolizing man's lapse into 
forbidden knowledge (the error of abstraction--the separation 
of subject and object), and redemption as God's acceptance of 
this burden of human error as His own--presumably in the per-
son of Jesus (SM, 302-03). For the view of the "ordinary 
Christian" Donagan chooses to compare this passage to one from 
John Bunyan's Grace Abounding and The Pilgrim's Progress, 
which speaks of the burden of human suffering that is the lot 
of every man. Donagan's objection is that no attempt at a 
literal paraphrase of religious metaphor can absorb the truth 
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of passages like the latter without remainder; but this is 
what Collingwood thought philosophy could do for religious 
truth CCEPC, 18). 
Now it is the measure of the difference between Dona-
gan and Lionel Rubinoff that the same passage that Donagan 
holds up for ridicule is later cited by Rubinoff as "one of 
the most important passages in all of his writings" (CEPC, 
101). Rubinoff's reading of Collingwood is almost a literal 
rendering of passages such as this one from The Idea of 
History: 
The task of religious thought and religious practice (for 
in religion the theoretical and practical activities are 
fused into one) is to find the relation between these two 
supposed conceptions of myself as finite and God as in-
finite .... (I)n religion the life of reflection is 
concentrated in its intensest form, and . . . the special 
problems of theoretical and practical life all take their 
special forms by segregation out of the body of the reli-
gious consciousness, and retain their vitality only so far 
as they preserve their connexion with it and with each 
other in it (IH, 314-15). 
Rubinoff argues that Collingwood's use of the religious meta-
phor of the fall and redemption are apt precisely because Col-
lingwood's entire philosophy is a sustained attempt at recon-
ciliation of all the divergent tendencies within man--subject 
vs. object, thought vs. action, faith vs. reason, history vs. 
philosophy, etc.--and the first level on which that reconcili-
ation takes place is that of religion, with Christianity as 
its highest manifestation (CEPC, 106). 
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The two articles by Donagan and Rubinoff therefore 
take radically opposing views on the same issue, and their 
divergent interpretations extend to the whole of Collingwood's 
philosophy. Donagan argues that the collapse of Collingwood's 
program for an idealistic metaphysics of the Absolute (in his 
early philosophy as expressed in Speculum Mentis and An Essay 
on Philosophical Method) left him with a crippled histori-
cist substitute and no viable philosophy of religion (CEPC, 
18). Rubinoff holds that for Collingwood not only is abso-
lute idealism the only philosophy adequate to the Christian 
solution to the twin problems of alienation and irrationalism 
that plague the modern world, but religion itself (at least 
as Christianity) is a necessary condition of the possibility 
of all other forms of experience--presumably (using the 
scheme of Speculum Mentis) art, science, history, and philoso-
phy (CEPC, 86-88). 
The reader's suspicion that Donagan and Rubinoff have 
their own, divergent meanings for the expression, "absolute 
idealism," is partly confirmed by the fact that Donagan formu-
lates the position in terms of an anti-realist or anti-
abstraction principle (viz. that all abstractions are partial 
truths and to that extent erroneous) which is explicit in 
Collingwood's early writings, while for Rubinoff the term re-
fers to the "unified life of the mind," the divisions of which 
mark the various subject-object alienations within contempor-
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ary consciousness. If these positions appear as obverse and 
reverse of the same coin, the way to distinguish heads from 
tails would be that Rubinoff accepts, and Donagan denies, that 
something describable as "the absolute standpoint" is possible. 
In his book, The Later Philosophy of ~· G. Colling-
wood, Donagan forcefully (if not always persuasively) argues 
that the reason that Collingwood abandoned the idealistic po-
sition of his youth is that he came to realize, from his analy-
sis of mental functions in The Principles of Art (1938) that 
all thinking is conceptual and hence abstract. 15 But this 
position renders anything like "absolute knowledge" (an abso-
lute identity between subject and object) impossible, and 
therefore represents a "repudiation" of his earlier idealism, 
in which abstraction (the cardinal doctrine of realism--on 
Donagan's reading of Collingwood) is regarded as the root of 
all error, and itself a falsification (LPC, 14, 47-50, 285-89; 
cf. CEPC, 18). The philosophy of mind that survives self-
destruction by contradiction forms Collingwood's "later phi-
losophy" which parallels conclusions of Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and anticipates Gilbert Ryle's concept of mind (cf. LPC, 37, 
42-43). 
15The references that Donagan cites at LPC, 14 and 
47-54 to support this assertion--namely, PA, 254 and NL, 7.22, 
7.3-7.31, and 7.38--do not make the claim that "all thinking 
is conceptual and hence abstract." See below, pp. 562-76. 
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Donagan reconstructs this philosophy of mind around 
four principles: (1) the Principle of Intentionality ("if 
a man is conscious he must be conscious of something"); 
(2) the Principle of Order ("if a man is conscious of one of 
his own acts of consciousness, then it is not by that act 
itself, but by another act of consciousness which may be 
said to be of a higher order"); 16 (3) the Law of Primitive 
Survivals ("when a function of consciousness (B) is brought 
into existence having a lower-order function (A) as its ob-
ject, unless the lower-order function (A) continues to exist 
in its primitive state, the higher-order function (B) cannot 
exist at all"); and (4) the Law of Contingency ("the earlier 
terms in a series of mental functions do not determine the la-
ter") (LPC, 27-29). In the resulting hierarchy of levels of 
consciousness, Donagan argues, there is no upper limit (LPC, 
2~ 91-92); therefore there is no such thing as 'absolute know-
ledge" as an upper 1 imi t to knowledge ( cf. LPC, 258) . 
16None of Donagan's references to Collingwood's texts 
for evidence for the "principle of order" support Donagan's 
formulation and subsequent employment of this principle: at 
LPC, 28 and more directly at LPC, 105 and 168, Donagan cites 
NL, 4.31, 5.91 and 5.92 as evidence that Collingwood's phi-
losophy of mind "was fundamentally anti-Cartesian; ... he 
repudiated Descartes' doctrine that acts of consciousness are, 
as it were, self-illuminating" (LPC, 25). In Donagan's view, 
Collingwood came to hold that no act of consciousness can 
have itself as an object (LPC, 108, 167-68). For Colling-
wood's views on self-consciousness and Cartesianism, see NL, 
1.84-1.85, 5.34-5.39; IH, 141, 291-94, 297, 306; PA, 206, 
222-23, 247-52. 
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Lionel Rubinoff, on the other hand, argues persuasive-
ly (if not always forcefully) in his own book, Collingwood 
and the Reform of Metaphysics, that such a position could never 
---
satisfy Collingwood, whose whole philosophy is an extended ar-
gument for rapprochement--including the rapprochement of sub-
ject and object in absolute knowledge. There was no "radical 
conversion" in Collingwood's development, Rubinoff argues, be-
cause Collingwood remained true to the idealistic program 
laid out in Speculum Mentis (CRM, 23). Taking his clue from 
the description in Speculum Mentis of the three ways that the 
"prize of truth" can be awarded (to one, to two or more, or to 
none of the competing forms of experience), Rubinoff con-
structs a framework of "three ontological levels of experi-
ence" on which all of Collingwood's writings can be located. 
At the first level, consciousness assumes an absolute dis-
tinction between subject and object, and views the whole 
of reality as an expression of whatever experience it is 
presently identified with .... At the second level, the 
distinction between subject and object remains but each 
experience now regards itself as only one among a variety 
of equally valid standpoints. At the third level the 
subject-object distinction has been finally overcome and 
some recognition is given to the fact that the forms of 
experience, rather than being coordinate species of a 
genus, are on the contrary a scale of overlapping forms. 
On the basis of these distinctions the implicit rationale 
of Collingwood's published works may now be reconstructed. 
According to this reconstruction each work may be seen 
as exemplifying one or another type of philosophy operat-
ing on one or more of the three levels of experience 
( CRM , 2 9 - 3 0 ) . 
Rubinoff's strategy in answering the charges of Knox 
and Donagan, therefore, is to locate the source of one of a 
pair of conflicting assertions on one level of this onto-
logical schema, and the other on a different level. Thus 
when Collingwood asserts in The New Leviathan that there 
is no upper limit to the levels of consciousness he is 
speaking at the "second level" in which new forms of ex-
perience are always possible because they are regarded 
merely as coordinate species of a genus. But when Colling-
wood asserts in Speculum Mentis that absolute knowledge 
forms the upper limit of forms of experience, he is speak-
ing from the "third level" at which subject and object are 
identified, the "absolute standpoint" (cf. CRM, 69-73, 
369-72). Where Collingwood's project seems to falter, Ru-
binoff calls up a reserve battery of idealistic arguments, 
from Hegel to Husserl, and from Bradley to Bosanquet and 
Blanshard. 17 And the summit of Collingwood's idealistic 
efforts is a description of mind as "pure act" 18--which 
stands in stark contrast to Donagan's static hierarchy of 
levels of abstract concepts, related by the logic of the 
Principia Mathematica. 
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17The most noteworthy use of idealistic arguments in 
Rubinoff's book are the sections dealing with the logic of 
the "concrete universal" (interestingly enough in the chapter 
on "Philosophy as Absolute Knowledge") and with the theory of 
mind as pure act. CRM, 150-83, 315-22. 
18Rubinoff uses in this portion of his argument Col-
lingwood's translation of G. de Ruggiero's Modern Philosophy. 
CRM, 315-22. 
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To the extent that he, too, finds a temporarily schizo-
phrenic Collingwood unacceptable, Louis 0. Mink sides with 
Rubinoff--but not by calling up the arguments of Hegelian 
idealism. In his perceptive and refreshingly tactful book, 
Mind, History, and Dialectic: The Philosophy of R. G. Colling-
-
wood, Mink asserts with Rubinoff, and against Donagan, that 
-
Collingwood is a dialectical philosopher rather than an an-
alytical one. But he holds, in direct opposition to Rubinoff, 
that Collingwood "retained dialectic and abandoned the abso-
lute" (MHD, 78). And like Donagan, Mink finds Collingwood's 
religious philosophy the least interesting of all his thought. 
Mink goes so far as to say that Collingwood had no sympathy 
for the philosophy of religion, and that Religion and Phil-
osophy was Collingwood's only non-dialectical book (MHD, 16, 
20, 260 n. 7). But Mink is no subscriber to Donagan's thesis 
that Collingwood's later philosophy of mind represents a com-
plete break with his earlier philosophical program as exem-
plified in Speculum Mentis and made explicit in the Essay on 
Philosophical Method (MHD, ix, 16, 20). 
Mink employs his considerable interpretative skills 
in bringing out the "recessive" themes in Collingwood's phil-
osophy. In doing so he tries to display the "figure in the 
carpet" (a tri-partite dialectic of experience, of concepts, 
and of mind) that makes it possible to soften many of the ap-
parent absurdities and contradictions in Collingwood's phil-
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osophy (MHD, 80; cf. MHD, 52, 118, 237). In his essay for the 
Krausz collection, for example, he takes up Collingwood's 
famous description of history as the "rethinking of past acts 
of thought" and shows that each term of the expression re-
quires qualifications in the light of Collingwood's "dialec-
tic of process." In Mink's reconstruction "history" in this 
expression must be taken as a philosophical rather than an 
empirical concept, and is thus subject to the characteriza-
tion of philosophical concepts that Collingwood gave in his 
Essay on Philosophical Method. As a philosophical concept it 
has a dialectical structure, which means that the elements 
designated by the term "history" are related in a develop-
ing series or a "scale of forms" (CEPC, 157-72). 
Mink describes such a dialectical system as having 
four properties: it is (1) connective (the terms in the ser-
ies are related generically to a single essence or general 
description), (2) cumulative (members of the series are pre-
served and modified in successive forms), (3) asymmetrical 
(no member is the mere duplicate of another, but rather dif-
fers both in degree and in kind from the others), and (4) 
non-deterministic (in the series a prior term is necessary 
but not a sufficient condition for the generation of its suc-
cessor). Mink argues that since intellectual history (e.g. 
the history of science, art, or religion) deals with a sub-
ject which involves acts that are purposively connected, 
cumulative in effect, non-cyclic and non-deterministic in 
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their growth, it is clear that it answers to a dialectical 
system. All history (in the philosophical sense) is there-
fore the re-thinking (i.e. the dialectical analysis) of past 
acts of thought (CEPC, 172-76). 
But while these efforts by sympathetic admirers of 
Collingwood's philosophy may go a long way towards giving the 
reader an understanding of the intricacies and articulations 
of Collingwood's philosophy, their solutions to its central 
paradox would fail to satisfy many of the other contributors 
to the Krausz volume--and especially as that paradox is stated 
in the Essay on Metaphysics. Thus W. H. Walsh points out that 
when Collingwood wrote in that work that "absolute presupposi-
tions" (the true object of the metaphysician's search rather 
than the "pure being" of the ontologists, which Collingwood 
rejects as an empty concept) are neither true nor false, he 
qualified himself as a "metaphysical neutralist"--Walsh's 
term for a philosopher who limits himself to description 
only, refusing to apply criteria which would allow one to 
make a judgment on the truth or falsity, reality or unreality, 
etc. of the object described. As merely descriptive and fac-
tually encountered factors operative in the thought of those 
who are engaged in any piece of scientific thinking, such 
presuppositions may escape the positivistic condemnation of 
metaphysical assertions as neither factually verifiable nor 
analytically tautologous, but they are also rendered immune 
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to any sort of justification--they can merely be reported. 
Metaphysics is thus an historical science, as Collingwood's 
central thesis of the Essay on Metaphysics maintains; but how 
then account for the referability, adequacy, or success of 
one set of "con-supponible" presuppositions to another 
(CEPC, 134-53; especially, 142-46, 149)? 
Similarly, Stephen Toulmin argues that although Col-
lingwood was one of the few pioneer thinkers to come to grips 
with the central and still unanswered metaphysical question 
about conceptual changes in the history of science (or sci-
entific revolutions, as Kuhn was later to call them), his 
"relativism" (roughly the equivalent to Walsh's "neutralism") 
prevented him from giving a rational account of why they oc-
cur. Instead Collingwood resorted to a quasi-causal, psycho-
logistic explanation in terms of unconscious mental "strains" 
occurring in a constellation or set of presuppositions (Kuhn's 
"crisis in normal science") which are "taken up" or resolved 
when a new conceptual framework replaces an old one (in Kuhn's 
terms, when a new "paradigm science" appears, completing a 
conceptual revolution). Toulmin's dissatisfaction with both 
Kuhn and Collingwood adds fuel to Walsh's charge: if two sets 
of presuppositions differ, must there not be some mutual pre-
suppositions with respect to which, or by reference to which, 
they are in agreement (CEPC, 201-21, especially 209-13)? 
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Finally, Nathan Rotenstreich adds his eloquent voice 
to this dissenting chorus with a deft discussion of Colling-
wood's proposed reform of metaphysics vis-a-vis the tradition 
he proposed to reform--Aristotle, Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel. 
Rotenstreich shows that as often as not when Collingwood used 
historical examples of a metaphysician (in Collingwood's re-
formed sense) who pointed out the presuppositions of science 
in one period or another, he (Collingwood) ignored the evalu-
ative activities of these same philosophers, who were not 
concerned with reportage only, but with justification and cri-
tique as well. What remains of Collingwood's truncated ver-
sion of metaphysical history is what Rotenstreich calls a 
"cultural anthropology of metaphysics," which "does not dis-
tinguish between the intention and the intentionality of a 
metaphysical system which attempts to be categorical" (CEPC, 
179-221; esp. 179-80, 197-99). 
From this seeming dead end two escapes are possible: 
expansion and revision. Both are represented by essays in the 
Krausz volume. The first is taken by Errol Harris. Like Ru-
binoff, Harris is a sympathetic student of Collingwood and of 
the great idealists of this and the last centuries, and he 
supplements Collingwood's thought by evoking a frankly ideal-
istic context for it. But unlike Rubinoff, Harris does not he-
sitate to criticize some of Collingwood's positions as unten-
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able. 19 In his essay for the Krausz volume, Harris renews 
his argument with Gilbert Ryle over Collingwood's defense of 
the ontological argument, first carried out in the pages of 
Mind in 1935 and 1936, just after Collingwood's Essay on 
-
Philosophical Method was published. 20 Ryle had argued that 
c&lingwood's use of Anselm's argument made the common ideal-
istic mistake of thinking that concrete matters of fact (con-
cerning the existence of anything whatever) could be estab-
lished by the use of ~ priori arguments that can only es-
tablish their conclusions hypothetically. Harris' response 
is to defend the idealist's use of such arguments by showing 
the legitimacy of "categorical universal" judgments, "the 
concrete universal" of Bosanquet and Bradley, and the Abso-
lute of Hegel (CEPC, 113-33). 
Michael Krausz, on the other hand, takes the alterna-
tive route. Collingwood had said in the Essay on Metaphysics 
19cf. Errol E. Harris, "Collingwood on Eternal Prob-
lems," Philosophical Quarterly, I, no. 3 (April, 1951), pp. 
228-41. Reprinted in his Nature, Mind and Modern Science (London, 1954), pp. 3-42. -- --
20G. Ryle, "Mr. Collingwood and the Ontological Argu-
ment," Mind, XLIV (April, 1935), pp. 137-51; E. E. Harris, 
"Mr. Ryle and the Ontological Argument," Mind, XLV (October, 
1937), pp. 474-80; G. Ryle, "Back to the Ontological Argu-
ment," Mind, XLVI (January, 1937), pp. 53-57. These essays 
are printed in John H. Hick and Arthur C. McGill, eds., The 
Many-Faced Argument (New York, 1967), pp. 246-74. 
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(1) that all questions have presuppositions from which they 
logically arise; (2) that to be true or false a proposition 
has to be an answer to a question; and (3) that absolute pre-
suppositions are neither true nor false because they are not 
answers to questions, but stand relative to all questions, 
in a body of inquiry, as their presuppositions. Krausz ar-
gues that Collingwood's formulation of the relation of ab-
solute presuppositions may be interpreted to mean either that 
it cannot be the answer to a question in any given systematic 
inquiry, or in any systematic inquiry whatever. In the second 
case it is impossible to explain how what is taken as an ab-
solute presupposition at one time can become a relative pre-
supposition (i.e. one that is itself an answer to a question, 
and therefore verifiably true or false) at another. Krausz's 
strategy is to argue in favor of the first interpretation, 
which involves altering Collingwood's theory of meaning to 
conform with more contemporarily acceptable accounts, notably 
that of P. F. Strawson, which allow for senses of truth and 
falsity not specified by Collingwood (CEPC, 222-40). 
It is unnecessary to delve any further into Krausz's 
collection of critical essays, 21 since we have at this point 
21 There are included in this volume illuminating arti-
cles by W. von Leyden, Peter Jones, and Richard Wollheim on 
Collingwood's esthetics and philosophy of mind; by Leon J. 
Goldstein on the constitution of the historical past (which 
deserves special marks for its care in comparing Collingwood's 
actual historical praxis, in his writings on Roman Britain, 
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a fairly synoptic overview of the range of alternatives avail-
able to the reader interested in finding out the extent of 
Collingwood's coherence--or incoherence--as a philosopher. 
Many of these ideas and issues will arise again in chapters 
to come, but before stating our own reasons for rejecting the 
approaches of the principal interpreters of Collingwood some 
sort of summary of conclusions is in order. Table I sets 
forth observations which seem to follow from our brief survey 
of Collingwood's interpreters. 
We shall see in Chapter II that the list of issues 
which we have found to be the central core of concern to Col-
lingwood's interpreters turns out, interestingly enough, to 
be the very set of issues that Collingwood himself presents 
in his Autobiography. And yet not one of the contributors to 
this volume of essays seriously considered the Autobiography 
as an interpretation valid for the whole of his philosophy. 
This is all the more the pity, because it seems that Colling-
wood is worthy of at least that degree of attention that he 
lavished on the unfortunate Albert Memorial during his mili-
with the theory of historical imagination in The Idea of His-
tory--perhaps the first time an author has approached Colling-
wood's work on the philosophy of history on his own terms); 
by Sherman M. Stanage on "Collingwood's Phenomenology of Edu-
cation: Person and the Self-Recognition of the Mind" (based 
on a few scant remarks by Collingwood on the spearker-hearer 
situation and the learning of language, in The Principles of 
Art); and by A. J. M. Milne on Collingwood's ethics and poli-
tical theory (which might serve as an antidote to Walsh's re-
marks in an earlier essay about Collingwood's lack of appre-
ciation for the social sciences.) 
TABLE 1 
THE INTERPRETATIONS OF COLLINGWOOD'S PHILOSOPHY 
1. The major issues with which Collingwood's interpreters 
are concerned are: 
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a. his attitudes towards, and arguments about, realism 
and idealism; 
b. his formulation of the logic of questions, answers, 
and presuppositions, and in general his position on 
philosophical methodology; 
c. his remarks about the nature of history and the re-
lationship of history to philosophy, and especially 
of history to metaphysics; and 
d. the way or ways inwhich he worked out a reconcili-
ation of all the disparate forms of knowledge (reli-
gion, art, science, history, philosophy) within an 
overall philosophy of mind. 
2. The major alternatives which interpreters have presented 
for dealing with the central paradoxes of Collingwood's 
philosophy are as follows: 
a. since Collingwood's philosophy is not coherent as it 
stands, it is necessary to divide his published works 
into two or more groups, based on the contradictory 
premises on which they are based, and then argue the 
relative merits of one group over the other or others; 
b. since Collingwood's philosophy is not coherent as it 
stands, it is necessary to propose a revision of a por-
tion of it in order to render the remainder coherent; 
c. since Collingwood's philosophy is coherent as it stands, 
its apparent inconsistency can be resolved by assimi-
lating it to a larger and more complete schema--e.g. 
historical idealism; 
d. since Collingwood's philosophy is coherent as it stands, 
its apparent inconsistency can be resolved by showing 
the essential core of truth or coherence that unifies 
its diverse aspects. 
tary service in World War I. For in so much of what he 
writes he seems, like the lines he quotes from Wordsworth's 
"Leech-Gatherer" to describe this monument, 
Like one whom I had met with in a dream; 
Or like a man from some far region sent, 
To give me human strength, by apt admonishment (A, 29). 
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It would be apt, therefore, to admonish oneself as an inter-
preter of Collingwood to ask what relationship there is be-
tween what he did and what he had tried to do--the very ques-
tion he wished to put to Scott, the architect of the Albert 
Memorial--and to start by taking seriously what he said he 
had tried to do, before rejecting or revising what he did. 
4. On Interpreting Collingwood. 
The very issue that is at the center of controversy con-
cerning Collingwood's philosophy recoils upon the method an 
interpreter chooses to employ in dealing with that philosophy. 
For (1) if history and philosophy are not identical, then in 
dealing with Collingwood's philosophy in an historical manner, 
the question of its truth or falsity cannot arise: the his-
torian would merely point to the "facts" of the matter, re-
cord any lapses in coherence, and let the matter stand. And 
in dealing with it in a philosophical manner, all the works 
of Collingwood suddenly assume equal standing, and it becomes 
impossible to see how later positions develop out of earlier 
ones, or how one work has priority over another. One is there-
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fore stuck again with apparent contradictions in his funda-
mental assertions. But (2) if history and philosophy~ 
identical, then one cannot deal with Collingwood's philosophy 
in a non-evaluative manner: understanding what he said at 
various points in his career would therefore be only a pre-
lude to measuring its implicit promise against its explicit 
performance, and evaluating the outcome. But this alternative 
necessitates the evaluation of some texts as central and 
others as peripheral, and therefore choosing the "facts" to 
which one is to attend. 
But if in getting caught up in interpretative con-
troversies we were to sidestep the issue of truth in Colling-
wood's philosophy, we would be showing that we had not 
learned the main lessons he wished to teach us about his-
tory: to think historically is not to merely record facts 
and refrain from judgment. History is essentially a judg-
mental affair, because it involves selective attention to 
a chosen set of facts. This is supremely the case when it 
comes to the history of philosophy, where the "facts" to 
which the historian selectively attends are meanings and 
meaning-complexes. One must therefore take a philosopher 
for what he said (because this constitutes all the evidence 
we have for what he was thinking) but only as a symbol for 
for what he meant. Conflicts in evidence (e.g. contradic-
tion in the texts) may make it difficult or impossible to get 
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beyond the symbol to the meaning, but this then is the point 
at which the borders between history and philosophy become 
precarious. But since so much of Collingwood's thought re-
sides here, we must not fear to explore these disputed 
territories. 
To think philosophically about the past, according 
to Collingwood, is also to take it as intentional--that is, 
as something already deliberated upon and thought about with 
us in mind as the intended heirs to a mental estate. The ques-
tion one ought to ask with respect to Collingwood's philosophy 
should then be not what chronological series of literary 
events occurred in his lifetime, but rather what order or se-
quence of thoughts he intended for his readers to follow if 
they are to understand his thinking. Now it is in his Auto-
biography that Collingwood publicly specified for his phil-
osophical heirs what sort of program he wished them to in-
herit, and in it he tried to make clear how they should pro-
ceed to lay claim to this inheritance. We therefore re-
spectfully decline to accept the limited inheritance offered 
to us by Mr. T. M. Knox, and declare our intentions to carry 
our suit to a higher court. In doing so we propose to accept 
his Autobiography as Collingwood's only public, legal will. 
In arguing our case we shall seriously attempt to live 
up to the highest standards of historical scholarship--these 
standards being those governing the philosophical interpreta-
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tion of another philosopher's literary remains. Most of the 
canons for such an endeavor are usually given in negative 
terms. Two of them were cited by Collingwood himself in the 
Autobiography: (1) never accept criticism of any author be-
fore satisfying yourself of its relevance; and (2) recon-
struct the problem, or never think you understand any state-
ment made by a philosopher until you have decided, with the 
utmost possible accuracy, what the question is to which he 
means it for an answer (A, 74). To these we add the five in-
terpreter's fallacies stated by Richard Robinson22 (which we 
shall number consecutively to the two Collingwood canons just 
cited). One should avoid committing any or all of the follow-
ing atrocities to a philosophical text: (3) mosaic interpre-
tation (the habit of laying any amount of weight on an isolat-
ed text or single sentence, without determining whether it is 
a passing remark or a settled part of your author's thinking); 
(4) misinterpretation by abstraction (assuming that because an 
author mentions X and X appears to the interpreter to be a 
case of Y, that the author also meant, asserted, or was aware 
of Y); (6) the fallacy of insinuating the future (assuming 
22Richard Robinson, Plato's Earlier Dialectic (Oxford, 
1953), pp. 1-5. It is interesting that Robinson seems to en-
vision the task of an interpreter in terms which sound like 
a direct quotation from Collingwood: "The purpose of an in-
terpreter . . . is to make himself and others rethink the very 
thoughts that were thought by someone long ago. Interpreta-
tion is not just any sort of commentary, including the revela-
tion of the historical causes and consequences of a given 
thought. It is the re-creation of that thought" (Ibid., 
pp. 5-6). 
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that the author held doctrines that did not become explicit 
until later); and (7) going beyond a thinker's last word 
(ascribing to him not merely all the steps he took in a cer-
tain direction but the next step too). 23 
There may be more rules than this, but these are the 
most helpful ones this author has ever encountered, and suf-
fice for the task at hand. They serve to eliminate every in-
terpretation of Collingwood that has yet been offered. For 
(1) would it not be an error to accept Knox's criticism of 
Collingwood's radical conversion to historicism as a lapse 
into dogmatism and scepticism due to a cerebrovascular acci-
dent, without satisfying ourselves first that it is relevant? 
And (2) would it not be a mistake to reconstruct Colling-
wood's mature philosophy of mind, as Donagan does, without 
understanding what the question was to which it was meant for 
an answer? And was this question not "How can a thinking 
person understand his own mind without resorting to the errors 
of realism?" And (3) is it not a mosaic interpretation when 
Rubinoff takes the metaphorical remark in Speculum Mentis 
about the three ways the "prize of truth" may be awarded, and 
then erects on this frail motif the "three ontological levels 
of consciousness" on which are mapped all of Collingwood's 
23we also declare ourselves bound by the full set of 
grammatical and logical rules necessary for any discourse to 
make sense and be coherent. These we omit stating because 
they are assumed in any piece of rational inquiry. 
writings, from books to essays to letters and even transla-
tions?24 And (4) is it not a case of misinterpretation by 
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abstraction when Mink rules out Collingwood's views on reli-
gion and its philosophy (in the book by that name) on the 
grounds that they are not dialectical? For how does Mink know 
that because Collingwood argues that philosophy is at least 
dialectical that he would accept the further statement that 
that is all it is? Does he not say it is also analytical, 
and is that not what he is engaged in doing in Religion and 
Philosophy? And (5) is it not a case of misinterpretation by 
inference to assert, as once again Donagan does, that because 
in Speculum Mentis Collingwood connected the doctrine of real-
ism to the mental function of abstraction, and argued that all 
abstraction is falsification, and then later in The Principles 
of Art argues (if he in fact did so) that all concepts are 
abstract, that he therefore "repudiated" his earlier rejection 
of realism? And (6) is it not an insinuation of the future 
to argue, as Donagan does, that Collingwood's philosophy of 
mind is a specimen of linguistic analysis of the sort carried 
out in Ryle's Concept of Mind, and then to assert (on the de-
ception of this analogy with Ryle) that it is fundamentally 
anti-Cartesian? But on the other hand (if we may be per-
24 r do not wish to imply that Rubinoff is the only inter-
preter to commit this error: Donagan and Mink are equally 
guilty of mosaic interpretation--Donagan's four principles of 
the philosophy of mind and Mink's tri-partite dialectic of ex-
perience, concepts, and mind are also examples of it. 
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mitted to invent a new version of (6), is it not an insinu-
ation of the past to justify Collingwood's philosophy of mind, 
as Rubinoff does, by appeal to the idealism of Hegel? And 
(7) is it not going beyond an author's last word to argue, 
as Rubinoff does, that because Collingwood took several steps 
in the direction of a descriptive phenomenology of conscious-
ness in Speculum Mentis, that he therefore would take the next 
step too, and endorse a "transcendental phenomenology" of 
mind (CRM, 54, 152-53, 311-15)? 
And yet historical scholarship, like history itself, 
is a developmental process, as Collingwood says, in which 
successive terms sum up and go beyond previous terms without 
being necessitated by them. Our own interpretation of Col-
lingwood is itself subject to this description. Therefore 
in what follows we shall see how Collingwood's philosophy, 
in senses yet to be specified, displays most of the charac-
teristics that his interpreters have attributed to it--per-
haps even some that they did not: 
(1) As Knox points out, Collingwood's most apparent 
problem is his "historicism"--his tendency to identify philos-
ophy with history; and beyond this is a deeper, less apparent 
problem of establishing a workable relationship between meta-
physics (which Collingwood recognized to be at the center of 
philosophy) and religious faith. And as Knox (and later such 
authors as Walsh, Toulmin, and Rotenstreich) argue, his final 
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position as stated in the Essay on Metaphysics does display 
aspects both sceptical and dogmatic. But unlike Knox, we 
find no need to posit a radical reversal in his philosophy, 
and by viewing the paradoxical statements of the Essay on 
Metaphysics in the light of the overall philosophical ori-
entation provided in his Autobiography, and the development 
of his thought in his published writings, this dogmatism and 
scepticism are transformed into something more akin to con-
viction and necessary self-criticism--philosophical virtues 
rather than vices. For there is no need to take the Essay 
on Metaphysics as a work all by itself, abstracted from his 
other writings. When restored to its rightful context, its 
central paradox is illuminated and refined, and the limits of 
its applicability are re-established; metaphysics may be more 
than an historical science, but Collingwood's point is that 
it is at least that. 
(2) And as Donagan argues, Collingwood's unique 
achievement in his later writings is a philosophy of mind that 
is carried out by arguments which stress the importance of 
expressive, linguistic structures in the life of thought. 
But unlike Donagan we find no grounds for arguing that his 
final philosophy of mind "repudiates" his earlier anti-
realistic stance, or even that it was "anti-Cartesian" or 
anti-intuitional in denying the thesis that self-consciousness 
is possible at all. The linguistic basis for his conclusions 
50 
was present even in his early writings, and he never varied 
in his assault on what he took to be the main tenet of real-
istic philosophy. For Collingwood, refuting this central 
tenet does not mean maintaining that "all abstraction is 
falsification," as Donagan thinks, but rather it involves 
showing that the proposition "knowing makes no difference to 
the object known" is false. 
(3) And as Mink argues, the central "figure in the 
carpet" of Collingwood's philosophy is recognizable in the 
methodology first explicitly spelled out in the Essay on 
Philosophical Method--a work that is, as Knox first said it 
was, a philosophical classic. We also will agree that the 
philosophy of mind that Collingwood worked out in his later 
writings exhibits the structure of a scale of forms, a struc-
ture first exhibited in Speculum Mentis, which Mink calls 
Collingwood's first dialectical book. However we find no 
need to argue, as Mink does, that Collingwood "discovered" 
dialectic after writing Religion and Philosophy, nor that 
Collingwood had no sympathy or interest in the philosophy of 
religion. On the contrary we will find that Collingwood's 
philosophy is profoundly religious, and although he discon-
tinued talking about "absolute knowledge" in his later writ-
ings, he modified his view of a philosophical absolute rather 
than dropping it altogether (as his discussion of the onto-
logical argument in both the Essay on Philosophical Method 
and the Essay on Metaphysics shows). And although some of 
the functions of a philosophical absolute were taken over 
by "absolute presuppositions," it is clear that Collingwood 
took as one of the absolute presuppositions of contemporary 
science the doctrine of Christianity that God exists. 
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(4) And as Rubinoff argues, Collingwood's philosophy 
as a whole cannot be understood apart from his overall ori-
entation towards a rapprochement of the alienating forces ty-
pical of the contemporary human situation. The paradigm for 
this rapprochement was indeed the relation of philosophy and 
history, which the position Collingwood called "realism" was 
committed to ignoring. And the means that Collingwood used 
to re-establish continuity between forms of knowledge was by 
arguments which are, in some sense of the term, "idealistic," 
relying as they do on premises that are incompatible with the 
realistic thesis that "knowing makes no difference to the ob-
ject known." However there is no need to call in Hegel's 
aufheben--or even Bradley's experiential Absolute--to save 
Collingwood's rapprochement project. If because of irrecon-
cilable contradictions on fundamental issues Collingwood's 
philosophy cannot be approached on its own terms, it must be 
declared to be to that extent inconsistent and in need of re-
vision, rather than declared to be incomplete and in need of 
assimilation to, or absorption by, the philosophy of Hegel. 
If we are in debt to Rubinoff for exposing the fallacy of the 
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"radical conversion hypothesis," we also declare ourselves 
free of his own fallacy, the "radical consistency hypothesis." 
The plain fact is that Collingwood did change his mind on se-
veral issues, and stated publicly that he had done so--but not 
on the fundamental issues discussed in the Autobiography, as 
we shall see. 
In short, the thesis of our interpretation is that it 
is possible to make sense of Collingwood on his own terms, if 
we are careful to avoid making the errors of our interpreta-
tive predecessors. Perhaps by so doing we shall avoid the 
wrath of the shade of Collingwood, who warned us of a haunt-
ing should we fail to take heed to the requirements of phil-
osophical interpretation: 
The reader . . . must approach his philosophical author 
precisely as if he were a poet, in the sense that he must 
seek in his work the expression of an individual experi-
ence, something which the writer has actually lived 
through, and something which the reader must live through 
in his turn by entering into the writer's mind with his 
own. To this basic and ultimate task of following or 
understanding his author, coming to see what he means by 
sharing his experience, the task of criticizing his doc-
trine, or determining how far it is true and how far 
false, is altogether secondary. A good reader, like a 
good listener, must be quiet in order to be attentive; 
able to refrain from obtruding his own thoughts, the bet-
ter to apprehend those of the writer; not passive, but 
using his activity to follow where he is led, not to find 
a path of his own. A writer who does not deserve this 
silent, uninterrupting attention does not deserve to be 
read at all (EPM, 215). 
CHAPTER II 
THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL INTERPRETATION OF 
COLLINGWOOD'S PHILOSOPHY 
1. The Autobiography as Literary Evidence. 
In an essay written just two years prior to the pub-
lication of his own Autobiography, Collingwood wrote the fol-
lowing account of the requirements for adequate autobiograph-
ical composition: 
If anyone of us were setting out to compose such an ac-
count ((viz. an autobiography - ''a strictly historical ac-
count of my own past")), he would be confronted with two 
kinds of tasks .... The first task is that of recol-
lecting: he must search his memory for a vision of past 
experiences, and use various means of stimulating it, 
for example by reading letters and books that he once 
wrote, revisiting places associated in his mind with cer-
tain events, and so forth. When this is done, he has be-
fore his mind a spectacle of the relevant parts of his 
own past life; he sees a young man undergoing such and 
such experiences, and knows that this young man was him-
self. But now begins the second task. He must not merely 
know that this young man was himself, he must try to re-
discover that young man's thoughts. And here recollec-
tion is a treacherous guide . . . because thought is not 
wholly entangled in the flow of experience, so that we 
constantly reinterpret our past thoughts and assimilate 
them to those we are thinking now. There is only one way 
in which this tendency is to be checked. If I want to be 
sure that twenty years ago ~ certain thought was-ieaiiy--
in ~mind, l must have evidence of it. That evidence 
must be a book or letter or the like that I then wrote 
.... Only by having some such evidence before me, and 
interpreting it fairly and squarely, can I prove to myself 
that I did think thus. Having done so, I rediscover my 
past self, and re-enact these thoughts as my thoughts; 
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judging now better than I could then, it is to be hoped, 
their merits and defects. (IH, 295-96, emphasis mine.) 
It would be hard to believe that a trained archeolo-
gist and historian, having just written such a clear account 
of the criteria for autobiography, an account which expresses 
such a hard-headed view of what counts as evidence for such 
a literary project, could have forgotten about them complete-
ly when it came time two years later to write his own auto-
biography. Yet such is the charge of more than one of Col-
lingwood's interpreters--including the man Collingwood named 
as his literary executor (cf. IH, x-xi). 
Since the charge has been made it must be confronted 
in the same spirit of historical objectivity to which Col-
lingwood himself subscribed. In the second part of his task, 
Collingwood wrote, "there is nothing which the autobiographer 
does ... that the historian could not do for another" (IH, 
296). If the autobiographer, in short, performs his task 
with the same rigor that is expected of historians, he func-
tions as an historian of a subject matter which merely hap-
pens to be the events of his own life. If in fact Colling-
wood was in good faith with this principle when he wrote his 
Autobiography (and he at least claimed that he was--see A, 
107 and "Preface"), his own interpretation of his intellec-
tual development (and this is the main concern of the Auto-
biography) stands as one among other such interpretations, 
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each of which must be judged in accordance with the same cri-
teria: each must be an interpretation of Collingwood's 
thought, based on the evidence provided by Collingwood's pub-
lished writings, critically evaluated. 
One serious objection to taking the Autobiography in 
this way is that at the time Collingwood wrote it (1938) two 
of his major works (An Essay on Metaphysics and The New Levi-
athan) and several articles had not yet been written. Con-
sequently a good part of his interpretation of what his phil-
osophy actually achieves remains speculation about what he in-
tended it to achieve, and not what, on the basis of documen-
tary evidence, it already had achieved. It is because his 
work remained incomplete at the time of the writing of his 
Autobiography that several of his interpreters have felt jus-
tified in rejecting the latter and arguing that his later 
works break entirely with the positions he had maintained 
prior to his writing of the Autobiography. 
But while it is certainly quite appropriate to raise 
the question of the de facto adherence of these later works 
to the philosophical doctrines of Collingwood's earlier wri-
tings, or of the adherence of both of these to the interpre-
tation offered in the Autobiography, it is capriciously ar-
bitrary at best, and maliciously prejudicial at worst, to ex-
clude the latter as a possible interpretation valid for the 
whole of Collingwood's philosophy, including the later works. 
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That the Autobiography should not be allowed a privileged 
position among the interpretations offered of Collingwood's 
philosophy is a defensible corollary of the principle cited 
by Collingwood above (viz. that correct autobiography is an 
application of correct historiography); but that it should be 
given no consideration is just as clearly ruled out by the 
same principle. 
A second objection is that in addition to proposing 
an interpretation or an account of the development of his 
thought, Collingwood's Autobiography also cites evidence to 
support this interpretation, and since some of this evidence 
is not publicly available, the interpretation based on this 
evidence is also open to question. 
Now the evidence in the Autobiography is of three 
sorts: (1) direct statements by Collingwood of positions he 
holds, at least at the time of the writing of the Autobiogra-
£by; (2) references to published works that he had completed 
some years before, some with and some without qualifying re-
marks to indicate the extent to which he still agreed or dis-
agreed with what he had written; and (3) references to un-
published manuscripts. Certainly there is no difficulty with 
taking statements from the first group as evidence that as of 
1938 Collingwood held the positions that he says he does. 
And just as certainly, statements from the second can be 
checked for their accuracy by consulting the published works 
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to which they refer. Where such reference is factually mis-
taken, one can only register the lapse and credit Collingwood 
only as holding to the position he is discussing (if he gives 
textual indication of it) as his own as of 1938. The third 
group requires special comment. 
In the Autobiography Collingwood refers to four pieces 
of documentary evidence that he gives every indication of hav-
ing consulted during his composition of the text, but which 
are not accessible to other historians. Two of these docu-
ments--an unpublished book called Truth and Contradiction 
which he wrote in 1917, and a book-length essay written in 
1920 and jokingly entitled Libellus de Generatione (as if 
written by one of the Italian idealists)--were destroyed by 
Collingwood after he wrote the Autobiography (A, 42, 99, and 
99 n.l). The other two may still exist: one is a paper he 
wrote around 1918 and read to his colleagues at Oxford, but 
apparently never published (A, 44); the other is a 1928 paper 
which he calls his "Die manuscript" (because it was written 
at a country-house at Le Martouret near Die in France), and 
which he may have published under a more descriptive title 
(A, 107). Of these four documents the first two were seen by 
at least one other person apiece--the first by "a publisher" 
to whom it was sent (and by whom it was refused) (A, 42); and 
the second by Guido de Ruggiero, "for whom I typed a copy, 
thinking that it might amuse him as an historian of philoso-
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phy" (A, 99). Whether the latter copy still exists is, to 
my knowledge, unknown; but in any event no one has questioned 
the fact that the original 1917 and 1920 manuscripts did 
exist until Collingwood destroyed them. The 1918 Oxford pa-
per may be among those unpublished papers still in the posses-
sion of Mrs. Kathleen F. Collingwood. If in fact he did pub-
lish the "Die manuscript" under a different title, it is still 
identifiable only in terms of the content he assigns to it, 
and is hence not unimpeachable evidence. 
Since the remainder of the pieces of literary evi-
dence that Collingwood cites in the Autobiography refer to 
books and articles still publicly available, such evidence is 
not in question, and one can still test his interpretation by 
comparing it with the relevant texts. The case is not so 
clear with respect to the four items mentioned above, and 
hence they must be treated as evidence of nothing more than 
what Collingwood's views were at the time of his writing of 
the Autobiography. The doctrines that Collingwood claims to 
have espoused in these docuQents, insofar as he mentions what 
these doctrines are, and insofar as he does not directly re-
pudiate the position stated, must be treated just like the 
other direct and contentful statements he makes in the Auto-
biography--that is, they must be taken as stating doctrines 
that he does not assign only to one period or to one document, 
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but puts forward as positions that he currently held. 1 
1since the issue is crucial for the interpretation of 
Collingwood's philosophy as contained in Autobiography, and 
since the issue is made so sensitive by later writers on Col-
lingwood's philosophy, at the risk of tedium I propose the 
following propositional version of what I take to be the limits 
of autobiographical interpretation: 
Supposing in manuscript M1 at time T1 an interpreter 
finds author A1 making these statements: 
sl: "I hold P II 1 
S2: "In M at T2 I held Pz 
II 
2 
S3: "I still hold Pz II 
Then an interpreter is justified in making at least 
the following assertions: 
Il:Ml is evidence that Al held sl, sz, and s3 at Tl. 
Iz:Ml is evidence that Al held pl and Pz at T1 . 
He is clearly not justified if he were to say: 
I 3 :M1 is evidence that~ held P2 at T2 . 
He is not justified because I 3 is not constructable on 
the basis of s 1- s 3 of M1 . It is valid on the evidence of M2 
only if M2 at T2 contains the assertion, "I hold P2 ." In 
short, s 2 is itself an interpretation requiring M2 for its 
justifying evidence. The situation is not changed if the in-
terpreter is the author himself, and the manuscripts are his 
own writings. 
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2. The Autobiography as Historical Interpretation. 
Prior to the Autobiography Collingwood had published 
only four philosophical works: Religion and Philosophy 
(1916), Speculum Mentis (1924), An Essay on Philosophical 
Method (1933), and The Principles of Art (1938). The latter 
two were intended as part of a projected series of philosophi-
cal works, about which we will have more to say presently. 
Concerning the former two Collingwood has several remarks in 
the Autobiography. Religion and Philosophy had been written 
"some years earlier" than 1916 "to tidy up and put behind me 
a number of thoughts arising out of my juvenile studies in 
theology" (A, 43). The main effect of these studies, at 
least for the development of his later thought, was his re-
cognition of the falsity of the claim that empirical psychol-
ogy had "already exploded the pretensions and inherited the 
possessions of the old pseudo-sciences of logic, ethics, po-
litical theory, and so forth," and was hence the science of 
human affairs the world was seeking (A, 92). 
If this claim never for a moment deceived me, that is a 
benefit I owed to my early studies in theology. Like 
every one else who studied that subject in those days, I 
read William James' Varieties of Religious Experience 
and a lot of other books in which religion was treated 
from a psychological point of view . . . . I was pro-
foundly shocked by the Varieties . . . because the whole 
thing was a fraud. The book professed to throw light on 
a certain subject, and threw no light on it whatever. 
And that because of the method used. It was not because 
the book was a bad example of psychology, but because it 
~as a good example of psychology, that it left its sub-
Ject completely unilluminated. And in Religion and Phil-
osophy I attacked, not William James, but any and every 
psychological treatment of religion, in a passage of 
which the crucial words are "the mind, regarded in this 
way, ceases to be mind at all." (A, 93).2 
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According to the above account, then, Collingwood's first pub-
lished philosophical work attacked the psychologistic reduc-
tions of religion and mind to neuropathology and physiology 
respectively, defending them as on the contrary functions of 
consciousness, reason, and will (cf. A, 94-95). 
His second philosophical work attempted to establish 
a position independently of idealism, but repudiating realism 
--a position which belonged to no recognizable or ready-made 
class. 
I became used to it ... when ((for example)) one of the 
"realists" (not an Oxford man), reviewing the first book 
in which I tried toindicate my position, dismissed it in 
a few lines as "the usual idealistic nonsense." The book 
was Speculum Mentis, published in 1924. It was a bad book 
in many ways. The position laid down in it was incomplete-
ly thought out and unskillfully expressed . . . . But any 
one who had been intelligent enough to see what I was 
trying to say would have realized ... that it was nei-
ther "usual" nor "idealistic." (A, 56-57). 
In a footnote to this passage Collingwood adds that, having 
just re-read Speculum Mentis for the first time since it was 
published, he found it better than he had remembered. 
2The exact words are: "The mind, regarded in this ex-
ternal way, really ceases to be a mind at all. To study a 
man's consciousness without studying the thing of which he is 
c~nscious is not knowledge of anything, but barren and trif-
h.ng abstraction." (RP, 42; FR, 77). 
It is a record, not so very obscure in expression, of a 
good deal of genuine thinking. If much of it now fails 
to satisfy me, that is because I have gone on thinking 
since I wrote it, and therefore much of it needs to be 
supplemented and qualified. There is not a great deal 
that needs to be retracted. (A, 56, n. 1). 
Surprisingly enough, this is as much as Collingwood 
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has to say in his Autobiography about his first two published 
philosophical books. For the remaining evidence that his 
ideas developed as he said they did in the period from 1912 
to 1932 Collingwood refers the reader to the short articles 
he published in philosophical periodicals, "where they were 
rendered useless by the fixed determination of the persons who 
read such periodicals not to think about history" (A, 116, n. 
1). Two volumes of these essays have appeared since Colling-
wood's death (EPA in 1964 and EPH in 1965). His first two 
books and these essays (several of which are included by Knox 
in the concluding portions of The Idea of History are the only 
sources presently available for critically reconstructing the 
development of Collingwood's philosophy during the period 
prior to the appearance of the Autobiography. 
What sort of conclusion then can one draw from a care-
ful reading of the Autobiography concerning Collingwood's de-
velopment as a philosopher? Every indication in the Autobiog-
raphy leads the reader to conclude that if there was any "de-
velopment' of his ideas, during which time a possible change of 
mind may have occurred, it was in the period from 1912 to 1932 
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(A, 23, 28, 116-17), and that after 1932 he was engaged in 
preparing his conclusions for publication. 
The ideas very briefly summarized in this chapter ((viz. 
ch. X--"History as the Self-Knowledge of Mind")) and the 
two preceding it were being worked out for nearly twenty 
years after I became a teacher of philosophy ((in 1912)). 
They were repeatedly written down, corrected, and re-
written .... None of these writings has ever been in-
tended for publication, although much of their substance 
has been repeatedly given in lecture form; but I am pub-
lishing this short summary because the main problems are 
now ((i.e. in 1938)) solved, and publishing them in full 
is only a question of time and health. (A, 116-17). 
Both of these conditions, however, were to prove problematic: 
By about 1930 my health was beginning to suffer from long-
continued overwork . . . . By this time I had in my head 
a great deal which I believed the public would value; and 
the only way of giving it to the public was by writing 
books. On this, therefore, I decided to spend my leisure; 
and planned a series, to begin with an Essay on Philosoph-
ical Method. This I wrote during a long illness in 1932. 
It is my best book in matter; in style, I may call it my 
only book, for it is the only one I ever had the time to 
finish as well as I knew how, instead of leaving it in a 
more or less rough state. After settling accounts with my 
archeological studies ... I wrote in 1937 the second 
book of my series, The Principles of Art. Before it had 
gone through the press I was overtaken by the more serious 
illness which gave me both the leisure and the motive to 
write this autobiography; whose purpose is to put on re-
cord some brief account of the work I have not yet been 
able to publish, in case I am not able to publish it in 
full. Henceforth I shall spend all my available time in 
going on with the series. (A, 117-18). 
This passage is crucial for any attempt to reconcile 
Collingwood's later philosophy to the interpretation of it of-
fered in the Autobiography. It will be the purpose of the 
later chapters of this dissertation to examine the extent to 
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which this program--his "series"--was carried out. Right now 
I merely wish to make two observations. First, Collingwood 
leaves no doubt that he considers the Essay on Philosophical 
Method as the key to understanding his mature philosophy. 
Even the Autobiography itself, the purpose of which is clearly 
stated in the text just quoted, is regarded as an interim re-
port of work in progress. No other work is singled out for 
such high marks, and consequently any account of his mature 
philosophy which ignores it must do so in defiance of Colling-
wood's own clearly stated intentions. 
Secondly, Collingwood gives no indication in the Auto-
biography of any radical change of mind either before or after 
he had begun his "series." He therefore clearly intends his 
readers to approach the body of his later writings (i.e. 
after 1932) as the fulfillment of a single-minded project, and 
the earlier writings as a development leading up to it. An 
interpretation of Collingwood's philosophy would be consis-
tent with the plan of the Autobiography only if it follows 
this pattern. 
3. The Autobiographical Interpretation: Four Themes. 
"My life's work hitherto, as seen from my fiftieth 
year," wrote Collingwood approximately five years before his 
death, "has been in the main an attempt to bring about a 
rapprochement between philosophy and history" (A, 77). The 
entire problem concerning Collingwood's mature philosophy is 
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contained in this sentence, and especially in the meaning of 
the term, rapprochement. According to Knox and Donagan the 
reconciliation which Collingwood outlines in the Autobiography, 
and continues in the Essay on Metaphysics, amounts to nothing 
short of radical historicism: philosophy as a separate dis-
cipline is liquidated by being absorbed into history (IH, x). 
According to Mink and Rubinoff no such reduction occurs in 
Collingwood's philosophy, since the rapprochement is dialec-
tical in nature, and in a dialectical relation the relata are 
not separate or mutually exclusive, but rather "overlap" (a 
technical term the meaning of which will be examined in Chap-
ter 9). 
In the Autobiography neither of these positions is di-
rectly supported. There is no mention of any serious change 
of mind, or of any radical reduction of philosophy to history; 
and there is no discussion of dialectic or dialectical rela-
tions. After two introductory chapters ("Bent of a Twig" 
and "Spring Frost") recounting his early educational experi-
ences at home and at Rugby (1902-08), there follows two chap-
ters ("Minute Philosophers" and "Inclination of a Sapling") 
on Collingwood's encounters with the Oxford Realists, first 
as a loyal, but somewhat sceptical student initiate, and 
later as a rebelliously independent tutor. Chapter V ("Ques-
tion and Answer") encompasses the years (1915-18) of his 
work in the Admiralty Intelligence Division during World War 
I, during which time his daily communings with the grotesque 
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Albert Memorial led to the development of his "question and 
answer logic" 3 which was to be the foundation of all his later 
philosophical and historical work. Chapter VI ("The Decay of 
Realism") records his return to Oxford in 1918 as a complete 
opponent of Oxford realism. The next five chapters ("The 
History of Philosophy," "The Need for a Philosophy of His-
tory," "The Foundations of the Future," "History as the Self-
Knowledge of Mind," and "Roman Britain") deal with the gra-
dual development of his views on historical and philosophical 
thinking, listing the principles which became part of his ma-
ture philosophy of history, and giving some indication of the 
progress of his work on the archeology of Roman Britain. A 
final chapter ("Theory and Practice") records his political 
views, especially concerning fascism and socialism, and his 
assessment of the rapidly degenerating situation in pre-
World War II Europe. 
Even from this brief topical survey one can see that 
four themes dominate the Autobiography's interpretation of 
Collingwood's philosophy. (1) Out of a total of twelve chap-
ters, no less than three (III, IV, and VI) deal with Colling-
wood's reaction to Oxford realism, and the theme recurs 
throughout Collingwood's discussion of his own positive con-
3Hereafter "Question and Answer" will be referred to 
by the abbreviation, Q-A: e.g., "question and answer logic" 
appears as "Q-A logic." 
tributions to philosophy and history. In fact, as we shall 
see, the Autobiography exhibits a rather surprising consis-
tency when seen from the point of view of this rejection of 
realist doctrines. (2) Five chapters (VII through XI) are 
devoted, as one might expect, to Collingwood's overthrow, 
based on his rapprochement between philosophy and history, 
of the sceptical conclusions of the Oxford realists. (3) 
The key to this reconciliation is discussed in a crucial 
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chapter (V) on his "revolutionary" Q-A logic. (4) Finally, 
the theme of rapprochement is extended, in the final chapter, 
but also in remarks scattered throughout the other chapters, 
to other, philosophically opposing doctrines: theory and 
practice, freedom and obligation, etc. These four themes--
the critique of realism, Q-A logic, philosophy and history, 
and rapprochement philosophy--are central concepts in the 
autobiographical interpretation. 
4. The Critique of Realism. 
Collingwood writes that his tutors at Oxford were 
members of the "realist" school of philosophers, a school 
whose primary function was the destructive criticism of ideal-
ism, and which converged towards the "zero line of complete 
scepticism" (A, 18-19). 
When I began to read philosophy there in 1910, Oxford was 
still obsessed by what I will call the school of ((T. H.)) 
Green . . . . The philosophical tendencies common to this 
school were described by its contemporary opponents as 
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Hegelianism. This title was repudiated by the school 
itself, and rightly .... This movement never in any 
sense dominated philosophical thought and teaching at Ox-
ford .... \ihen I say that Green's school at this ~ime 
obsessed Oxford philosophy, what I mean is that the work 
of that school presented itself to most Oxford philoso-
phers as something which had to be destroyed, and in de-
stroying which they would be discharging their first duty 
to their subject. The question what positive views they 
themselves held was of secondary importance (A, 15, 16, 
19) . 
At the time of his graduation Collingwood felt that he was 
"logically bound to remain a 'realist'" until he had satisfied 
himself "either that the positive doctrines of the school were 
false, or that its critical methods were unsound" (A, 23) . In 
connection with the relation between methods and doctrine 
there appeared to be three alternatives, between which, he 
says, he did not decide until after he had begun to teach phil-
osophy at Oxford: (a) there was no connection between them 
(i.e., both were false); (b) the positive teachings were mis-
taken but the critical methods sound; or (c) the positive doc-
trines were correct but the critical methods were invalid. 
The fourth alternative--viz. that both the positive doctrines 
and the critical methods were valid--was apparently ruled out 
by Collingwood on the basis of the negativity of the latter: 
their positive teachings were incapable of resisting attack 
by their own critical methods (A, 23). 
Collingwood's description of this method is given in 
acid terms: 
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(T)he 'realists'' chief, and in the last resort, it seemed 
to me, only method was to analyze the position criticized 
into various propositions, and detect contradictions be-
tween these ... (f)ollowing as they did the rules of 
propositional logic .... (A, 42). 
on any given issue a realist would "fish the problem P out of 
the hyperuranian lucky-bag, hold it up, and say 'what did So-
and-so think about this?'" and only after this would they ask, 
"Is he right?" (A, 68-9). In short, they separated the his-
torical question, "What did X think about P?" from the phil-
osophical question, "Was X right in thinking A about P?" (A, 
27, 59). The presupposition of this procedure was that there 
were a set of "eternal problems" in philosophy, to which phil-
osophers gave various answers at various times (A, 60, 69). 
The answers given by different philosophers were to a presum-
ably identical set of questions--where "the sameness was the 
sameness of a 'universal', and the difference the difference 
between two instances of that universal" (A, 62). Since truth 
and falsity were regarded as properties of propositions (A, 
34), the "answers" could be compared to one another to see if 
they were contradictory or not (A, 40-42). 
As for the positive content, Collingwood writes that 
this consisted of a single assertion, dogmatically maintained: 
" except for ((the)) one nonsensical phrase ((that)) knowledge 
making no difference to what is known, 'realism' had no posi-
tive doctrines of its own at all but had stolen all that it 
had from the school of thought which it was primarily con-
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cerned to discredit" (A, 44-45). The dogma was propagated in 
a number of ways, all of which embody the central assertion in 
one way or another. In its metaphysical form it is the doc-
trine that "the known is independent of, and unaffected by, 
the knowing of it" (A, 45). In epistemology the "Oxford 'real-
ists' talked as if knowing were a simple 'intuiting' or a 
simple 'apprehending' of some 'reality"' (A, 25). 
What all these "realists" were saying, I thought, was that 
the condition of a knowing mind is not indeed a passive 
condition, for it is actively engaged in knowing; but a 
"simple" condition, one in which there are no complexi-
ties or diversities, nothing except just the knowing. 
They granted that a man who wanted to know something might 
have to work, in ways that might be very complicated, in 
order to "put himself in a position" from which it could 
be "apprehended"; but once the position had been attained 
there was nothing for him to do but "apprehend" it, or 
perhaps fail to "apprehend" it. (A, 25-26). 
As Collingwood paraphrased the way one member of the movement 
stated it, knowing is "the simple 'compresence' of two things, 
one of which ((is)) a mind" (A, 25). In ethics "the great 
principle of realism, that nothing is affected by being known" 
becomes the principle that "(m)oral philosophy is only the 
theory of moral action: It can't therefore make any difference 
to the practice of moral action" (A, 48). In political theory 
the realists denied "the conception of 'common good', the fun-
damental idea of all social life," by "insisting that all 
I d I goo s were private" (A, 49). 
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In Collingwood's estimation the net result of all this 
was nothing short of disastrous--for philosophy, for civiliza-
tion, and for the realist movement itself. In a gradual and 
piecemeal fashion, a process of self-stultification occurred 
within the ranks of the Oxford realists. 
In this process, by which anything that could be recog-
nized as a philosophical doctrine was stuck up and shot to 
pieces by the "realist" criticism, the "realists" little 
by little destroyed everything in the way of positive doc-
trine that they had ever possessed. (A, 49). 
But although "the fox was tailless, and knew it," he did not 
count it a misfortune: the realists 
were glad to have eradicated from the philosophical schools 
that confusion of philosophy with pulpit oratory which was 
involved in the bad old theory that moral philosophy is 
taught with a view to making the pupils better men. They 
were proud to have excogitated a philosophy so pure from 
the sordid taint of utility that they could lay their 
hands on their hearts and say it was no use at all; a phil-
osophy so scientific that no one whose life was not a life 
of pure research could appreciate it, and so abstruse that 
only a whole-time student, and a very clever man at that, 
could understand it. They were quite resigned to the con-
tempt of fools and amateurs. If anybody differed from 
them on these points, it could only be because his intel-
lect was weak or his motives bad. (A, 51). 
Collingwood writes that at the time of the outbreak of 
World War I he had not satisfactorily decided which of his three 
alternatives concerning Oxford realism was correct (A, 27-28). 
As far as he had advanced was to work out the first of his 
two rules for sound scholarship which he tried to instill in 
his students. 
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I ... taught my pupils, more by example than by pre-
cept, that they must never accept any criticism of any-
body's philosophy which they might hear or read without 
satisfying themselves by first-hand study that this was 
the philosophy he actually expounded; that they must al-
ways defer any criticism of their own until they were ab-
solutely sure they understood the text they were criticiz-
ing; and that if the postponement was sine die it did not 
greatly matter. (A, 27). 
"This did not as yet involve any attack" writes Collingwood, 
"upon the realists' critical methods" (A, 27). Using this 
rule himself he came to realize that with respect to what the 
realist movement primarily was--viz. an attack on "the school 
of Green"--they misspent their shot. The position they as-
saulted was not Hegelianism, nor was it even idealism in the 
proper sense (A, 15-16, 19). 
But when Collingwood returned to Oxford after the war 
he was already convinced that both the critical methods and 
the positive doctrines of the realists were in error (his 
first alternative) (A, 42, 44), and his "logic of question and 
answer," worked out during his wartime reflections on the Al-
bert Memorial, had led to a second pedagogic maxim: "recon-
struct the problem" or "never think you understand any state-
ment made by a philosopher until you have decided, with the 
utmost possible accuracy, what the question is to which he 
means it for an answer" (A, 74). 
In an (unpublished) paper read at Oxford in 1918, Col-
lingwood writes, he assailed the cardinal principle of the 
realists: 
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I read a paper to my colleagues, trying to convince them 
that ((the realists')) central positive doctrine, "know-
ing makes no difference to what is known", was meaning-
less. I argued that any one who claimed ... to be· sure 
of this, was in effect claiming to know what he was simul-
taneously defining as unknown. For if you know that no 
difference is made to a thing 8 by the presence or ab-
sence of a certain condition c-,-you know what 9 is 1 ike 
with c, and also what 6 is like without c, andon compar-
ing the two find no difference. This involves knowing 
what ~ is like without £; in the present case, knowing 
what you defined as the unknown. (A, 44). 
In addition to this "refutation of realism" Collingwood pro-
posed an alternative theory of knowledge based on the centrality 
of the questioning, rather than the merely asserting, activity: 
The questioning activity, as I called it, was not an ac-
tivity of achieving compresence with, or apprehension of, 
something; it was not preliminary to the act of knowing; 
it was one-half (the other half being answering the ques-
tion) of an act which in its totality was knowing. (A, 
26) • 
We will presently consider the "logic of question and answer" 
in more detail, but here it is worth noting that Collingwood 
proposed his "revolutionary" logic as an alternative to pro-
positional logic: 
For a logic of propositions I wanted to substitute what I 
called a logic of question and answer. It seemed to me 
that truth, if that meant the kind of thing which I was 
accustomed to pursue in my ordinary work as a philosopher 
or historian--truth in the sense in which a philosophical 
theory or an historical narrative is called true, which 
seemed to me the proper sense of the word--was something 
that belonged not to any single proposition, nor even, as 
the coherence-theorists maintained, to a complex of pro-
positions taken together; but to a complex consisting of 
questions and answers. (A, 36-37). 
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As this passage makes clear, Collingwood's alternative logic 
was intended as an instrument for the discovery of philosoph-
ical and historical truths--a task for which he felt proposi-
tional logic ill-suited. 
As a corollary to his Q-A logic, Collingwood denied 
the realist's assumption that there are "eternal problems" 
in philosophy. This occurred in two phases (A, 68). In the 
first, Collingwood discovered through his historical research 
and in his teaching experience that there is in fact no set 
of permanent, eternal questions in philosophy (A, 60-68): 
I found (and it required a good deal of hard detailed 
work in the history of thought) that most of the con-
ceptions around which revolve the controversies of mod-
ern philosophy, conceptions designated by words like 
"state", "ought", "matter", "cause", had appeared on the 
horizon of human thought at ascertainable times in the 
past . . . and that the philosophical controversies of 
other ages had revolved around other conceptions, not 
indeed unrelated to ours, but not ... indistinguishable 
from them. (A, 68). 
Secondly he attacked the problem in principle. There can be 
no absolute distinction between historical and philosophical 
questions both because the distinction presupposes the per-
manence of philosophical problems (which was false on histor-
ical grounds), and because in any case of a philosophical 
question one and the same passage is used as historical evi-
dence that it was a problem and as philosophical evidence of 
~that problem was (A, 69-70). 
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Having disposed of the central positive doctrine of 
the Oxford realists, as well as their epistemology and logic, 
Collingwood went on to reject their moral and political theor-
ies. He writes that since 1919 he lectured almost every year 
on moral philosophy, and although his reconciliation-philoso-
phy was still incomplete, the rudiments were present even 
then of a solution to the realist separation or distinction 
between "facts" and "theories" (A, 148-49). 
My first efforts in this direction were attempts to obey 
what I felt as my call to resist the moral corruption 
propagated by the "realist" dogma that moral philosophy 
does no more than study in a purely theoretical spirit 
a subject matter which it leaves wholly unaffected by 
that investigation. The opposite of this dogma seemed 
to me not only a truth, but a truth which, for the sake 
of his integrity and efficacy as a moral agent in the 
widest sense of that term, ought to be familiar to every 
human being: namely, that in his capacity as a moral, 
political, or economic agent he lives not in a world of 
"hard facts" to which "thoughts" make no difference, but 
in a world of "thoughts"; that if you change the moral, 
political, and economic "theories" generally accepted by 
the society in which he lives, you change the character 
of his world; and that if you change his own "theories" 
you change his relation to that world; so that in either 
case you change the way in which he acts . . . . There 
were, I held, no merely moral actions, and no merely po-
litical actions, and no merely economic actions. Every 
action was moral, political and economic. (A, 147, 149). 
Collingwood regarded this as only a "theoretical" 
rapprochement, and the conclusion of the Autobiography de-
scribes Collingwood's bitter and painful discovery that a 
"practical" rapprochement was also necessary. But this meant 
a unification of what he calls the "three R. G. C. 's"--the 
" 1 g oves-on" university professor; the family man of practical 
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affairs; and the "man of action", a "gloves-off" philosopher 
for whom "the difference between thinker and man of action 
disappeared," and who used to "stand up and cheer, in a 
sleepy voice," whenever he began reading Marx (even though, 
he says, he was "never at all convinced either by Marx's meta-
physics or by his economics") (A, 150-53). The closing lines 
of the final chapter give the reader a sense of just what a 
threat Collingwood regarded the "realists" to be, not only to 
philosophy but to civilization as well. Recalling his remarks 
about the realists' reduction of ethics to pure theory, Col-
lingwood links them with the recent rise in England of what 
he regarded as a fascist movement: 
I am not writing an account of recent political events in 
England: I am writing a description of the way in which 
those events impinged upon myself and broke up my pose of 
a detached professional thinker. I know now that the 
minute philosophers of my youth ((viz. the realists)) for 
all their profession of a purely scientific detachment 
from practical affairs, were the propagandists of a com-
ing Fascism. I know that Fascism means the end of clear 
thinking and the triumph of irrationalism. I know that 
all my life I have been engaged unawares in a political 
struggle, fighting against these things in the dark. 
Henceforth I shall fight in the daylight. (A, 167). 
The results of our survey of Collingwood's critique 
of Oxford realism can be summarized as follows: 
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TABLE 2 
THE CRITIQUE OF REALISM 
1. Any doctrine which asserts as its basic principle that 
the known is independent of, and unaffected by, the know-
ing of it, is realism (A, 44-45). 
2. Realism's ultimate method is destructive criticism; that 
is: 
a. the analysis of a position into various propositions; 
and 
b. the use of the rules of propositional logic to detect 
contradictions between these propositions (A, 42). 
3. The consequences of realism are: 
a. the separation of the historical question of fact 
from the philosophical question of truth, and the me-
taphysical assumption that the latter are eternal 
(A, 59); 
b. an epistemology which defines knowledge as the simple 
apprehension of an object (A, 25-26); 
c. a metaphysics which deals with a body of eternal 
truths concerning the world's general nature (A, 65-
67), and which denies the reality of becoming (A, 99); 
d. an ethics which regards itself as merely moral theory, 
and hence makes no difference to the practice of 
moral action (A, 47-48, 147); 
e. a political theory which denies the conception of a 
"common good" and insists that all "goods" are pri-
vate (A, 49). 
4. The basic principle of realism cannot withstand destruc-
tive criticism: it involves the meaningless assertion 
(on propositional grounds) that one can know what is si-
multaneously defined as the unknown. Realism hence can-
not live up to its own claims, and fails as a philosophy 
(A, 23, 44). 
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5. The method of realism is false as a philosophical method, 
because 
a. there is not, and cannot be, a one-one correspondence 
between indicative sentences in a language and logi-
cal propositions (A, 35); and 
b. meaning, contradiction and agreement, truth and fal-
sity do not belong to propositions by themselves, but 
to propositions as answers to questions (A, 33). 
6. The consequences of realism, as well as being disastrous 
for civilization, are philosophically erroneous: 
a. philosophical and historical questions are inseparable, 
and there are no eternal questions and concepts (A, 
68-69); 
b. knowledge is a complex process consisting of questions 
and answers, and questioning activity being one half 
(the other half being answering the question) of an 
act which in its totality is knowing (A, 26); 
c. questions concerning the world's general nature are 
based on beliefs or presuppositions made by the physi-
cists of an era, these presuppositions being subject 
to change but not to the distinction between truth 
and falsity (A, 66); 
d. knowledge of the situation in which one is called 
upon to act affects the action of the agent in that 
situation (A, 147-48); 
e. actions (which are moral, political and economic at 
the same time) based on false knowledge of the situ-
ation in which one is called upon to act, do not serve 
the good of the nation as a whole but the good of a 
class, section, or only oneself (A, 147-49, 155). 
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5. The Logic of Question and Answer. 
Collingwood states that the first steps that he took 
in his youthful revolt against the doctrine of realism were 
methodological: in place of the "propositional logic" ac-
cepted not only by realists but by idealists as well (A, 52), 
Collingwood formulated a "logic of question and answer", phil-
osophically more appropriate and historically more sound (A, 
26, 28, 30). He went so far as to write it up in book-length 
form ("during my spare time in 1917"), and offered it, under 
the title Truth and Contradiction, to a publisher, but was 
refused on the grounds that "the times were hopelessly bad 
for a book of that kind" (A, 42). The book was never pub-
lished, and Collingwood later destroyed the only draft of it 
(A, 99, n.l). 
The roots of Collingwood's "revolutionary" logic, as 
stated in the Autobiography, are complex, and the rules of this 
logic shade off imperceptably into his views on history and 
metaphysics. With respect to the former, three areas of his 
experience seem to have contributed to the formulation of his 
views. The first was his field experience in archeology--
initially under the tutelage of his father, then, after 1913, 
directing his own excavations (A, 23-24, 30). This experience, 
he writes, impressed upon him the importance of the "question-
ing activity" in knowledge: in archeological field work "one 
found out nothing at all except in answer to a question; and 
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not a vague question either, but a definite one" (A, 24). In 
addition to teaching him that the questioning activity was 
not preliminary, but rather integral to the activity of know-
ing, it also taught him that the intuitionistic epistemology 
(knowledge reduced to direct acquaintance with an object) and 
propositional logic (truth as a property of indicative asser-
tions) espoused by the realists were inadequate (A, 26-27, 
30-31). 
The second was his pre-war experience as a teacher at 
Oxford. This yielded the first of his two pedagogical rules 
for philosophical interpretation: "never accept critic ism of 
any author before satisfying yourself of its relevance"--that 
is, one should satisfy oneself by first-hand study that this 
was the philosophy the author actually expounded (A, 27, 74). 
But (as we have already seen) while this "did not as yet in-
volve any attack upon the 'realists'' critical methods", when 
coupled with his archeological experience it converged as a 
"flank attack on 'realism' as a philosophy which erred through 
neglecting history" (A, 28). 
The third source and by far the most important, ac-
cording to the Autobiography, was Collingwood's daily commun-
ings with the Albert Memorial: 
A year or two after the outbreak of ((the first world)) 
war, I was living in London and working with a section of 
the Admiralty Intelligence Division in the rooms of the 
Royal Geographical Society. Every day I walked across Ken-
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sington Gardens and past the Albert Memorial. The Albert 
Memorial began by degrees to obsess me . . . . Everything 
about it was visibly mis-shapen, corrupt, crawling, ver-
minous; for a time I could not bear to look at it, and 
passed with averted eyes; recovering from this weakness, 
I forced myself to look, to face day by day the question: 
a thing so obviously, so incontrovertibly, so indefensibly 
bad, why had Scott done it? .... What relation was 
there, I began to ask myself, between what he had done and 
what he had tried to do? (A, 29). 
His reflections on the unfortunate Albert Memorial led Col-
lingwood to formulate the second of his two pedagogical rules: 
"reconstruct the problem", or "never think you understand any 
statement made by a philosopher until you have decided, with 
the utmost possible accuracy, what the question is to which he 
means it for an answer" (A, 74). This was a direct generali-
zation arising from the analysis of his aesthetic experience 
of the Albert Memorial: Collingwood forced himself to recon-
struct the problem that Scott had set for himself in design-
ing such an artistic monstrosity: 
Had he tried to produce a beautiful thing; a thing, I 
meant, which we should have thought beautiful? If so, he 
had of course failed. But had he perhaps been trying to 
produce something different? If so, he might possibly 
have succeeded. If I found the monument merely loath-
some, was that perhaps my fault? Was I looking in it for 
qualities it did not possess, and either ignoring or de-
spising those it did? (A, 29-30). 
In addition to affording Collingwood yet another occasion for 
examining the role of questioning in knowledge, his reflec-
tions on the Albert Memorial provided him with a clue for sol-
Ving the problem about "eternal questions" in philosophy, and 
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especially in metaphysics (A, 60). Applying his second pe-
dagogical maxim to political theory he discovered that "the 
history of political theory is not the history of different 
answers given to one and the same question, but the history 
of a problem more or less constantly changing, whose solution 
was changing with it" (A, 62). Hence the realist assumption 
that different philosophies were different attempts to answer 
the same question was a "vulgar error, consequent on a kind 
of historical myopia which, deceived by superficial resem-
blances, failed to detect profound differences" (A, 60-61). 
Just as the ideal nature of the state exhibits essential dif-
ferences for philosophers living at different times and in 
different societies, so the ideals of personal conduct are 
subject to essential changes (A, 61-65). The question "What 
is the ideal state?" and "What sort of behavior is moral?" 
are not the same questions when asked by different philoso-
phers, because they have different essential meanings and 
different presuppositions. The clearest application of the 
principle was to metaphysics, where Collingwood finally laid 
to rest "the philosophers convictions about the eternity of 
problems or conceptions" (A, 65): 
It became clear to me that metaphysics (as its very name 
might show, though people still use the word as if it had 
been "paraphysics") is no futile attempt at knowing what 
lies beyond the limits of experience, but is primarily at 
any given time an attempt to discover what the people of 
that time believe about the world's general nature; such 
beliefs being the presuppositions of all their "physics", 
that is, their inquiries into its detail. Secondarily, it 
is the attempt to discover the corresponding presuppo-
sitions of other peoples and other times, and to follow 
the historical process by which one set of presupposi-
tions has turned into another. (A, 65-66). 
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Hence after discovering the clue during his reflections on 
the Albert Memorial and after generalizing the maxim and ap-
plying it to the fields of political theory, ethics, and fi-
nally metaphysics, Collingwood concluded that ''there was no 
recognized branch of philosophy to which the principle did 
not apply that its problems, as well as the solutions pro-
posed for them, had their own history" (A, 67). Except in 
the sense used to designate collectively a series of problems 
connected by a process of historical change, such that their 
continuity, but not their differences, are discernible--
except in this inaccurate sense "(t)he conception of 'eter-
nal problems' disappeared entirely" (A, 67-68, n.l). 
Based on the generalizations from these three regions 
of his experience, Collingwood formulated his revolutionary 
Q-A logic, the rules of which (in the autobiographical ver-
sion) may be tabulated as follows: 
TABLE 3 
QUESTION AND ANSWER LOGIC - AUTOBIOGRAPHY 
A body of knowledge consists not of propositions but of 
these together with the questions they are meant to an-
swer (A, 30). 
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a. "Proposition" denotes an assertive act of thought or 
what in those acts of thought is asserted (A, 30). 
b. A proposition is always a logical and not merely a 
linguistic entity ((i.e. it states what ought to be 
the case rather than what merely is the case concern-
ing assertive acts of thought)) (A, 31). 
2. In order to find out what a proposition means the ques-
tion to which the proposition was meant as an answer must 
be known (A, 31). 
3. No two propositions can agree with or be contradictory to 
one another unless they are answers to the same question 
(A, 33). 
a. The sameness of two questions is the sameness of an 
historical process, and the difference between two 
questions is the difference between one thing ((the 
first question)) which in the course of that process 
has turned into something else ((the second question)) 
(A, 62). 
b. An historical process is a process of becoming such 
that if a process P1 turns into a process P2 , there 
remains in P2 a trace or survival of P1 (A, 98-99). 
4. Truth and falsity belong to a complex consisting of ques-
tions and answers such that: 
a. each answer and its question must be relevant to a 
complex of questions and answers ((i.e., to a syste-
matic inquiry)); 
b. each question within that complex must "arise" ((Col-
lingwood leaves the meaning of "arise" unresolved in 
the Autobiography)); 
c. each answer must be the "right" answer to its ques-
tion (where "right" means "enabling the inquiry to 
proceed", and not "true"--the right answer could. be 
false); 
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d. each answer is to a certain specific question in the 
questions and answer complex (A, 37). (cf. A, 31-32--
correlativity of Q & A). 
5. Questions not only have answers, they also have presuppo-
sitions which are not subject to the distinction between 
what is true and what is false (A, 66). 
a. Some presuppositions ((relative presuppositions)) may 
be the answer to another question (A, 66). 
b. Some presuppositions are "absolute"--that is, are not 
answers to any questions at all (A, 67). 
6. The question "To what question did So-and-so intend this 
proposition for an answer?" is an historical question, 
and cannot be settled except by historical methods (A, 
38-39). 
a. The settlement of an historical question results from 
arguing back from the propositional answer to its 
question (A, 70). 
b. In arguing back from a propositional answer to its 
question, one and the same piece of evidence states 
the answer and allows the historian to identify the 
question (A, 70). 
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Collingwood's informal presentation of this Q-A logic 
is interspersed with commentary on it, some of which is worth 
mentioning here as a sort of concluding appendix to this sec-
tion. 
It is worth noting, to begin with, that Collingwood's 
Q-A logic is formulated in the context of a theory of know-
ledge, and a theory of knowledge that looks to history as a 
paradigm of knowing rather than to mathematics (A, 36-37). 
This is the significance of the first statement in the above 
table. The "body of knowledge" or systematic inquiry which he 
has in mind is an inquiry in which discoveries are still being 
made (at least for the inquirer), and not a closed system witlt 
fixed relationships (cf. A, 75). 
Secondly, Q-A logic is at once a theory of meaning, of 
logical validity (agreement and contradiction), and of truth: 
If the meaning of a proposition is relative to the ques-
tion it answers, its truth must be relative to the same 
thing. Meaning, agreement and contradiction, truth and 
falsehood, none of these belonged to propositions in 
their own right, propositions by themselves; they belonged 
only to propositions as the answers to questions: each 
proposition answering a question strictly correlative to 
itself. (A, 33; cf. A, 37). 
Another way of putting the matter would be to say that meaning, 
validity, and truth are functions of a Q-A complex which, for 
Collingwood, is taken as the primary logical unit. Items 2, 
3, and 4 of the above table take up each of these successive 
functions. 
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Thirdly, it is over these three functions of the Q-A 
complex that Collingwood felt he departed from the doctrines 
of propositional logic--the mathematical logic accepted in 
part by the idealists, and in total by the realists (A, 33-
36, 42). As in his refutation of the cardinal principle of 
the realists, Collingwood was careful to formulate "the cen-
tral doctrine of propositional logic" which he was concerned 
to reject: 
that there is, or ought to be, or in a well-constructed 
and well-used language would be, a one-one correspondence 
between propositions and indicative sentences, every in-
dicative sentence expressing a proposition, and a propo-
sition being defined as the unit of thought, or that which 
is true or false. (A, 35-36). 
This central doctrine would clearly be ruled out of Q-A logic 
on the grounds that both meaning and truth are functions of a 
Q-A complex, and not of answers or of assertive acts of 
thought alone. Yet it is presupposed by all the various well-
known theories of truth": 
One school of thought holds that a proposition is either 
true or false simply in itself, trueness or falseness be-
ing qualities of propositions. Another school holds that 
to call it true or false is to assert a relation of "cor-
respondence" or "non-correspondence" between it and some-
thing not a proposition, some "state of things" or "fact". 
A third holds that to call it true or false is to assert a 
relation between it and other propositions with which it 
"coheres" or fails to "cohere". And, since in those days 
there were pragmatists, a fourth school should be men-
tioned, holding ... that to call a proposition true or 
false is to assert the utility or inutility of believing 
it. All these theories of truth I denied. (A, 36). 
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It is no wonder that, as Collingwood remarks in a later chap-
ter, "(s)o far as my philosophical ideas were concerned, I 
was now cut off not only from the 'realist' school ... but 
from every other school of thought in England, I might almost 
say in the world" (A, 53). 
Fourthly, it is in connection with his application of 
Q-A logic to the supposedly "eternal problems" of metaphysics 
that the relationship between Q-A complexes and presupposi-
tions makes its appearance (A, 66-67). So also the example 
which Collingwood uses to illustrate that contradiction or 
agreement (what we have called "validity") is a function of 
the Q-A complex, is the classical metaphysical problem of "the 
one and the many": 
For example, metaphysicians have been heard to say "the 
world is both one and many"; and critics have not been 
wanting who were stupid enough to accuse them of contra-
dicting themselves, on the abstractly logical grounds 
that "the world is one" and "the world is many" are mu-
tually contradictory propositions .... There is no 
contradiction between saying that something ... is one, 
and saying that it is many. Contradiction would set in 
only if that something were said to be both one x and 
many x's .... Thus, if a given doctrine D is criti-
cized as self-contradictory because it is divisible into 
two parts E and F, where E contradicts F, the criticism 
is valid only if the critic has correctly reconstructed 
the questions to which E and F were given as answers (A, 
40-41). 
Fifthly, and finally, the way Collingwood formulates 
his Q-A logic presupposes an understanding of "history" as he 
uses the term. This is clear from items 3a and 3b of the 
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above table, which specify "sameness of question" in terms of 
historical process, and item 6, which makes historical metho-
dology integral to the discovery of "sameness of meaning" in 
a Q-A complex. 
6. History and Philosophy. 
By the time of the outbreak of World War I, but be-
fore his reflections on the Albert Memorial, Collingwood had 
not successfully resolved his "threefold question" concern-
ing the critical methods and positive content of Oxford real-
ism, but his archeological research and early philosophical 
teaching experience aided him in mounting what he calls a 
"flank attack" on the same problem: 
Working siumltaneously along these two lines, I could see 
them tending to converge in an attack on "realism" as a 
Bhilosophy which erred through neglectin~ history. If I 
ad thought it possible to forewarn the rrealists" of this 
attack, I should have said, "You must pay more attention 
to history. Your positive doctrines about knowledge are 
incompatible with what happens, according to my own ex-
perience, in historical research; and your critical me-
thods are misused on doctrines which in historical fact 
were never held by those to whom you ascribe them." (A, 
28, emphasis mine). 
By 1920, Collingwood writes, he had completely worked 
out the idea of a "living past", and was prepared for a fron-
tal assault on the realists' view of the past as consisting 
of corpse-like "events". The realists' neglect of history 
was a result of their refusal to admit the reality of becom-
ing. The overcoming of the error involved in the recognition 
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that historical processes survive in the present, and this is 
the key concept in deciding how history can be reconciled with 
the "wisdom" sought by philosophers. The past that the his-
torian studies is part of the situation within which he is 
called upon to act (A, 114); and the "events" of the past are 
processes of becoming which survive as active features of the 
present (A, 98-100). 
By 1930, according to the Autobiography, Collingwood 
had worked out the principles on the basis of which history 
as "a science of human affairs" could be constructed (A, 115). 
These principles Collingwood connects with his Q-A logic and 
with the maxims drawn from his experience as an archeologist 
(A, 106-109, 122, 130). Again, for brevity's sake, we shall 
tabulate these principles here in slightly altered order from 
their appearance in the Autobiography, but with a notation 
that facilitates reconstruction of that order: 
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TABLE 4 
THE PRINCIPLES OF HISTORY 
1. (LG) History is concerned not with events but with proces-
ses (A, 99). 
a. Processes are things which do not begin or end ((as 
events do)) but turn into one another; if process P1 
turns into P2 , P1 goes on in the changed form P2 , and 
P2 has previously been going on in earlier ((implicit)) 
form , P 1 ( A , 9 8 ) . 
b. ((In an historical process)) P1 leaves traces (evi-
dence) of itself in P2 , so that an historian living 
in P2 ((a situation)) can discover that what is now 
P2 was once P1 by the interpretation of evidence (A, 
98; cf. A, 96). 
NOTE: In Table 4, the following abbreviations are 
used: LG = Libellus de Generatione (see page 94, below), 
mentioned in Chapter IX of the Autobiography; ARCH-1,-2,-3 
=Archeological principles, mentioned in Chapter XI; HIST -1, 
-2,-3,-4 = Historical principles mentioned in Chapter X. 
Collingwood clearly indicates that the principles employed in 
archeology are applicable to all of history (A, 121, 130, 133). 
He also states that the idea of a living past, expressed in 
terms of historical processes, became his "first principle of 
a philosophy of history"; it is therefore listed as such in the 
table. "ARCH-2" follows it, because it amplifies "LG", and is 
a natural bridge to "HIST-1". "HIST-1,-2,-3 are listed in that 
order in Chapter X of the Autobiography. "HIST-4" is not so 
numbered by Collingwood, but he indicates that it forms the 
conclusion of a train of thought that "was not complete until 
about 1930" (A, 115). Finally, it is worth noting that Col-
lingwood states in a footnote that the principles we are call-
ing "HIST-1,-4" were discussed in a paper delivered before the 
British Academy after his election to that body in 1934. They 
appe~r almost verbatim in The Idea of History in the "epilegom-
enon called, after the paper, "Human Nature and History" (IH, 
205-231; see especially IH, 215). 
2. 
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(ARCH-2) There are no mere "events" in history; what is 
miscalled an event is really an action, and expresses some 
thought (intention, purpose) of its agent; the historian's 
purpose is to identify this thought (A, 127-28; cf. A, 130). 
3. (HIST-1) All history is the history of thought (A, 110). 
a. The thought must be expressed: either in language or 
in one of the many other forms of expressive acti-
vity (A, 111). 
b. The historian must be able to think over again for 
himself the very same thought whose expression he is 
trying to interpret (A, 111). 
4. (HIST-2) Historical knowledge is the re-enactment in the 
historian's mind of the thought whose history he is study-
ing (A, 112) . 
a. The sameness of the thought is not the sameness of a 
universal but the sameness of an historical process 
(A, 62). 
b. The difference between the thought of the agent and the 
re-enacted thought of the historian is a difference of 
context: to the historian it is a past thought living 
in the present ("incapsulated", not "free"), while to 
the agent it is a present thought (A, 113). 
5. (HIST-3) Historical knowledge is the re-enactment of a 
past thought incapsulated in a context of present thoughts 
which, by contradicting it, confine it to a plane differ-
ent from theirs (A, 114). 
a. An incapsulated thought is a thought which, though 
perfectly alive ((not a mere "event", which ends and 
begins)), forms no part of the Q-A complex which con-
stitutes the "real" life, the superficial or obvious 
present, of the mind in question (A, 113; cf. A, 140-
41) . 
b. Present and past planes of thought are distinguished 
by observing the way in which ((their respective)) 
problems arise (A, 114). 
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c. Every historical problem ultimately arises out of 
"real" life--i.e., out of practical problems (A, 114). 
6. (HIST-4) The science of human affairs (i.e. moral and 
political wisdom) is history (A, 99, 115). 
a. Knowledge achieved by historical inquiry is not know-
ledge of his (the historian's) situation as opposed 
to knowledge of himself, it is knowledge of his situ-
ation which is at the same time knowledge of himself 
(A, 114). 
b. There must be a kind of action which is not deter-
mined according to rule, and where the process is di-
rectly from knowledge of the situation to an action 
appropriate to that situation without passing through 
the stage of formulating a rule appropriate to the 
situation (A, 103). 
c. History offers insight into the situation in which 
one is called upon to act, rather than ready-made 
rules for acting in all situations of a given kind 
(A, 100-102; cf. A, 114). 
7. (ARCH-1) Success in historical studies depends upon clear 
application of Q-A logic to historical problems (A, 121-
122, 124). 
8. (ARCH-3) No historical problem should be studied without 
studying its second-order history, that is, the history 
of historical thought about it (A, 132). 
Again, several comments about these principles are 
in order. The first is that what is stated by Collingwood 
to be the "first principle" of a philosophy of history, as 
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of 1920, is expressed by him in two ways, which are not trans-
parently identical in meaning. The first is "that the past 
which an historian studies is not a dead past, but a past 
which in some sense is still living in the present"; the se-
cond is in the form in which it appears above. The idea of a 
living past is described later in terms of the principle of 
incapsulation (5. of Table 4), so that its later reiteration 
eliminates the need to argue for an identity of meaning in 
these two expressions, as well as the necessity to specu-
late why Collingwood took them to mean the same thing. 
Secondly, Collingwood writes that this first prin-
ciple of history initially appeared in an essay of short 
book-length (Libellus de Generatione) which "was primarily 
a study of the nature and implications of process or becoming." 
Secondarily, it was an attack on "realism", showing how 
the non possumus of "realists" towards a theory of his-
tory arose from their refusal to admit the reality of be-
coming, and from their analysis of the true proposition 
"P1 becomes P2" into the complex of propositions "P1 is 
P1", "P1 is not P2" "P1 ends where P2 begins", "P2 is P2", 
and "P2 is not P 1", all of them either tautologous or false. (A, 11). 
Hence Collingwood's first principle of history was formulated, 
according to the Autobiography, in direct opposition to what 
he took to be a realist's position. 
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Thirdly, Q-A logic appears as an integral part of his 
listing of historical principles: it appears in his principles 
of re-enactment (4), of incapsulation (5), and of successful 
historiography (7). 
Fourthly, Collingwood states that in connection with 
the principle of re-enactment (4), the question of what the 
difference is between the thought of an historical agent and 
the re-enacted thought in the historian's mind, was the most 
difficult of all the questions he encountered in his study of 
historical method (A, 112). The answer that he gives to this 
question in the Autobiography and the example which accom-
panies it are given in terms of his Q-A logic. According to 
the principle of incapsulation (see 5 in Table 4), present 
thoughts and past, incapsulated thought are distinguished by 
the way in which questions arise in each. For Admiral Nelson 
at the naval battle at Trafalgar the question, "Shall I take 
off my decorations?" and its answer, "In honour I won them, 
in honour I will die with them," occur in a primary Q-A ser-
ies that involve the battle and his participation in it on 
the decks of the Victory. But this question does not arise 
in a primary Q-A series involving the incapsulated thought 
(the historian does not contemplate removing his own decora-
tions in fear of losing his life). 
But a question ar~s~ng in ((the historian's)) primary 
series may act as a switch into another dimension. I 
plunge beneath the surface of my mind, and there live a 
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life in which I not merely think about Nelson but am 
Nelson, and thus in thinking about Nelson think about 
myself. But this secondary life is prevented from over-
flowing into my primary life by being what I call incap-
sulated, that is, existing in a context of primary or sur-
face knowledge which keeps it in its place and prevents 
it from thus overflowing. Such knowledge, I mean, as 
that Trafalgar happened ninety years ago: I am a little 
boy in a jersey: this is my father's study carpet, not 
the Atlantic, and that the study fendeL, not the coast of 
Spain. (A, 113-14). 
That primary or surface knowledge, some examples of which Col-
lingwood uses from his juvenile re-enactments of the naval 
engagement at Trafalgar, serve to "contradict" the imaginative 
experience in which one takes on the role of being Nelson (and 
in the process forgets oneself or loses oneself in the im-
agined object). It is this "contradiction" which confines 
incapsulated thought to a plane different from the context of 
present thoughts. 
Finally, history as the science of human affairs (6) 
corrects the false claim that psychology, a natural science 
of mind, is the source of wisdom, especially in matters moral 
and political (A, 92, 94, 116, 126). 
The nineteenth century, likewise in search of a science 
of human affairs, tried to realize it in the shape of a 
"psychology" in which the mental was reduced to the psy-
chical, the distinction between truth and falsehood thrown 
overboard, and the very idea of a science negated, psy-
chology itself being involved in the resulting bankruptcy. 
But the revolution in historical method . . . swept away 
these sham sciences and ... brought into existence a 
genuine, actual, visibly and rapidly progressing form of 
knowledge which now for the first time was putting man in 
a position to obey the oracular precept "know thyself" 
.... (A, 116). 
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But if a "science of human nature" cannot be achieved except 
by historical methods, part of the reason is that actions--
historical processes--are not always performed in accordance 
with rules. Collingwood points out two occasions in which 
agents necessarily act without knowledge of any rule appro-
priate to the situation: (1) when a situation requires one 
to act and yet does not recognizably belong to any rule-
governed types; and, (2) when the situation is recognized as 
of a rule-governed type, but the required act "involves a 
certain misfit between yourself and your situation"--pre-
sumably because the agent requires more of himself than ac-
tion according to type or to rule (A, 103-104). 
Of these two cases in which it is necessary to act other-
wise than according to rule, the first arises out of the 
agent's inexperience and ignorance of life .... The 
second arises only for people of experience and intelli-
gence, and even then occurs only when they take a situ-
ation very seriously; so seriously as to reject not only 
the claims of ... desire, and ... self-interest, but 
((also)) ... right conduct, or action according to the 
recognized rules (A, 105). 
Such rule-free occasions call for improvised actions appro-
priate to the recognized realities of the situation; and the 
function of historical thinking was to provide "insight" in-
to such situations, the reality of which included the in-
capsulated past as part of itself (A, 106, 101). 
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7. Rapprochement Philosophy. 
We have already seen that Collingwood regarded his 
philosophy as "in the main an attempt to bring about a ~­
Erochement between philosophy and history"; that he rejected 
realism as a "philosophy which erred through neglecting his-
tory"; that philosophy and history shared a common methodol-
ogy by employing Q-A logic; and that historical questions are 
not separate from philosophical questions because "all history 
is the history of thought". The final step in the autobio-
graphical account is therefore to elucidate the meaning of 
Collingwood's "rapprochement" philosophy. 
One aspect of this rapprochement occurred to Colling-
wood in the course of his philosophical teaching at Oxford: 
if philosophers were to deal with the history of their own 
subject they ought to do so in a manner that met the contem-
porary standards of historical thinking (A, 77)--some of which 
Collingwood states in the Autobiography, and which we have 
summarized in Table 4. 
But, in addition to making philosophy more histori-
cally respectable, it was necessary to make history more 
philosophical: this Collingwood did in his own historical 
work. As an example of it he cites the chapter on "Art" 
which he wrote for the first volume of the Oxford History of 
England--a chapter in which he showed how a revival of Celtic 
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art forms was possible after two centuries, during which time 
only Romanized art was produced. In solving the problem Col-
lingwood made use of a modified form of his principle of in-
capsulation: 
Incapsulation is not an "occult entity". It was my name 
for such facts as this--familiar enough to everybody--
that a man who changes his habits, thoughts, etc., retains 
in the second phase some residue of the first. (A, 141). 
The principle also operates in habits transmitted from one gen-
eration to the next, and without the need of positing any oc-
cult entities "like racial temperament or an inheritance of 
acquired psychical characteristics" (A, 142): 
(T)he transmission by educational means of any moral ideal 
which involves the outlawry of an institution or custom, 
and the repression of a desire for it, entails the simul-
taneous transmission of that desire itself. The chil-
dren of each generation are taught to want what they are 
taught they must not have. (A, 143). 
This was the means by which a suppressed art-form was pre-
served over two centuries of time in Romanized Britain: 
(T)he 
their 
never 
144). 
less successful the Britons were in Romanizing art, 
the more they were likely to cherish the memory of 
own fashions and ensure that these fashions were 
wholly lost to sight by the rising generation. (A, 
Collingwood calls on this example as an illustration of the 
use of his rapprochement philosophy: 
I found it possible to assert a connection between two 
facts, both of them notorious, which had not previously 
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been thought of as connected. One was the Celtic re-
vival; the other was the badness of Romanizing British 
art .... (T)he idea which I expressed in the chapter 
on "Art" in the Oxford History of England . . . I would 
gladly leave as the sole memorial of my Romano-British 
studies, and the best example I can give to posterity of 
how to solve a much-debated problem in history, not by 
discovering fresh evidence, but by reconsidering ques-
tions of principle. It may thus serve to illustrate what 
I have called the rapprochement between philosophy and 
history, as seen from the point of view of history (A, 
144-145). 
In addition to a reconciliation from the historical 
direction, there is presumably a reconciliation from the 
point of view of philosophy: 
This meant, in the first instance, a special branch of 
philosophical inquiry devoted to the special problems 
raised by historical thinking. Epistemological problems, 
such as one might group together under the question "how 
is historical knowledge possible?" Metaphysical problems, 
concerned with the nature of the historian's subject-
matter: the elucidation of terms like event, process, 
progress, civilization, and so forth. (A, 77). 
We have already observed how Collingwood resolved the first 
question (viz. that one can know the past if it is not a "dead" 
past, but is rather "living", incapsulated in the present, 
and known by critical evaluation of evidence). In the second 
group, Collingwood deals only with the terms "event" and 
"process"--the subject matter of the first two principles in 
Table 3; the remainder are left unelucidated in the Autobiog-
raphy. 
"But this demand for a new branch of philosophy," adds 
Collingwood, "soon developed into the demand for a new kind of 
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philosophy" (A, 77), a "Copernican revolution" (A, 79, n.l) 
in which historical knowledge is shown to be an element in all 
thinking (A, 86-88, 67-68). Collingwood cites the example of 
a scientist who, in framing a theory, makes use of historical 
knowledge as to what experiments had been tried and with what 
results, and insists that this historical knowledge is an es-
sential element in all scientific thinking (A, 87). Metaphy-
sics itself is an historical science, insofar as "the ques-
tion what presuppositions underlie the 'physics' or natural 
science of a certain people at a certain time" is a purely 
historical question, and the origins of these beliefs about 
the world's general nature have come into existence by cer-
tain changes out of other such beliefs (A, 66-67). 
Finally, a similar analysis occurred in connection 
with moral philosophy, which also involved an historical ele-
ment: 
If knowledge as to the facts of one's situation is called 
historical knowledge, historical knowledge is necessary 
to action .... Immediately after the War, therefore, I 
began to reconsider in detail all the familiar topics and 
problems of moral philosophy .... In the first place, 
I subjected these topics and problems to what I called an 
historical treatment, insisting that every one of them 
had its history and was unintelligible without some know-
ledge of that history. Secondly, I attempted to treat 
them in another way, which I called analytic. My notion 
was that one and the same action, which as action pure 
and simple was a "moral" action, was also a "political" 
action relative to a rule, and at the same time an "econ-
omic" action as means to an end. (A, 149). 
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The reconciliation between theory and practice, like that be-
tween history and philosophy, proceeded from two sides. From 
the theoretical side thought and action were shown to be mu-
tually dependent, "thought depending upon what the thinker 
learned by experience in action, action depending upon how he 
thought of himself and the world" (A, 150). We have already 
seen how the need for a practical rapprochement impressed it-
self on the "three R. G. C.'s". 
Unfortunately this is as much as Collingwood has to 
say on the subject of rapprochement philosophy in the Auto-
biography, and the reader is directed to complete the task of 
working out the details for himself (A, 149). Unlike the dis-
cussion of Q-A logic and the principles of history, there are 
no explicit rules for rapprochement. However, from the above 
discussion several generalizations about rapprochement phil-
osophy are possible: 
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TABLE 5 
RAPPROCHEMENT PHILOSOPHY 
1. The subject matter of rapprochement philosophy are view-
points presumed to be distinct and opposite (e.g. phil-
osophy and history, theory and practice, etc.). Such an 
accepted state of unreconciled opposition between view-
points is characteristic of the "realist" philosophy (A, 
148) . 
2. A reconciliation of opposing viewpoints proceeds from 
each viewpoint towards its presumed opposite (e.g. from 
philosophy toward history, and from history toward phil-
osophy) (A, 77, 144-45). 
3. What must be shown for minimal reconciliation is that 
there is a relation of mutual dependence of each view-
point on its presumed opposite (A, 150). 
4. A relationship of mutual dependence between opposing 
viewpoints is established by subjecting them to both: 
a. an historical treatment, in which they are shown to 
satisfy the conditions (or principles) of historical 
inquiry (to be related as two phases of a process, 
capable of re-enactment, etc.); and 
b. an analytic treatment, in which they are shown to 
satisfy the conditions (or principles) of Q-A logic 
(they must be answers to the same question, be part 
of a Q-A complex, etc.). (A, 148; cf. A, 31, 42). 
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It is questionable, given Collingwood's remarks about 
rule-free situations and improvisation, whether he would agree 
that any such semi-formalization of the methodology of recon-
ciliation is possible. Improvisation apparently extends even 
to the level of methodology: 
Obscure provinces, like Roman Britain, always rather ap-
peal to me. Their obscurity is a challenge; you have to 
invent new methods for studying them, and then you will 
probably find that the cause of their obscurity is some 
defect in the methods hitherto used. When these defects 
have been removed, it will be possible to revise the gen-
erally accepted opinions about other, more familiar, sub-
jects, and to correct the errors with which those opinions 
are perhaps infected. In this sense, knowledge advances 
by proceeding to "from the known to the unknown", but from 
the "unknown" to the "known". (A, 86). 
Collingwood extends this remark to include "obscure subjects" 
including (at that time in England) historical methodology, 
the systematic study of which he hoped would reveal episte-
mological truths "concealed from the 'realists' by their ob-
viously conventional and second-hand ideas about the methods 
of natural science" (A, 86). 
It is also possible that Collingwood's failure in the 
Autobiography to specify the sorts of conditions under which 
questions are said to "arise" is related to his reversal of 
the Aristotelian maxim about the direction in which the mind 
works in coming to know a subject (for Aristotle it proceeded 
from the known to the unknown). If obscurity is a stimulus 
for the invention of new methods which, in turn, reveal errors 
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in previous treatments of the subject, then it is hardly pos-
sible to predict in advance the questions that will arise: 
it presumes prior knowledge of the errors that have been made. 
But on these issues Collingwood is enigmatically 
silent. 
PART II 
THE EARLY WRITINGS (1916-1932) 
CHAPTER III 
REALISM AND IDEALISM 
1. Introduction. 
In the Autobiography Collingwood described his wean-
ing from the brand of realism that he had been taught at Ox-
ford, the turning point occurring during his reflections on 
the Albert Memorial sometime around 1917. At one end of this 
development is the teaching of Cook Wilson and the other Ox-
ford realists, and at the other is the publication of Specu-
lum Mentis in 1924, which the Autobiography acknowledges was 
perceived by at least one reviewer as the "usual idealistic 
nonsense.'' In between these two points there is the publica-
tion of his first book, Religion and Philosophy, in 1916, but 
actually ''written some years earlier, in order to tidy up and 
put behind me a number of thoughts arising out of my juvenile 
studies in theology (A, 43). Prior to the appearance of Spe-
culum Mentis Collingwood published a lecture entitled "Can 
the New Idealism Dispense with Mysticism?" and several other 
articles dealing with the distinction between science and his-
tory and Croce's philosophy. From these points we should be 
able to sketch in the curvature of his thought and compare it 
to that described in the Autobiography. 
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Along the way we should be able to reconstruct what 
Collingwood's understanding was of the realism-idealism .issue, 
before it hardened into the form it takes in his later writ-
ings--viz. the anti-realism of the Autobiography. This is a 
crucial topic, since the starting point for virtually every 
one of Collingwood's publications is a critique of the real-
istic position of the subject under investigation. Further-
more his interpreters, as we saw in Chapter I, have used this 
issue to discredit the accuracy of the autobiographical ac-
count. Indeed it is difficult to understand how Collingwood 
could deny that in the years following the war he thought and 
wrote as an advocate of a school of thought widely recognized 
under the title "idealism"--as the 1924 article on the "New 
Idealism" illustrates. Yet in the Autobiography Collingwood 
writes that Speculum Mentis was neither "usual" nor "idealis-
tic" (A, 57). We shall have to decide on the basis of his 
use of the term whether this is a sheer piece of effrontery 
or if it would be like Hegel denying that he was an idealist 
--where the term means "subjective idealism" of the sort he 
attributed to the Kantian philosophy. 
The idealism-realism issue is also a strategic bound-
ary in the interpretation of Collingwood, since (as we also 
saw in Chapter I) Rubinoff uses Speculum Mentis as a basic 
program for interpreting the entire remainder of Collingwood's 
philosophy, and views Collingwood as an unregenerated idealist 
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of an Hegelian pedigree, whereas Donagan reconstructs what he 
regards as the steps by which Collingwood worl~d his way free 
from his youthful idealism and forged a philosophy of mind on 
linguistic and analytic principles. And where Rubinoff has to 
explain why such terms as "absolute knowledge" and "dialec-
tic" tend to disappear in the later writings, Donagan has to 
account for Collingwood's continued and uncompromising anti-
realism in these same works. And finally, where Rubinoff has 
to account for the reversal from the condemnation of abstrac-
tion in Speculum Mentis to the apparent endorsement of it for 
all higher thought in The New Leviathan, Donagan, who uses 
this as an index of Collingwood's conversion from idealism, 
must account for the striking difference between the descrip-
tions of this process of abstraction in the same two works--
a point that we will examine more carefully in later chapters. 
In all of this discussion we must therefore try to be 
as clear as the texts will allow us to be on the senses of the 
terms "idealism" and "realism" as Collingwood formulates them. 
This will necessitate trying to be clear about certain other 
related terms, since what we are trying to do is to flesh out 
the bones of the abstract formula for realism from the Auto-
biography, "Knowing makes no difference to what is known." 
What does Collingwood mean by each of the terms, "object," 
"knowing," and "makes a difference"? As we shall see in this 
and subsequent chapters, the sense of the formula shifts with 
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the meaning of the terms: where "knowing" means "perception" 
the difference knowing makes to the object of perception is 
not completely equivalent to the situation in which "knowing" 
means "history" and the object is the thought of an histori-
cal agent. And when Collingwood rejects realism with his 
autobiographical anti-realistic argument, one must pay careful 
attention to the situation in which it is applied in order 
not to discard the baby with the bathwater. When he rejects 
the abstractions of realism in Speculum Mentis, for example, 
we must ask if there is any acceptable sense of "abstraction" 
that is salvable from the condemnation as distinct from the 
realism that it is aimed at overcoming. And similarly when 
we find the project of "absolute knowledge" collapsing for 
lack of any concrete subject matter at the end of Speculum 
Mentis, we have to ask if from the wreckage we can find any 
principles on which a more solid structure of thought can be 
erected. (Some of this work will occupy us in the next three 
chapters.) 
2. Realism and Idealism in Religion and Philosophy. 
If we were to begin where a beginning should really 
be made, we would probably never achieve the limited goals we 
have set for ourselves. A proper assessment of Collingwood's 
background would require sketching out not only the realistic 
doctrines of Cook Wilson and the Oxford realists but also of 
the shadowy figure of Bradley, whose thought was still very 
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much alive--even if only as the target of realistic critics. 1 
From this point one could trace the issues backwards or for-
wards: backward into the roots of Collingwood's idealism in 
Bradley, Green, Hegel, Kant, and Berkeley, and the sources of 
the realism he opposed in Mill, Hume, and Locke; and forward 
into the fruits of idealism contemporaneous to Collingwood in 
the Italian idealists, Croce, Gentile, and de Ruggiero, and 
the development of realism with Alexander, Moore, Ayer, and 
Russell. All of this would make fascinating reading and would 
be a welcome study and an invaluable background work for the 
understanding of Collingwood's philosophy. Having said that 
we shall say little more about these matters, except by way 
of occasional footnotes suggesting interesting parallels or 
contrasts. Our task is to understand Collingwood's philosophy 
as interpreted by the Autobiography, and limitations in both 
space and our own background necessitate leaving these matters 
for another time. 
The place for us to start is with Collingwood's early 
publication, Religion and Philosophy, which we anticipate will 
give evidence of Collingwood's early tolerance of realism. As 
expected, this work exhibits an ambivalent attitude toward 
realism. On the one hand Collingwood writes that what he is 
saying "contains little if anything which contradicts the prin-
1964), 
osophy 
1c. J. Warnock, English Philosophy Since 1900 (Oxford, 
pp. 1-12. Cf. John Passmore, ~Hundred Years-of Phil-
(Baltimore, 1957/1968), pp. 48-71, 240-57). 
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ciples of either Realism or Idealism in their more satisfac-
2 tory forms," and adds that "There is an idealism with w,hich 
I feel little sympathy, and there is a so-called realism 
which seems to be only distinguishable from that idealism by 
its attempt to evade its own conclusions" (RP, 101, n. 1; FR, 
3 
n. 1). · On the other hand (and even this passage shows a 
leaning in this direction), in the same work Collingwood ad-
mits that in at least one controversy the position he is de-
fending "would claim the title of idealism" (RP, 94-95). The 
only way for us to understand where Collingwood stands in 
this early work is therefore to look a little more closely at 
the positions he is analyzing and the arguments he puts for-
ward to confirm or reject them. 
Religion and Philosophy is laid out in three parts. 
Part I examines the general nature of religion, and attempts 
2In this same footnote he cites with apparent approval 
the work of Joachim on The Nature of Truth on the one hand and 
Prichard's Kant's Theory of Knowledge and Carritt's Theory of 
BeautX on the other as representing the "more satisfactory 
torms of the theories he hopes not to be contradicting. In 
the Autobiography Collingwood identified Carritt as his real-
ist tutor, and H. A. Prichard as following Cook Wilson, and 
H. H. Joachim as a close personal friend of Bradley and later 
of Collingwood (A, 18, 20-22). 
3In-text citations from Religion and Philosophy are 
followed by citations from the publication, Faith and Reason, 
ed. by L. Rubinoff, because the former is out of print, and 
portions of it appear in the latter work. Where no second ci-
~ation follows the reference to RP, it does not also appear 
ln FR. 
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to examine the distinction of religion from ritual, conduct, 
and fee 1 ing, and to identify it as "creed," i.e. its int;e llec-
tual element. Furthermore it examines the distinction between 
religion and conduct (thought and action), history, science, 
and philosophy. To anticipate later conclusions, we might add 
that it is in this part that Collingwood not only engages in 
wholesale identification of apparently distinct subject-matters 
(religion as creed is identified with history, philosophy, and 
even, by implication, science; thought and action are identi-
fied; etc.), but also sets up many of the problems against 
which he would later struggle in Speculum Mentis. Part II 
takes up the metaphysical issues of proving the existence of 
God, the dualism of matter and mind, personal identity, and 
evil--these issues all approached in a manner which first an-
alyzes a claim, then its counter-claim, and then attempts to 
state on which side the truth appears to reside. Part III is 
more properly theological in tone, dealing in successive chap-
ters with the self-expression of God in Man, in the person of 
the Christ; God's redemption of Man; and the problem of Mira-
cles. 
As can be seen from this glance at the table of con-
tents, there is a good deal of interesting material in this 
very early work, and we must resist the temptation to deal 
With all of it (some of it will appear in later chapters--the 
issue of the "identities" will appear, for example, in Chapter 
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VI on rapprochement). What we seek to clarify at this point 
is how Collingwood stood on the issues of idealism and realism, 
and this requires us to limit ourselves primarily to the ma-
terial presented in Part II, "Religion and Metaphysics." In 
particular we want to find out the way in which Collingwood 
understood the independent status of objects of knowledge. 
As in most of his subsequent writings, Collingwood 
prefaces his positive treatment of the subject with a critique 
of false views of the subject matter. In Part I Collingwood 
singles out psychology as characteristic of the way the phe-
nomenon of mind in general, and religious thinking in particu-
lar, is improperly approached. When composing the Autobiogra-
EhY Collingwood recalled this passage with evident approval 
(A, 93), and in re-reading it he may have prepared himself 
for writing the anti-psychological chapters in the Essay on 
Metaphysics, which it strikingly anticipates. Psychology, Col-
lingwood writes, is distinguished from the philosophical sci-
ences of logic and ethics (which also study the mind) not by 
its subject-matter but by its method. 
The method peculiar to psychology may perhaps be described 
as follows. The psychology of knowing differs from logic 
or the philosophical theory of knowledge in that it treats 
a judgement--the act of knowing something--as an event in 
the mind, a historical fact. It does not go on to deter-
mine the relation of this mental event to the "something" 
known, the reality beyond the act which the mind, in that 
act, apprehends. Such a further investigation would be 
metaphysical in character and is therefore avoided by psy-
chology. Now this formula can be universalized, and thus 
gives us the definition of the psychological method. Take 
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the mental activity as a self-contained fact; refuse, so 
far as that is possible, to treat of its metaphysical as-
pect, its relation with real things other than itself; and 
you have psychology. Thus in scientific thought as stud-
ied by logic we have a judgement in which the mind knows 
reality: psychology, treating the judgement as a mere 
event, omits its reference to reality, that is to say, 
does not raise the question whether it is true. (RP, 40; 
FR, 7 5-76). 
In a footnote Collingwood adds that the same omission or ab-
straction is made by formal logic, which he takes to be a psy-
chological rather than a philosophical science (RP, 40, n. 2; 
FR, 76, n. 2). 
Here we have in germ a strategy which comes to frui-
tion in Collingwood's later philosophy of history as are-
interpretation of the act-object distinction, i.e. the dis-
tinction between an act of consciousness and the object of 
such an act, where the former is regarded by realists as an 
event in the subjective or psychological life of a conscious 
agent (cf. IH, 282-301). Our present interest is in the "me-
taphysical" aspect of the "reality beyond the act" which the 
mind apprehends. Throughout this chapter and those which fol-
low, where Collingwood's anti-realism is being evaluated we 
will use this independent reality of the object as an index 
to measure the degree of his anti-realism, bearing in mind 
that in each case ·we must try to assess the meaning of the 
terms involved. It is, after all, the object's independence 
from the act of knowledge which is at the center not only of 
Collingwood's autobiographical realist formula, but also of 
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the historical issue as Collingwood inherited it. 4 
The passage about psychology which we have just quot-
ed is taken from a chapter on religion and history, in which 
Collingwood is trying to demonstrate that religious creed is 
not devoid of reference to historical factuality. The attack 
on psychology is carried out because the psychology of reli-
gion, while pretending to deal with the phenomenon of reli-
gious consciousness, fails to do so precisely because it ig-
nores this factual reference: a mind regarded in an external 
way, i.e. without reference to its object, "really ceases to 
be a mind at all," and the knowledge gained by studying it in 
this way "is not knowledge of anything, but barren and trif-
ling abstraction" (RP, 42; FR, 77). In a later passage he 
comments that empirical psychology treats mind exactly as if 
it were matter (RP, 76). But when it comes to describing the 
4cf. Bertrand Russell, "Logical Atomism," in Contem-
porary British Philosophy, ed. J. H. Muirhead (London, 1924), 
I, p. 360: "For some years I was a disciple of Mr. Bradley, 
but about 1898 I changed my views, largely as a result of argu-
ments with G. E. Moore. I could no longer believe that know-
ing makes any difference to what is known." A more technical 
version of the formula was given by Russell some years earlier 
in "Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions," Mind, n.s. 
XIII (1904), p. 204: "every presentation and every belief must 
have an object other than itself, and, except in certain cases 
where mental existents happen to be concerned, extramental; . 
. . and ... the object of a thought, even when this object 
does not exist, has a Being which is in no way dependent upon 
its being an object of thought." R. M. Chisholm in his "Edi-
tor's Introduction" to Realism and the Background of Phenomen-
ology (New York, 1960), p. 3, n. 1, quotes Russell as saying 
that he had been led to accept these theses by Mr. G. E. Moore, 
and that "Except Frege, I know of no writer on the theory of 
knowledge who comes as near to this position as Meinong." 
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nature of history in contrast to this Collingwood endorses 
what appears to be a blatantly realistic definition: 
History must be regarded not as a mechanical process, nor 
yet as a gradual accumulation of truths, but simply as ob-
jectivity; as the real fact of which we are conscious. --
History is that which actually exists; fact, as something 
independent of my own or your knowledge of it. In this 
sense there would be no philosophy without it; for no form 
of consciousness can exist without an object. (RP, 49; 
FR, 83). 
At this point in his development Collingwood had not yet come 
to a full realization of what he would later call the ideality 
of history, and as the subsequent discussion illustrates, his-
tory is not yet confined to deeds of men. In Chapter V we 
shall see how this primitive idea of history became refined 
in the essays written between 1920 and 1930. 
But what of this concept of a fact as "something inde-
pendent of my own or your knowledge of it"? Where we might be 
tempted to soften its realistic impact by qualifying it as dis-
tinct from an object (the factuality of anything is its given-
ness, its aspect of independence, which says nothing about the 
facticity of objects, or about their independent existence or 
reality), it is better to let it serve as a statement forming 
the limit of Collingwood's early attitude toward realism. We 
shall never again encounter him affirming anything like it--
unless it is as a premise which he was setting out to demolish. 
The problem of the reality of objects makes its appearance in 
a later chapter in the discussion of what he calls the "plain 
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man's metaphysic:" 
Popular metaphysic distinguishes two categories of reality, 
mind and matter. Mind is a reality whose qualities are 
thought, will, and so forth; it is not extended over space 
or divisible into parts. Matter, on the other hand, oc-
cupies space, and is homogenously subdivisible into smaller 
parts; it has no consciousness of itself as mind does 
.. Mind is active ... matter is passive .... We have 
thus three hypotheses before us. Either the world is en-
tirely material, or it is entirely spiritual, or it is a 
compound of the two .... (M)aterialism will admit the 
existence of thought, but will try to explain it as a kind 
of mechanism; the opposite theory (which for the sake of 
convenience I shall call idealism) will admit the existence 
of mechanism, but will try to describe it in such a way 
that its operation is seen to be a form of spiritual ac-
tivity. (RP, 72-73). 
In a footnote Collingwood adds that the sense of the term "ide-
alism" which is opposed to materialism "must be carefully dis-
tinguished from Idealism as a theory of knowledge. The former, 
concerned with the antithesis between mind and matter, has no 
connexion whatever with the latter, which concerns the quite 
different antithesis of subject and object, and is opposed not 
to Materialism but to Realism" (RP, 73, n. 1). 
Here a preliminary distinction has been drawn between 
metaphysical and epistemological idealism, and although one 
might question whether they truly have "no connexion whatever" 
5 
withone another, such an equivocation on the term might allow 
5
we shall try to avoid being drawn into a protracted 
historical discussion of what the various meanings of the term 
"idealism" have been--since the title encompasses everything 
from Platonic archetypalism to Husserlian essentialism, and 
along the way from one end of this spectrum to the other, cuts 
across both Kantian and Hegelian territory. Nevertheless to 
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Collingwood to deny being an idealist (in the metaphysical 
sense) without being committed thereby to a denial that he 
was an idealist in the epistemological sense. More impor-
tantly, Collingwood does not view the realism-idealism con-
troversy in a metaphysical sense--as it might be viewed by 
someone who takes realism to be a statement about independ-
ent existence of objects, in which case it is saying some-
thing about reality rather than something about our know-
ledge of it. For Collingwood realism is not a metaphysical 
issue but an epistemological one, i.e. one which says some-
thing not about reality but about our knowledge of it. 
After some argumentation criticizing rigid adherence 
to the materialistic hypothesis (partly based on the impossi-
bility of importing mind-characteristics into a purely mech-
anistic description of the world, and partly based on the 
failure of mechanists to defend the principle of causality), 
Collingwood pays the mechanistic devil his due. Materialism 
satisfies the scientist's demand for uniformity, regularity, 
and generality--all of which are satisfied by a materialis-
tic philosophy (RP, 91). But that is not all. 
Another merit of materialism is its insistence on fact, on 
reality as something beyond the power of the individual 
~ay that the metaphysical and epistemological forms of ideal-
lsm have nothing whatsoever to do with one another ignores 
the fact that Berkeley's idealism arises from a critique of 
the concept of matter from a practitioner of epistemological 
empiricism. 
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mind to create or alter. Matter is supremely objective. 
And when it is said that mind is the only reality, the 
suggestion at once arises that the world is less solid, 
less satisfying, less "real" than we believed ... ·. 
Materialism ... is right as against those theories which 
make the world an illusion or a dream of my own individual 
mind; but while it is right to insist on objectivity, it 
goes too far in describing the objective world not only as 
something different from, and incapable of being created 
or destroyed by, my own mind, but as something different 
and aloof from mind in general. (RP, 92-93). 
We shall find Collingwood making this point in various forms 
repeatedly throughout his philosophical writings, but usually 
not in defense of materialism. Whatever mind may make of the 
world, it is not simply the creation of one's own imagination 
--a view that Collingwood called "subjective idealism" (RP, 
120) 6 and one which he tended to associate with solipsism. 
6This is the title Hegel applied to the Kantian cri-
tical philosophy. Hegel faulted Kant for stopping short with 
the analysis of experience at that point at which objects of 
experience are shown to be mere appearances (phenomena), 
whereas the view that Hegel advocates is absolute idealism, 
which holds that objects of experience are not only mere phe-
nomena for us but in their own nature, since their existence 
is founded not in themselves but in the universal divine Idea. 
Cf. The Logic of Hegel, tr. from The Encyclopedia of the Phil-
osophical Sciences by William Wallace (Oxford, 1873), pp. 93-
94. Kant himself refuted a form of idealism which he called 
"material idealism"--the theory which declares the existence 
of objects in space outside us to be merely doubtful and in-
demonstrable (the problematic idealism of Descartes) or to be 
false and impossible (the dogmatic idealism of Berkeley)--Im-
manuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, tr. by N. Kemp Smith 
(New York, 1961), B 274, p:-244. Collingwood's use of the 
term is closer to Kant's "material idealism" than to Hegel's 
"subjective idealism." 
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The outcome of the discussion of the matter vs. mind 
controversy is that "we cannot conceive matter without a.scrib-
ing to it some qualities of mind, nor mind without ascribing 
to it some qualities of matter" (RP, 93-94)--in short, the 
"mixed" hypothesis. But even here there is a definite tilt 
towards idealism. 
To ask whether mind is a form of matter or matter a form 
of mind is largely a question of words. The important 
thing is that we should be able to bring the two into re-
lation at all; that we should hold such a conception of 
matter as does not prevent us from admitting truth, moral-
ity, and life as a whole to be real facts, and that we 
should hold such a conception of mind as does not reduce 
the world to an illusion and experience to a dream. The 
first of these errors is that of crude materialism, and 
the second that of an equally crude idealism. The view 
for which we are contending would claim the title of ide-
alism rather than materialism, but only because the cur-
rent conception of mind seems a more adequate description 
of the world than the current conception of matter. We 
are laying stress on the fact that the world is the place 
of freedom and consciousness, not of blind determinism; 
and at present this can best be convey;d by saying that 
mind is the one reality. (RP, 94-95). 
A similar fate awaits the immanence-transcendence 
question in a later chapter. God must be regarded as both im-
manent and transcendent: immanent because all human knowledge 
and goodness are the very indwelling of his spirit in the 
7
collingwood closes the chapter with the suggestion 
that he does not wish to exclude a "higher materialism" which 
would "regard matter as nothing else than mind itself in its 
concrete existence, and mind as the life and operation of mat-
ter"--but this must wait for physics to develop to the point 
where it can adopt a principle which would regard all matter 
as in its degree a form of life (RP, 95). 
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mind of man; and transcendent because God has attained these 
things whether or not man attains them, his being not depend-
ing upon the success of human endeavor (RP, 119). But when 
he asks if God exists only as a "spirit in our hearts" or if 
he is also a real person "with a life of his own, whether we 
know him or not," he confesses that this is not an easy phil-
osophical problem to solve. 
The difficulty of answering this question is bound up with 
a well-known philosophical puzzle, the puzzle of how to 
prove the existence of anything except as present to the 
mind. If it is true that things cease to exist when we 
are not thinking of them, ... then it follows by the 
same argument that God is immanent only, and exists nowhere 
but in the mind of men. But we cannot really believe that 
these things are so . . . . The arguments for pure imma-
nence are at bottom identical with the philosophical creed 
of subjective idealism, and with that creed they stand or 
fall. (RP, 119-20; FR, 188-89). 
If God is not entirely an immanent idea, what objec-
tive status does the concept have? Can the existence of God 
be proven? Collingwood argues that the traditional proofs for 
the existence of God are not so much impossible as premature: 
what is required is to first define what one means by "God," 
which involves finding some definite content to the concept--
the task of theology. "No one can prove that God exists, if 
no definite significance is attached to the words" (RP, 64). 8 
8
collingwood does not deny that the existence of God 
can be proven--he merely postpones it until after an adequate 
concept of God has been developed. But after he spends the 
remainder of Religion and Philosophy expending considerable 
effort to develop just such a concept, he does not conclude 
his study with any such proof. Nor does one appear in any of 
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The only course open to the sceptic who doubts the existence 
of God is to discover what he actually thinks, and then to 
find out if that idea was justified or not (RP, 69). 
This is an extension of a principle which Collingwood 
lays down as fundamental to all thought, and which is an early 
statement of the principle of intentionality, the modifica-
tion of which we will be watching closely in succeeding chap-
ters. In its earlie~formulation it is expressed as follows: 
The mind is specifically that which knows the object .. 
The mind seems to be not so much that which thinks 
as the thinking itself; it is not an active thing so much 
as an activity. Its esse is cogitare .... All con-
sciousness is the consciousness of something definite, 
the thought of this thing or of that thing; there is no 
thought in general but only particular thoughts about par-
ticular things. The esse of mind is not cogitare simply, 
but de hac re cogitare. (RP, 100; FR, 172). 
When two minds think the same thought it is never exactly the 
same in terms of emphasis or applications peculiar to the in-
dividual; but that does not mean that such a difference de-
stroys the identity of the truth, or its ability to be the 
same truth thought by two different minds (RP, 106; FR, 177). 
his writings. What one finds instead is a favorable discus-
sion of the ontological argument in the Essay on Philosophical 
Method (EPM, 124-26), and a very idiomatic use of the argument 
in the Essay on Metaphysics (EM, 185-90), which declares that 
the statement-rrGod exists" is not a verifiably true or false 
proposition, but an absolute presupposition, and therefore 
that the ontological proof is only a way for Christians like 
St. Anselm to say what in fact they believe. If Religion and 
Philosophy is Collingwood's theology, his philosophy of reli-
gion remains unpublished. (Cf. RP, 16; FR, 53-54). 
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In Chapter VI we shall take up the issue of Collingwood's use 
of the term "identity" as he uses it in Religion and Philoso-
QhY and Speculum Mentis. 9 
On the strength of the passages we have been examining 
we can say that in this early publication Collingwood already 
shows a leaning toward an epistemological form of idealism, 
but at the same time he rejects both a "metaphysical" or sub-
jective idealism which would assert that objects of knowledge 
are simple creations or imaginings of subjective consciousness. 
With respect to realism he displays a certain tolerance--as in 
the notion of "fact" as something independent of any knowledge 
of it, and in the distinction between an act of consciousness 
and its object (although he says nothing about the esse of the 
object to correspond to the esse of consciousness). Similarly 
9our purpose in this chapter is to examine Colling-
wood's early views on realism and idealism, and it is only 
secondary to this that we have become involved in the issues 
of the philosophy of religion. But we do not mean to leave 
the reader dangling on the issues we have just raised--some 
of which we will meet again repeatedly in different chapters. 
The conception of God that Collingwood develops in Religion 
and Philosophy is basically that of the Christian God--center-
ing on the Incarnation as the means by which the creator God 
overcomes his transcendence. The unity of man and God occurs 
through a "concrete union . . . attained in and by the iden-
tification of the self in all its aspects with the perfect 
mind of God" (RP, 150; FR, 254). This is achieved in the per-
son of the Christ, who "has absolute experience of the nature 
of God and lives in absolute free obedience to his will" (RP, 
~66; FR, 267). Insofar as any man achieves a similar concrete 
ldentity of will with the mind of God he achieves union with 
God (RP, 160, 167; FR, 262, 268). Whether such a person as 
the Christ actually existed is an historical issue that Col-
lingwood declines to consider (RP, 151; FR, 254). 
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he shows a tolerance for the positive aspects of materialism 
as a philosophy which, with proper modifications, is able to 
satisfy the scientific demand for uniformity and generality. 
We have not yet found any form of the anti-realism argument 
as outlined in the Autobiography, nor any linkage of realism 
and abstraction. The situation, in short, is pretty much what 
we would expect it to be on the grounds of the autobiographi-
cal interpretation. 
3. Idealism, the Absolute, and the Metaphysic of Knowledge. 
In a short piece published after a symposium in 1923 
(the year before Speculum Mentis), Collingwood responded to a 
paper by Evelyn Underhill on the "new idealism"--by which she 
meant the philosophy of Croce and Gentile (FYC, 85). Under-
hill charged the Italian idealists with failing to provide 
room for mysticism in their account of the forms of experi-
ence, and Collingwood (who had just finished translating Guido 
de Ruggiero's Modern Philosophy10 ) undertook a defense of Gen-
10collingwood translated three of Croce's works and 
two books by Croce's disciple, Guido de Ruggiero--see John-
ston, FYC, 66. Johnston's book also has a sketchy chapter on 
Collingwood's relation to Croce and the Italian idealists, 
whose influence on Collingwood Johnston aptly summarizes under 
the rubric formulated by Collingwood himself, that "to borrow 
is to interpret" (FYC, 89). "Collingwood asks us to focus not 
on what was borrowed, but on what led the borrower to select 
what he did .... It was the multiplicity of his interests 
and his command of many fields of learning which made Colling-
wood 'capable of borrowing' from Croce, Gentile, and Vico. It 
was his almost unique intellectual versatility which 'laid 
(Collingwood) open to their influence''' (FYC, 88-89). 
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tile's religious philosophy against her attack. The interest 
for us of this brief and tactful article is in the distiDC-
tions that Collingwood draws concerning idealism, which if 
they do not directly reflect his commitment to the school of 
thought he is discussing, at least indicates to us his under-
standing of it. 
Collingwood corrects Miss Underhill's misconception 
that the new idealism "dispenses with mysticism" in the sense 
that it ignores an intuitive or immediate consciousness of the 
supreme reality as one, eternal, and spiritual. On the con-
trary, both Croce and Gentile identify mysticism with reli-
gion (FR, 270). 11 Gentile in particular does not deny the 
existence of an absolute object of thought such as that which 
mystics contemplate--something that is one, eternal, and un-
changing; nor is Gentile's philosophy exhausted by calling it 
a philosophy of change like that of Bergso~ for whom absolute 
reality is an absolute flux (FR, 273). This misconception is 
taken over from Bosanquet, whose view Collingwood corrects as 
follows: 
11 collingwood recognizes that Croce did not represent 
religion as one of the "necessary forms of the spirit" in his 
systematic philosophy (FR, 270), but adds that it provides the 
hint of a new attitude towards religion that "in Gentile blos-
soms into a complete new attitude to religion" (FR, 271-72). 
Johnston adds that Croce "accords religion scant place," and 
that in this "he differs significantly from Collingwood, who 
all his life regarded religion as a necessary, even indispen-
sable component of culture" (FYC, 70). 
126 
reality, for Gentile, is history. Now history is not, 
as Miss Underhill assumes, a synonym for change. Change 
is ... a realistic concept, history an idealistic. That 
which changes is a mere object, which need not know that 
it is changing, and indeed which no one need know to be 
changing. The philosophy of change is a "metaphysics of 
being," that is, a philosophy which tries to describe the 
world as a thing in itself without raising the question 
how it comes to be known. And there can be little doubt 
that the philosophy of change makes the world unknowable. 
That which has a history, on the other hand, is a mind, 
for matter may change but it cannot be said to have a his-
tory .... Hence Gentile's philosophy is a "metaphysic 
of knowledge," that is to say, a philosophy which never 
loses sight of the question "how do we come to know what 
we know?" (FR, 274). 
In the light of what we shall find Collingwood saying in Spe-
culum Mentis in this and the next three chapters, it can hard-
ly be doubted that Collingwood would describe his own philoso-
phy as a "metaphysic of knowledge." 
But is that idealism? By 1923 it is clear that Col-
lingwood had recognized the essential ideality of history, and 
had already moved away from a conception of history as simply 
"factuality." In Chapter V we shall observe the staging of 
this development; at this point we are interested in the way 
in which Collingwood describes idealism. In the essay under 
consideration Collingwood finds in Gentile an expression of 
the common ground of all idealism (FR, 277), the double aspect 
of mind as both active and passive, expressed by Gentile as 
the identity of act and fact: 
(C)hange in a mind must be change for that mind, a change 
of which that mind is conscious; and to be conscious of it, 
the mind must somehow be raised above it. How is this ap-
parent contradiction to be realized? How is the mind to 
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be at once in change and out of change? Only if the mind 
originates change in itself. For then, as the source and 
ground of change, it will not be subject to change; while 
on the other hand, as undergoing change through its ·own 
free act, it will exhibit change. This double aspect of 
the mind as active and passive is the very heart of Gen-
tile's philosophy. It is his favorite distinction of act 
and fact. (FR, 275). 
But if the identity of act and fact is the equivalent of Cro-
ce's principle of immanence, what room is there for a princi-
ple of transcendence? Gentile assigns the name of religion or 
mysticism to the losing of the mind in its object--the trans-
cendent element of all human life. The synthesis of the im-
manent element of life (which Gentile calls art) with the 
transcendent is philosophy, which seeks the absolute, defined 
(citing Hegel for support) as "that which has reconciled its 
own opposite to itself, and therefore no longer stands in op-
position to it" (FR, 276). Collingwood therefore states that 
in pursuing the absolute, Gentile's philosophy ''is as convinced 
of the necessity of transcendence as Miss Underhill herself .. 
. . That reconciliation of the opposing principles of imman-
ence and transcendence which both regard as possible, neces-
sary, and indeed actual, she calls mysticism, and ((Gentile)) 
calls it philosophy" ( FR, 2 76- 77). It is, he adds, in basic 
' 
agreement with Hegel's Absolute Spirit and the post-Kantian 
tradition in philosophy (FR, 277). For this tradition, mysti-
cism is a thing which cannot be dispensed with--not as some-
thing intuitional or wholly immediate, but as something assim-
ilated by the labor of the life of the mind (FR, 278-79). 
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The necessity of mystical experience lies in the prin-
ciple that we discover new truths neither by the infer-
ence of the logic-books nor by the intuition of Aristotle, 
but by an act of mind which reaches out beyond the g1ven, 
grasps the new thought as it were in the dark, and only 
after that consolidates its new conquest by building up 
to it a bridge of reasoned proof. (FR, 281). 
In this discussion of Gentile we find Collingwood de-
fending a form of absolute idealism, and defending it against 
attack not from the point of view of someone who finds it 
problematic in the sense of failing to show how the object is 
unaffected by the knowing of it (epistemological realism), but 
from the point of view of someone who charges it with failing 
to provide sufficient grounds for mystical religious experi-
ence. In the next section we shall find Collingwood widening 
this discussion to include all forms of experience, and deepen-
ing his commitment to absolute idealism at the same time that 
he begins to lay the foundation for moving beyond it. 
4. Absolute Idealism and the Forms of Experience. 
In 1916, when Religion and Philosophy was published, 
we found Collingwood stating that the argument he was advocat-
ing did not conflict with either realism or idealism in their 
more satisfactory forms. By 1924 not only had his point of 
view shifted in the direction of absolute idealism, but his 
earlier tolerance had completely vanished. In Speculum Mentis 
Collingwood was prepared to take a stronger stand against re-
alism and all its ramifications, and it was this work that 
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earned him the reputation of being an "idealist." It is a 1 a-
bel that he explicitly rejected, but in much the same sense 
that he had rejected it in Religion and Philosophy: 
Idealism ... is the doctrine th~t the world is made, so 
to speak, of mind; and is regarded as the opposite of ma-
terialism or the doctrine that the world is made of matter. 
Both of these theories begin by abstracting the object of 
knowledge from the subject, and both go on by inquiring 
into the nature of the object in this abstraction, regard-
ed as a thing in itself. Both agree in committing the fun-
damental error of separating the metaphysical inquiry as 
to what the world is in itself from the psychological in-
quiry as to how we come to know it. Idealism in this 
sense leaves unreconciled the opposition between subject 
and object, and therefore sets the object outside the sub-
ject; ... it tries to bridge the gap by ascribing to the 
object some kind of consubstantiality with the subject, 
turning it into another mind, a society of minds (spirit-
ual pluralism) or an infinite mind (theism). With any-
thing which deserves the name of idealism in this sense we 
have nothing to do except reject it. (SM, 266-67). 
What is being rejected is the "metaphysical idealism" that he 
had contrasted with materialism in Religion and Philosophy. 
But what of the "epistemological idealism" that is 
contrasted with realism over the issue of whether knowledge 
makes a difference to the object known? Speculum Mentis 
widens our horizon beyond the object of religious knowledge; 
it is an analysis of successive "forms of experience," each 
of which competes with all the others for the "prize of truth" 
--that is, the successful fulfillment of its claim to be 
true knowledge (SM, 42). Each form of experience is a con-
scious attitude with respect to the known, an activity which 
has both cognitive and practical aspects (SM, 39, 42, 44). 
In short, each is knowledge claiming to be wisdom. 
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Five such forms of experience are examined--art, reli-
gion, science, history, and philosophy--although the list is 
not exhaustive of all possible forms (SM, 41, 57, 280). As 
concrete activities engaging the whole self, each form of ex-
perience regards the others as illegitimate contenders for the 
prize of truth, "rival ways of conceiving the whole"--the 
"whole" being that conception of reality which will allow the 
mind to live the unified life that it sees and needs in order 
to be totally satisfied (SM, 36-37, 47-48). Consequently the 
forms of experience cannot be regarded as mere species of a 
genus, each taking a portion of the prize: "each denies the 
others; and because they are not species they have not that 
indifference with respect to one another which characterizes 
abstract logical classifications" (SM, 55). Each is to be ex-
amined on its own merits or in accordance with its own claims, 
in order to discover whether its claim is consistent with its 
actual performance. 
Our map ((of knowledge)) ... is to be a statement of the 
essential nature or structure of each successive form of 
experience, based on actual knowledge of that form from 
within, and concentrated upon the search for inconsisten-
cies, rifts which when we come to put a strain on the fab-
ric will widen and deepen and ultimately destroy it. (SM, 
46). 
When such inconsistencies appear it is the task of a higher-
131 
order form of experience to repair the damage by constructing 
"from without" a self-conscious justification of the pri)llary, 
inconsistent form (SM, 250, 252-55). 
Since we will be engaging in an explicit discussion of 
the form of experience called science in Chapter IV, of history 
in Chapter V, and of the overall argument of Speculum Mentis 
in Chapter VI, rather than attempting a detailed analysis of 
the contents at this point we shall first present Collingwood's 
own summary of the five forms of experience in the Outlines of 
~ Philosophy of Art which appeared the following year (re-
printed in EPA, 45-154), and then focus on those sections of 
Speculum Mentis which particularly reveal Collingwood's views 
on idealism and realism. 
After stating at some length a general theory of art, 
Collingwood locates art within the context of the life of the 
spirit, which he characterizes as follows: 
The life of the spirit is an indivisible whole within 
which are necessary and permanent distinctions: permanent 
in the sense that the spirit in its own activity perpetu-
ally affirms them, and necessary in the sense that the at-
tempt not to affirm them would merely result in affirming 
them over again. Fundamentally, the spirit is awareness 
or consciousness, which implies a prima facie distinc-
tion between the conscious spirit and the world of which 
it is conscious; but since this awareness is itself an 
act, a self-modification on the part of the spirit, the 
passivity of pure awareness rests upon the creativity of 
action, and the life of the spirit is a whole within which 
consciousness and action, awareness of the world and modi-
fication of the world are correlative elements. The unity 
of these two elements is feeling, where that of which we 
are aware is our own states, and these states are identi-
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cal with the feeling of them: they are at once states of 
consciousness and objects of consciousness.(EPA, 137-38). 
coming upon this pa~sage after reading Collingwood's defense 
of "the new idealism" it is hardly possible to ignore Colling-
wood's commitment to an idealism at least similar to that of 
the Italian philosophers, Croce and Gentile. For certainly 
the view expressed herE: represents the unity of "act and fact" 
or the duality of spirit or consciousness as both active and 
passive--a view that Collingwood had called the common ground 
of all idealism. Furthermore it appears that this distinction 
is at least post-Kantian, and probably Hegelian: the con-
sciousness-object distinction is described as occurring within 
spirit ("a self-modification on the part of spirit") rather 
than forming the limit of spirit beyond which lies an unintel-
ligible thing-in-itself. 
Furthermore Collingwood imbues this structure with an 
internal dynamism which propels it through the stages of the 
"forms of experience": 
Hence a rhythm in which awareness and activity concentrate 
themselves into the unity of feeling, and feeling again 
articulates itself into awareness and activity, is funda-
mental in all aspects of spiritual life. But life is not 
a mere rotation of three psychological categories in a 
rhythmical montony. This triple rhythm is present in all 
life, but it is never twice alike; its whole character is 
altered by the specific difference of the experience in 
which it is embodied. These differences emerge in the 
course of a process which on its theoretical side may be 
called the spirit's attempt to know itself, on its practi-
cal side the spirit's attempt to create itself. To know 
itself means also knowing its world, and to create itself 
means creating its world; its world in the former case 
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means the world of which it is aware, in the latter case 
the world in which it can live. (EPA, 138). 
It is clear that when Collingwood refers to "objects" or "the 
world" he means primarily objects of consciousness--what he 
had called, in Religion and Philosophy, de hac re cogitare. 
It refers to the objective correlate of acts of consciousness, 
and when the term "object" is used henceforth without further 
qualification this is the sense we shall have in mind. If we 
mean to refer to a "thing" we shall call it a "physical ob-
ject" or an object having extramental reference. 
The first stage in the life of spirit is the life of 
art or the pure act of imagination--i.e. "the act of conscious-
ness which presents to itself an object of whose relation to 
other objects it takes no cognizance" (EPA, 139). It is im-
portant to bear in mind that by imagination Collingwood does 
not mean a faculty which creates objects which appear to be 
presented in perception; in an earlier section of this essay 
Collingwood makes this point more clearly than he ever did in 
his subsequent writings: 
In art there are always a subject and an object, a con-
templator and something contemplated. But the subject's 
activity, the object's nature, and the character of the 
relation between them have certain peculiarities which 
distinguish the case of art from other cases. What the 
subject does is to imagine: the object is an imaginary 
object, and the relation between them is that the indi-
vidual or empirical act of imagining creates the object. 
In knowledge, on the other hand, the object is real; and 
the relation between them is that the empirical act of 
knowing presupposes the object and does not create it. 
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This may be said without prejudice to the idealistic view 
that there is an absolute or transcendent sense in which 
knowing creates its object; for no idealist is so i~nocent 
as to confuse knowledge with imagination and to suppose 
that what we generally call knowing is simply imagining. 
(EPA, 52). 
The caveat against the "idealist" here is clearly against the 
''subjective idealist." Furthermore by "the empirical act of 
knowing" Collingwood clearly means perception. We shall find 
that throughout Collingwood's writings he never intimates that 
in perception consciousness creates an object ex nihilo: and 
this is the abhorent sense of "idealist" that he rejected 
throughout his published works. 
If the essence of artistic consciousness or aesthetic 
experience is its monadism, i.e. its contemplation of an ob-
ject without relating it to other objects, its practical as-
pect appears in play--the immersing of ourselves in an ac-
tivity without any question as to the relation of this activ-
ity and anything else. "Just as art does not explain itself 
by stating reasons, so play does not explain itself by stat-
ing reasons; and immediacy means the absence of reasons" (EPA, 
139-40). But neither simple imagination nor simple play can 
remain in this immediacy as a complete and self-contained form 
of consciousness: 
It is only within a consciousness which distinguishes 
truth from falsehood that we can find in actual existence 
that consciousness which does not distinguish them . . . . 
The question "what am I?" can therefore no longer be an-
swered in terms of imagination; I am not merely an imagin-
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er but a thinker. The question "what is my world?" must 
be answered by saying that it is a world not merely of 
fancies but of realities. But if I who think am als.o the 
I who imagine, it would seem natural to superimpose the 
act of thinking on the act of imagining in such a way that 
the real is merely one division of the imaginary. The 
only world whose existence we have learned to recognize is 
the world of our own imaginations; and when the distinc-
tion between reality and unreality forces itself upon us 
. . . we impose this distinction upon the world of imagin-
ations, and regard certain imaginations as true and others 
as false. To do this is to break with the life of art; 
for . . . now we are asserting one imaginary object as 
real, and denying another as unreal; and to do this is to 
embark upon the life of religion. (EPA, 140-41). 
I have quoted this passage at some length because it 
is our first contact with a transition between forms of con-
sciousness, and is expressed without much of the complicating 
circumlocutions of Speculum Mentis. In fact it is exemplary 
in its simplicity, and gives us a clear sense of how Colling-
wood envisioned distinctions occurring within the unified life 
of the spirit: when a distinction like that between reality 
and unreality "forces" itself upon us, it is imposed on the 
unity of the form of consciousness which thereafter regards 
its objects under this oppositional distinction. In religion 
this takes the form of mythological or metaphorical expression, 
insofar as religion "says one thing and means another" by us-
ing imagery to convey a truth. Nevertheless religion marks 
an advance in the life of spirit: 
(I)n religion that indifference to the distinction be-
tween real and unreal, which is the essence of art, is 
abolished. Religion is essentially a quest after truth 
and explicitly conscious of itself as such a quest. But 
the truth which it can and does discover is a truth which 
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is always hidden from view in a reliquary of symbolism: 
we see the imagery, but we do not see the truth; we are 
only conscious that the truth is there, and its pres~nce 
converts the beauty of the imagery into holiness. But 
inasmuch as this holiness is a property of a mere symbol, 
religion always contains an element of idolatry and su-
perstition. (EPA, 141).12 
Religion, like art, cannot survive the disruptive force 
of the tension between metaphorical and literal language. When 
it attempts to overcome its own superstitious tendencies it is 
forced to distinguish thought from its own imagery, aud in the 
process "the symbol loses its holiness and becomes merely sig-
nificant" (EPA, 142). With the distinction between metaphori-
cal and literal expression the life of explicit or self-
conscious thought is reached. While art forgets the presence 
of thought and concentrates on the pure imagery of language, 
and where religious thought was immediately identified with the 
language expressing it, scientific consciousness separates 
thought from language and intellect from imagination. 
Here thought is regarded as an activity self-contained and 
self-sufficient, and its object as a self-contained and 
self-sufficient intelligible world, reached through, but 
lying behind, the sensible world. The aim of science is 
to apprehend this purely intelligible world as a thing in 
itself, an object which is what it is independently of all 
thinking .... The world of thought is the universal, 
the timeless and spaceless, the absolutely necessary, 
whereas the world of sense is the contingent, the changing 
12Remarks like this make it difficult to assess Col-
lingwood's true estimate of religion, which here seems to have 
slipped somewhat under the high position he accords it in Reli-
gion and Philosophy. In Chapter VI we shall review Collingwood's 
remarks about religious consciousness and try to judge the ex-
tent to which his view of religion is reductive. 
and moving appearance which somehow indicates or sym-
bolizes it. (EPA, 142). 
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The distinction is the separation of reality from appearance, 
the necessary from the contingent, which ultimately poses prob-
lems for scientific consciousness. Science cannot bridge the 
gap between the abstract universal and the particular, the ne-
13 cessary and the contingent, reality and appearance. 
The overcoming of this opposition is the achievement 
of the form of experience known as history. 
Appearance and reality, imagination and thought, have been 
merely distinguished and not related: they must somehow be 
brought together again and shown to be equally necessary, 
each to the other. This need is satisfied by the histori-
cal consciousness, whose object is the individual; no 
longer an abstract universal divorced from its own equally 
abstract particulars, but a universal that particularizes 
itself, a particular constituted by its own universality. 
For history, the truth is no longer an abstract necessity 
which nowhere actually exists; it is concrete and actual, 
it is real in every sense of the word, while the truth of 
science is a reality which is in one sense utterly unreal, 
and ideal never realized, a law which has no instances. 
(EPA, 143). 
13collingwood's view of science in these early writ-
ings is primarily based on the classical Greek notions of sci-
ence, perhaps modified by Renaissance advances, but hardly 
based on first-hand knowledge of work in the physical and bio-
logical sciences of his day. It is therefore s~at under-
standable why this form of experience is least articulated and 
not altogether satisfactory. Having stated the requirement 
for other forms of experience that the philosopher of it must 
be one who not only observes the experience of others but has 
engaged in the activity for himself (EPA, 153), Collingwood 
was in a weak position to describe the nature of scientific ex-
perience. Nevertheless we shall try always to evaluate what he 
says about it as a reflection of his own understanding of it ra-
ther than what natural science is in itself or in the contem-
porary understanding of it. What he.does understand by it is 
sometimes quite remarkable, as we shall see in Chapter IV. 
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But history too has its fatal flaw. The historian presumes a 
world of fact which is already there for him to discover., and 
for which the historian is a mere spectator. The fact is a 
thing in itself, "a thing whose existence and nature are sup-
posed to be wholly independent of the thinker" (EPA, 143). 
This constitutes the separation of subject and object--a relic 
of the abstractness of science remaining in history. 14 
This abstractness is only overcome in philosophy. The ob-
ject of philosophy is nothing short of reality, a reality 
which includes both the fact of which the historian is 
aware and his awareness of that fact. The philosopher 
... is not, like the historian, outside his own pic-
ture; he sees himself as part of the historical process 
which he studies, and therefore part of his problem is to 
understand how that historical process has thrown up in 
its development an organ--namely himself--which is at once 
a part of it and the spectator of it. With this clue in 
his hand ... he is able to reinterpret that process it-
self, and to see in every phase of it a nisus towards 
self-consciousness. And in realizing that history is the 
emergence of the spirit's consciousness of itself he is 
actually achieving that consciousness .... His know-
ledge is therefore explicitly action; he is creating him-
self by knowing himself, and so creating for himself an 
intelligible world, the world of the spirit in general. 
(EPA, 143-44). 
Since we are treading on the margins of territories that we 
prefer to leave for later chapters, we shall leave off this 
discussion of the forms of experience with the conception of 
philosophy just given. In Chapter VI we shall be in a better 
14As Collingwood's idea of history developed he strug-
gled against this very criticism, and his development of the 
concept of "re-enactment" is an attempt to overcome the diffi-
culty completely. The extent to which this constitutes an ad-
equate rapprochement between history and philosophy will be 
evaluated in Chapter IX. 
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position to evaluate Collingwood's project for a philosophy 
of "absolute knowledge." 
But we have several particular ideas from Speculum 
Mentis to attend to, and to these we must now turn. 
5. Speculum Mentis and the Emergence of Explicit Anti-Realism. 
In the last section when we discussed the way in which 
the five forms of experience competed, as rival ways of con-
ceiving the whole, for the prize of truth, we noted that when 
a particular form of experience exhibits inconsistencies it be-
comes the task of a higher form of experience to resolve the 
disparity. That form of experience is philosophy, whose main 
task is to attain self-consciousness and therefore to overcome 
all the contradictions that arise due to the subject-object 
dichotomy. In Speculum Mentis this process gives rise to the 
construction of what Collingwood calls "dogmatic philosophy"--
i.e. a form of consciousness which is conscious of itself, but 
imposes on itself the limits of a particular form of experi-
ence--art, religion, etc.--which it undertakes to justify as 
the only true form of experience. But these are errors that 
the mind makes about itself, and since the esse of mind is de 
hac re cogitare, it follows that when the mind takes itself 
as its object, an error about that object is an error that it 
makes about itself--an error that is immediately reflected in 
the mind's activities under the erroneous conception of it-
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self: "the mind, having formed a false conception of itself, 
tries to live up to that conception. But the falseness Df 
the conception just means that it cannot be 'lived up to"' 
( SM, 2 50) . 
Art, religion, science, and history are thus philosophi-
cal errors, and owe their characteristics, and the char-
acteristics attributed by them to their ostensible ob-
jects, to the initial error on which each is based .. 
. . Each grasps "one aspect of the truth," as we say, 
forgetting that truth is a whole whose aspects cannot be 
thus separated: each is true, even while it is false .. 
. . Error is always present in truth, but negatively pres-
ent, that is to say, it is present as that which is denied 
.... This interdependence of truth and error, error 
containing truth positively and truth containing error 
negatively, is not only a fact easily verified in empiri-
cal observation ... but is a corollary of the fact that 
all knowledge is self-knowledge, and every error an error 
about the knowing mind. Hence an abstraction which sepa-
rates subject and object also separates truth and error 
(good and evil, and so on), and ... is a logical conse-
quence of realism, for if there were a world of real ob-
jects completely other than the mind, absolute errors 
could no doubt be made concerning them. (SM, 250-52). 
Here for the first time we encounter Collingwood at-
tributing to realism all the errors that the mind makes about 
itself. But if we are to become aware of the genesis of this 
generalization, we must return to the conception of "fact" 
with which we began our investigation of realism in the sec-
tion on Religion and Philosophy. Where in that earlier work 
Collingwood appeared to be content with leaving uncriticized 
the concept of historical "fact" as "something independent 
of my own or your knowledge of it," this immunity is no longer 
respected. The philosopher knows what the historian does not 
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know, "that his own knowledge of facts is organic to the facts 
themselves, that his mind is these facts knowing themselves 
and these facts are his mind knowing itself" (SM, 295; cf. SM, 
287). Modern realism arises from the discovery of the concept 
of fact, which soon develops into the "historical form of dog-
matism" (SM, 281): 
Historical dogmatism is the assertion of fact as ultimate-
ly real, and fact means not only the facts of "history" 
but the facts of perception. Such a dogmatism may take a 
considerable number of forms ((several of which Colling-
wood lists: monism and pluralism, intuitionism and intel-
lectualism, materialism and spiritualism, etc.)) .... 
That which unites all these divergent views is their com-
mon assertion of the ·positivity of the object, that is, 
their denial that the object is conditioned or affected 
by becoming known to any thinking mind or to what, with 
a question-begging epithet, is sometimes called finite 
mind: its finiteness being just this indifference to it 
on the part of its object. Such a realistic account of 
the object, as positive fact indifferent to its being 
known, is at first sight compatible with any theory as to 
what the ultimate nature of this object may be; and so we 
get all manner of realisms ... all equally capable of 
being held in combination with the fundamental thesis 
of realism, which is distinguished from them as "theory 
of knowledge" from "metaphysics." (SM, 282-83). 
Here we find a clear statement of what the Autobio-
graphy called the central doctrine of realism. This formula-
tion never changed substantially in Collingwood's writings. 15 
15cf. EPA, 182-83 (1925); EPH, 99-100 (1933); EPM, 
161-62, 169-70 (1933); IH, v, 142 (1936). The term "realism" 
does not appear in some of the later writings because the move-
ment ceased to maintain its positions under that title. But 
Collingwood's arguments were directed against the same posi-
tions as they were now maintained under the titles of positiv-
ism and empiricism: cf. PA, 130-31, 149-51 (1938); EM, 34-35, 
37-38, 337-38 (1940); NL, 5.2, 5.31-5.32, 5.39 (1942). 
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Just as in the Autobiography it is presented primarily as a 
negative thesis: the negative formula that knowledge can make 
no difference to its object. But the realist is caught in a 
positive antithesis to which he is equally committed--a coin-
cidentia oppositorum which could not help but embarrass a sub-
scriber to formal logic. If reality consists of a collection 
of objects independent of the mind which knows them, then a 
pluralistic realism is affirmed--a universe in which objects 
and minds both occur. But on the other hand the historian 
presumes that all facts fall into place in a single all-embrac-
ing system of fact, and this system is the absolute, the ulti-
mate reality--a monistic realism which conflicts with its la-
tent pluralism precisely over the status of the thinker. Col-
lingwood phrases the dilemma as follows: 
For either the thinker himself falls inside the absolute 
whole or he does not. If he does then differences in his 
thought about it make a difference to it, and the more 
concretely real--that is, organized and interconnected in 
all its parts--it is, the more fundamental these differ-
ences will be and the more completely the positivity of 
fact is lost. If he does not, then the monistic doctrine 
is surrendered and we return to pluralism. (SM, 283-84). 
While this is an issue that appears to arise only from within 
the perspective of the form of experience called philosophy, 
Collingwood emphasizes that it is a problem that arises from 
within the historical standpoint itself. The fundamental 
principle of history, the concreteness of the object, makes 
it impossible for it to define its object in such a way that 
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it leaves out the subject, i.e. the historian, and "compels 
us to recognize an object to which the subject is organ~c, 
in the sense that the subject's consciousness of it makes a 
real difference to it as a whole and to all its parts," so 
that "(b)eing known, whether truly known or erroneously known, 
must make a difference to the object" (SM, 244). 
Just as the formulation of the central doctrine of 
realism corresponds to the statement of it in the Autobiogra-
EQy, so one also finds in Speculum Mentis a rejection of the 
principle in an argument employing the same strategy. However 
the argument introduces a complication in the form of the 
principle of abstraction, an issue to which we shall return 
after having a look at the argument. 
(A)ny object considered in abstraction from a mind which 
knows it is neither material nor mental, but an illusion, 
a false abstraction. Thus we do not say that the objec-
tive world in itself is mental. If we are asked what it 
is apart from a mind that knows it, we shall answer that 
it is not "apart from" such a mind; it is "with" it in 
the sense of being known by it. If we are asked what it 
would be apart from such a mind, we shall answer that the 
very question implies the suggestio falsi that we can de-
scribe that which by definition is unknown. (SM, 267-68; 
cf. SM, 241). 
Notice that the nerve of this argument is the absurdity that 
results from suggesting that we can describe (and hence know) 
what has been defined as something that is unknown, i.e. the 
world as it is "apart from" the mind which knows it. This is 
slightly different wording from the Autobiography, but essen-
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tially the same argument as the one that he claims to have 
given at Oxford in a paper which refuted the central negative 
tenet of realism (A, 44). It is also noteworthy that although 
the phrase "in abstraction from" is employed in connection 
with this refutation of realism, its use in the argument is 
confined to the meaning, "apart from," as is indicated by the 
fact that Collingwood replaces the phrase with this expression 
without any change in the resulting sense of the argument. 
But since Alan Donagan has made the issue of abstrac-
tion central to his interpretation of Collingwood's develop-
ment (see Chapter I), we should take careful note of this mean-
ing of the term in Speculum Mentis, so that when we encounter 
it again in its altered meaning in Chapter VIII we shall have 
some basis for comparison. Furthermore it plays such a prom-
inent role in Speculum Mentis and its connection with realism 
is so strong that it would be hard to ignore it. Collingwood 
himself ties the concepts of realism and abstraction together: 
Such was ... and to some extent still is, the belief of 
eminent realists, who sum up their own position in the 
negative formula that knowledge can make no difference to 
its object. On the other hand, it is not possible to as-
sert so much as this without asserting more, namely the 
principle of abstract thought; for what is explicitly as-
serted is the complete separateness of subject and object, 
their independence of one another: and this implies that 
there are facts in existence which are thus completely in-
dependent. It is therefore correct to maintain that re-
alism commits its author to the principle of pluralism; 
and pluralism only means the scientific abstraction of the 
universal from its particulars. This path, therefore, 
leads from historical dogmatism back to scientific dogma-
tism. (SM, 283). 
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It is this double implication that causes the basic inconsis-
tency within realism itself, and is responsible for the dual 
role that realism is assigned in Speculum Mentis. On the one 
hand realism is identified with the particular form of dogma-
tism which he calls "historical"--history being taken as "the 
assertion of concrete fact," and realism as the assertion of 
this fact as ultimately real (SM, 281-87, 201-11). On the 
other hand realism is identified with all forms of dogmatism, 
insofar as realism is the willful resistance to any doubt 
that subject and object are in all cases separate from one an-
other, such an act of will being the essence of the dogmatic 
attitude (SM, 259). Realism thus appears to be identified 
with both the principle of abstraction (where abstraction 
means separation of subject and object), and the principle of 
concrete factuality. Collingwood himself recognizes this dual 
role, and charges the realists themselves with it: 
In spite of the simplicity of these difficulties, they 
have not as yet been fairly faced by a single realist 
with whose work the present writer is acquainted .... 
The fact is that modern realism is essentially inconsis-
tent. It is a halt, or rather a confused running to and 
fro, between two principles, the abstract concept and the 
concrete fact (SM, 284-85). 
Speculum Mentis thus emerges as a philosophical work 
which not only rejects realism but does so in large part on 
the grounds of its principle of abstraction. It is the latter 
principle which is responsible for all the errors that con-
sciousness makes about itself. "There is not only one dogma-
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tism; there are as many types of dogmatism as there are types 
of abstraction" (SM, 268). 16 "Every error is a lapse from 
concreteness into abstraction, and all abstraction is dogma-
tism" (SM, 288). "(T)he abstraction which separates subject 
and object also separates truth and error (good and evil, and 
so on) . . Such a melodramatic view of life is a logical 
consequence of realism (SM, 252; cf. SM, 259). "Abstract know-
ledge is the same as error .... But all error contains an 
element of truth and the error appears as the externality of 
the object, its otherness with respect to the mind" (SM, 313). 
Furthermore realism and abstractionism are also held 
responsible for most of the pernicious consequences of realism 
that Collingwood listed in the Autobiography: an ethics which 
separates knowledge from conduct (SM, 169-72); an epistemology 
which defines knowledge in terms of intuition (SM, 188-94; cf. SM, 
255, 262, 283, and 293); a metaphysics which deals with hypo-
statized or abstract universals concerning "nature or the ob-
jective world'' (SM, 271-81, especially 273 and 277; cf. SM, 
158-63); and political theory which, in the guise of utili-
tarianism, pits the subjective will of the individual (as de-
16 How many types is that? Clearly more than Colling-
wood enumerates in Speculum Mentis, since the abstraction that 
he embraced in later years is not one of those considered 
among the abstractive processes of the four sub-philosophical 
forms of experience. See Chapter VIII, below. We leave it 
to the reader to judge if that form of abstraction also quali-
fies as a dogmatism. 
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sire) against the objective will of society (as law), so that 
"in such a society one regards every one else as a means to 
his own ends"--a society in which, in other words, all goods 
are regarded as private (SM, 169-76, 221-31). 
Nor is this anti-realism peculiar to Speculum Mentis 
alone; many of these themes appear in different guises in ar-
ticles which he published during this period, and some of them 
are brought out even more forcefully in later publications. 
It is also instructive to pay attention to the synonyms that 
Collingwood uses for realism. Thus what is called the "plain 
man's metaphysic" in Religion and Philosophy, and "realism" 
in Speculum Mentis, is called "the plain man's realism" de-
fined as "to think of the object as a 'thing in itself,' a 
thing existing in and by itself" in a paper of 1928 on "The 
Limits of Historical Knowledge" (EPH, 99). In a 1921 paper 
on "Croce's Philosophy of History," Collingwood criticizes 
Croce for his "vacillation between naturalism, for which some 
statements are just true and other just false, and idealism, 
for which truth and falsehood are inextricably united in every 
judgement" (EPH, 12)--the former representing the Croce who 
is "the realist, dualist, empiricist, or naturalist, who de-
lights in formal distinctions and habitually works in dualis-
tic or transcendent terms"(EPH, 8). In passages such as these 
it is clear that Collingwood tends to use interchangeably 
terms like realism, naturalism, dualism, and empiricism. 
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This synonymous use of terms is further exemplified 
in a 1923 paper on "Sensation and Thought" in which Colling-
wood attacked what he called "the empiricist fallacy" of di-
vorcing sensuous appearance from objective reality, or assum-
ing "that a distinction could be made between what a thing 
looks like and what it is" 17--a distinction which is taken as 
"the infallible mark of dogmatism (and consequently of real-
ism) in all its varieties in Speculum Mentis (SM, 255; cf. SM, 
77). Here we have empiricism and naturalism described in 
terms identical with the epistemological doctrine of realism. 
In a 1925 paper on "Economics as a Philosophical Science" Col-
lingwood reinforces this identification of realism and empiri-
cism by defining "empirical thought" as "that which conceives 
its object as substance or thing," as opposed to philosophical 
thought, which conceives its object as activity. 18 The dis-
tinction is virtually repeated in "Political Action," a paper 
delivered before the Aristotelian Society in 1928. 19 
6. Conclusion. 
To say that "realism" as described in Speculum Mentis 
is a protean monstrosity would hardly be an exaggeration, and 
17p d · f h A . t t 1. S . XXIV ( 1923 rocee 1ngs £_ ~ r1s o e 1an oc1ety, -
1924)' p. 66. 
18International Journal of Ethics, XXXVI (1925), p. 162. 
19Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, XXIX (1928-
1929)' p. 155. - --
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one cannot help but wonder why any person of sound mind and 
civilized demeanor would ever willingly describe himself· as a 
realist. Are we dealing with something which has any histori-
cally evidenced counterpart, or is Collingwood presenting us 
with caricature as a foil for his protagonist, absolute ide-
alism? While we can certainly say that at this point that 
the autobiographical interpretation on the issue of realism 
11 d b h . d h b . . 20 is we supporte y t e ev1 ence we ave een exam1n1ng, 
we are left with a number of troubling problems which we shall 
have to monitor closely in the chapters which follow. 
20Two themes from his discussion of realism in the 
Autobiograthy have not been discussed at this point: the non-
eternity o philosophical problems and the falsity of realis-
tic logic with its claim to one-one correspondence of proposi-
tions with indicative sentences. We shall be examining Col-
lingwood's views on logic in the next chapter. Concerning the 
eternity of problems, the closest one comes to a statement of 
his position at this time is in a 1927 paper on "The Theory 
of Historical Cycles" (EPH, 76-89), which argues that in one 
sense it is true to say the the problem of politics is always 
the same, but in an equally important sense it is always dif-
ferent. The abstract goal of providing for the needs and bet-
terment of a society remains the same, but in each case this 
involves solving different concrete problems (EPH, 85-87). 
The reader of the quotations of the last few pages would not 
have much difficulty in constructing an argument to overcome 
this difficulty: the problems that philosophers are concerned 
with are eternal--the same questions from generation to gener-
ation--only insofar as they are initially taken as abstracted 
from the historical situations in which they arise. The re-
fusal to see these questions and their historical context as 
related is a willful dogmatism, and a species of the more fun-
~amental error of separating subject (the philosopher) and ob-
J:ct (the problems he considers). From an abstract point of 
~lew, then, there are eternal questions and concepts--and such 
1~ the point of view of the realist; from a concrete point of 
V1ew, there are not--and such is the view point of the phil-
osopher as historian. 
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The first of these is the issue we just raised. If 
there are distinctions which Collingwood is willing to make 
within the ranks of those who have been called idealists, 
so that when Collingwood denies that Speculum Mentis is ide-
alistic he can remain in good faith with his readers by as-
suming that they understand him to mean that he was not a sub-
jective idealist, are there no such equivalent distinctions to 
be found among the ranks of the realists? While Collingwood 
tells his readers that there are as many forms of error as 
there are forms of realism, he fails to tell the reader what 
those forms might be. We shall find in succeeding chapters 
that this issue remains unresolved, and that the "realists" 
remain not only a shadowy group of figures warming themselves 
by the bare fire of their negative thesis, but also that the 
position being rejected becomes progressively more indistinct 
as his polemic against it increases in its fury. 
What is clear from this polemic is that in discussing 
realism Collingwood himself always employs an abstract sense 
of "knowing" and "object" because he was dealing with the prob-
lem from what he considered to be the realist's own perspec-
tive, i.e. one which takes the perception of a physical, ex-
tra-mental object as paradigmatic for all forms of knowing. 21 
21 Passmore writes that "British philosophy, preoccu-
pied with the theory of perception, tends to classify philoso-
phical theories by their attitude to the perception of mater-
ial things: 'realism,' for it, is the view that material things 
exist even when they are not being perceived, and 'idealism' 
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This means that by "realism" Collingwood had in mind the epis-
temological viewpoint which looks to empiricism as its natural 
point of departure. That there might be non-empiricist real-
ists Collingwood never appears to have considere~ as is clear 
from the fact that even in his criticism of a realist he ad-
mired--Samuel Alexander--his main objection is to the fact 
that he adopts an acquaintance theory of knowledge (EM, 176-
78). His strategy is therefore to attack any sensation-bound 
theory of knowledge which neglects the active role of thought 
in perception, and to do so by emphasizing the contextual and 
interpretative aspects of the perceptual process. In Chapter 
VII we shall find Collingwood arguing against a different op-
ponent--G. E. Moore--and adopting a similar strategy, but one 
which argues that the expression "sense datum" is intrinsical-
ly absurd. But in both earlier and later writings, his point 
of departure is the abstract statement of the realists that 
"knowing makes no difference to the object known," where 
"knowing" means perception, and "object known" means object 
of perception. 
Secondly, what about the connection between realism 
and abstraction? Obviously an empiricist epistemology must 
account for the existence of universal concepts and many do 
is, most commonly, the view that they exist only as objects 
of perception." Op. cit., p. 49, note. 
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so by providing a theory which describes universals as aris-
ing by a process of abstraction from particular sensible in-
stances. In Speculum Mentis Collingwood does not enter into 
a criticism of any such abstractive process, nor is it the 
basis for attack on "abstraction" as the root error of realism 
and all forms of dogmatism. Speculum Mentis, adopting the 
stance of absolute idealism, assumes that absolute truth re-
sides only in the whole, and "abstraction" is whatever divides 
this whole into atomic parts. Just as Collingwood did not 
seem to consider the possibility of a non-empiricist realism, 
in Speculum Mentis he did not appear to consider a non-abstrac-
tive realism. But we found him in at least one passage argu-
ing against realism in a way which does not entail any commit-
ment to the principle of abstraction (SM, 267-68), at least 
not in all senses of the term. In Chapter VIII we shall find 
Collingwood proposing a peculiar description of abstraction 
that does not involve "separating" what is abstracted from its 
abstracting context, and at that point we shall have to assess 
whether such a process can be maintained within an anti-real-
istic framework. The statements "all abstraction is falsifi-
cation" and "abstraction is necessary for all true judgements" 
may not be contradictory when the appropriate interpreting 
qualifiers are added--"simple abstraction" in the first asser-
tion being semantically discernible from concrete or "real 
abstraction" in the second. But more of this in Chapter VIII. 
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Thirdly, we wish to point to a hidden presupposition 
in these early discussions of realism and idealism, but pne 
which Collingwood stated early on in his career, and never 
abandoned. In Religion and Philosophy Collingwood had already 
decided that there was no such thing as a fixed human nature. 
This appears to be a corollary of his principle that the esse 
of mind is de hac re cogitare. "The question to be asked 
about mind," writes Collingwood in 1916, "is not what it is, 
but what it does; a question which thelogic of things and 
qualities does not deal" (RP, 165; FR, 266)--and herein lies 
an enormous part of the program for the remainder of his phil-
osophy. Not only does it entail placing Collingwood on a col-
lision course with empirical psychology, which until the end 
of his life he criticized for treating mind as if it were a 
thing, and acts of thought as if they were events not signifi-
cantly different from those of the physical world; but it re-
quired him to formulate a logic alternative to that of "things 
and qualities" in order to have an instrument for dealing with 
what mind does without doing violence to it in the process. 
In the next chapter we shall look at Collingwood's early at-
tempts to satisfy this requirement. We can anticipate that, 
just as he found in the philosophy of absolute idealism a kind-
red spirit for his anti-realistic leanings, so he would also 
find in their logic an alternative to the formal logic he pre-
sumed to be the tool of the realist philosophers. 
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CHAPTER IV 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, LOGIC AND DIALECTIC 
1. Introduction. 
In the Autobiography Collingwood states that his Q-A 
logic was not explicitly formulated until he was obliged to 
confront the Albert Memorial on a daily basis during World 
War I; but by 1917 it was, since he states that it was at 
that time that he wrote a book called Truth and Contradiction, 
which was refused by a publisher. After writing the Autobiog-
raphy Collingwood deliberately destroyed it (A, 29-30, 42, 
99 n. 1). In Chapter I we noted that Knox found it incred-
ible that Collingwood could have worked out his theory of ab-
solute presuppositions (which the Autobiography describes as 
part of Q-A logic) prior to writing the Essay on Philosophical 
Method in 1932 (IH, x-xi). Since the Autobiography is not 
clear on what exactly is included in the version of Q-A logic 
presented in Truth and Contradiction, we have questioned Knox's 
judgment on this issue. In this chapter we must try to find 
whatever evidence we can in the writings prior to 1932 of the 
role of questions and their presuppositions in the logical 
functions of mental acts, and on the basis of this evidence to 
decide if Collingwood's autobiographical interpretation can be 
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upheld on this point, or if he was deliberately trying to de-
ceive his readers (as one might suspect from his destruction 
of the manuscript of Truth and Contradiction, which could be 
interpreted as an attempt to cover his own tracks). 
At this level of inquiry our task is plain: we are to 
take up the early publications, including books, essays, and 
published lectures, and examine them for statements concern-
ing questions, answers, and presuppositions. Unfortunately 
this task is already complicated by the overlay of issues from 
the previous chapter--especially the problems which arise due 
to his early commitment to absolute idealism. For while Col-
lingwood disclaimed originality in rejecting propositional log-
ic and the propositional, correspondence, coherence, and prag-
matic theories of truth (A, 36), he appears to claim credit 
for recognizing that truth is a property of the Q-A complex 
and not of propositions as such (A, 38). Furthermore he 
clearly wants his readers to believe that the alternative to 
formal logic was his own Q-A logic, and that Q-A logic allowed 
him to answer his 1914 question about whether the realists' 
methods were sound: the answer was that they were not, be-
cause "the 'realists'' chief and only method was to analyse 
the position criticized into various propositions, and detect 
contradictions between these," following as they did the rules 
of propositional logic (A, 42). 
But if Collingwood could have been so historically 
careless as to have forgotten, as other students of Oxford 
realism have not, that it was Cook Wilson himself who was 
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highly critical of propositional logic, and who insisted that 
what the actual subject or predicate of a statement was de-
pended on what question the statement is answering, 1 could he 
also have been mistaken about other details concerning his 
"discovery" of Q-A logic? What is particularly puzzling is 
Collingwood's failure inthe Autobiography to mention anything 
at all about dialectical logic, and it is this oversight--or 
was it deliberate neglect?--that is brought into focus by the 
issues raised in the previous chapter. While it is true that 
in Religion and Philosophy Collingwood employs a method of ar-
gument that relies more on what he claimed in the Autobiogra-
E£y to be that of the realists (i.e. analysis into contradic-
tory propositions), Speculum Mentis is beyond any reasonable 
shadow of a doubt built upon the dialectical logic familiar to 
1
"A point of particular importance ... is Cook-
Wilson's criticism of the subject-predicate logic. First of 
all, he sharply distinguishes between the grammatical subject 
and the logical subject, which the traditional logic is con-
tent . . . to identify . . . . Everything depends upon what 
question ((a)) statement is answering .... (S)tress and 
context are ignored by the traditional logic; thus there ari-
ses what Cook Wilson regards as the absurd presumption that 
the noun which is nominative to the principal verb in a state-
ment is bound to indicate the logical subject" (John Passmore, 
~Hundred Years of Philosophy (Baltimore, 1957/1968), p. 244). 
Passmore also notes that Cook Wilson criticized Bradley's di-
alectical method for asking "unreal" questions, i.e. questions 
which cannot intelligibly arise (op. cit., p. 246). 
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post-Kantian idealist philosophers. If Collingwood was an 
anti-realist primarily because he became an absolute idealist, 
then it is understandable that he would also be opposed to a 
logic of atomic propositions, each externally related to an 
equally atomic and distinct state of affairs in the physical 
world, and that he would offer in its place a dialectical log-
ic of developmental processes more in keeping with the active 
role of thought in reconciling oppositions. But this is not 
the genesis of his thought as he outlined it in the Autobiog-
raphy, where the turn away from realism is described without 
any mention of absolute idealism or dialectical logic. In 
fact it is astonishing to find that there is no mention of any 
of the Italian idealists in the Autobiography other than one 
brief reference to Guido de Ruggiero as the recipient of a 
copy of his manuscript, Libellus de Generatione, which out-
lined the logic of historical process (A, 99). His descrip-
tion of this process is also the closest that Collingwood 
comes in the Autobiography to discussing dialectical logic 
(the term is not used). In fact in reading the Autobiography 
one is inclined to believe that while Collingwood read widely 
in his youth, in his maturity he was philosophically influ-
enced only by indigenous British philosophers. 
We already know this not to be the case. But if we 
are to understand the Autobiography as an act of self-inter-
pretation, our concern is less with such oversights as these--
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whatever their reason might be 2--than with the extent to which 
the account he gives can make sense of his published writings, 
and it is to these that we now turn without further prologue. 
2. Abstract and Concrete Universals. 
As one might expect, there is no mention of the ques-
tioning activity in Religion and Philosophy, nor of the Q-A 
complex as the unity of knowledge. But there are scattered 
remarks about logic, the universal, abstraction, and scienti-
fie thinking which provide us a few clues about the way in 
which he conceived these subjects prior to his turn to abso-
lute idealism. In the first chapter Collingwood tries to an-
alyze what would be meant by a philosophy of religion, and in 
the process outlines what a "philosophy of" anything means: 
The philosophy of any subject means careful reflexion upon 
that subject; thus we have the philosophy of art, of con-
2
one such reason could very well be the political and 
military polarizations which were occurring at this time in 
Europe. In May of 1936 Italian forces entered the Abyssinian 
capital of Addis Ababa, and in July of 1936 the Spanish Civil 
War began. The Preface to Collingwood's Autobiography is 
dated 2 October 1938. In May of 1939 Germany and Italy signed 
the "Pact of Steel." From June through August of 1939, Col-
lingwood sailed to Greece and Italy as First Mate of the 
schooner yacht, Fleur de Lys. In The First Mate's Log he 
writes with outrage and contempt of an incident with an Ital-
ian fascist harbor patrol in Messina (FML, 170-74), and at the 
end of his account of the voyage he describes the discovery by 
the crew, mostly from Oxford, of the German-Russian alliance 
and the Nazi invasion of Poland. In such circumstances it is 
understandable why Collingwood might not wish to make an issue 
of expressing his indebtedness to German and Italian idealism. 
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duct, of science and so on. To do a thing, and to under-
stand what one is doing and how one does it, seem to be 
different things; ... to conduct an argument is science, 
to reflect upon it is logic .... But the theory of 
knowledge or logic does not consider differences of the 
object, but only processes of the subject; and therefore 
there is no distinction between the philosophy of religion 
(as theory of religious knowledge) and the theory of know-
ledge in general. If there is a general philosophy of 
knowing, it includes religious knowledge as well as all 
other kinds; no separate philosophy is required. (RP, 
15; FR, 53) . 
As Collingwood's thought developed, nearly every statement in 
this passage is modified to the point of contradiction, with 
the exception of the definition of logic as a "theory of know-
ledge."3 By the time he came to write Speculum Mentis he had 
already abandoned the idea of a "general philosophy of know-
ing"--as if knowledge were a genus and cases of it were partie-
ular species; and in the same work he denies that a theory of 
knowledge does not consider differences of the object, but 
only "processes of the subject." In fact even in Religion 
3In his chapter on Cook Wilson and Oxford philosophy, 
Passmore writes: "Cook Wilson's main theme is logic, but log-
ic conceived in the Oxford manner, as a philosophical investi-
gation into thought rather than as the construction of a cal-
culus. The Boole-Schrtlder logic, indeed, Cook Wilson con-
demned as 'merely trivial,' in comparison with 'the serious 
business of logic proper'--inquiry into 'the forms of thought'" 
(op. cit., p. 240). It must be recalled that Collingwood 
learned his logic from Cook Wilson, and never seems to have 
accepted any other view than that the true task of logic is 
to understand the "forms of thought"--cf. Chapter VIII, below. 
As Donagan rightly notes, Collingwood completely failed to ap-
preciate the revolution in logic occurring during his life-
time. 
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and Philosophy Collingwood could not consistently maintain 
-
that logic considers only processes of the subject, since in 
this work we have already found him attacking psychology for 
treating a judgment (the act of knowing something) as an 
event in the mind without going on to determine the relation 
of this mental event to the reality beyond the act which is 
being apprehended (RP, 40; FR, 75-76). 
A more promising and enduring starting point is with 
his remarks about the universal-particular distinction. In 
analyzing the relationship of philosophy and history (as part 
of his efforts to relate religion and history), Collingwood 
examines the attempt to distinguish history and philosophy on 
the grounds that they deal respectively with the particular 
and the universal: 
History, it is sometimes said, is knowledge of the par-
ticular, philosophy knowledge of the universal. But the 
particular is no mere particular; it is a particular of 
this or that universal; and the universal never can exist 
at all except in the form of this or that particular. 
"The universal" and "the particular" considered as sepa-
rate concrete things are fictions; and to equate the dis-
tinction of philosophy and history with such a fictitious 
distinction is to admit at once that it is untenable. 
(RP, 49-50; FR, 83). 
Later Collingwood settles in much the same way the suggestion 
that the Incarnation can be interpreted by means of the same 
distinction--God as the universal and man as the particular. 
To regard the universal as if it were something separate and 
concrete is the result of a logic gone awry. 
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(T)he universal itself, which as a matter of fact exists 
only in various particulars, is sometimes falsely con-
ceived as if it were itself another particular; and-thus 
arises the notion of an archetype or ideal specimen of a 
class to which every less perfect member is an approxima-
tion. These ((are)) two tendencies of false logic, the 
tendency to elevate one particular into the standard and 
only real instance of a universal, and the tendency to 
hypostasise the universal into a perfect and ideal par-
ticular .... (RP, 163). 
What Collingwood suggests as an alternative to the 
separate universal of false logic is what he calls a concrete 
identity in Religion and Philosophy and the concrete univer-
sal in Speculum Mentis. We shall deal with the latter in the 
next section, but it will be helpful to have a provisional 
idea of what he means by these terms. Evidently a universal 
refers to a unity of some sort, and especially a unity which 
is capable of being shared by two minds thinking about the 
same thing--such is the minimal sense of "universal" at least 
since the time of Socrates and Plato. When Collingwood asks 
how it is possible for two minds to think the same thought, 
he begins by assuming the factual existence of communication 
and knowledge (RP, 98, 109; FR, 170, 180) and, like Kant, asks 
how this is possible. Since all consciousness is the con-
sciousness of something definite, it follows that if one is 
thinking of anything at all it must be a thought of something 
concrete; Collingwood goes so far as to say that "One simply 
cannot make general statements without any thought of their 
instances'' (RP, 46; FR, 81). Two minds share the same thought 
when that thought is a concrete identity, i.e. one which has 
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the characteristics of a whole in each of whose parts the 
whole is entirely present (RP, 88-89; cf. RP, 108, 112; FR, 
179, 182). Collingwood contrasts this concrete unity (mani-
fested in personal identity) with the abstract unity--i.e. 
what a thing is in itself as opposed to what it is in rela-
tion to its context or the whole of which it is a part; he 
argues that the character or self of a thing, what it is, can-
not be distinguished from its relations, which consist in a 
quality of the thing itself (RP, 110-12; FR, 181-82). 
Without going further into this discussion (we shall 
take it up again in more detail in Chapter VI on rapprochement 
identity), we can see already a drift in the direction of 
idealism of the sort we discussed in Chapter III. It is also 
transparent that Collingwood is making use of distinctions 
that were known to anyone familiar with the logic of Bradley. 4 
The contrast is between the abstract and concrete universals, 
and while it is somewhat vague and imbedded in discussion of 
other topics in Religion and Philosophy, it is explicit and 
prominent in Speculum Mentis. But so is, we must add, the 
role of questioning in knowledge. 
In Religion and Philosophy Collingwood seems anxious 
to take seriously the realists' princi~le "that the mind is 
4F. H. Bradley, The Principles of Logic (Oxford, 1883), 
Vol. I, p. 188; cf. Bosanquet, The Principle of Individuality 
~Value (London, 1927), pp. 35-39. 
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one thing and the object another," although he immediately 
adds that "we cannot rest content with the statement" (RP, 
99; FR, 172). The theory of knowledge contained in this 
early work seems to be an attempt at a compromise between cor-
respondence and coherence theories of truth with the hope ex-
pressed that it would offend neither realists nor idealists. 
On the one hand mental acts (judgments) are defined and de-
termined by their reference to objects (RP, 99-102; FR, 171-
73); on the other hand the "object" toward which mental acts 
are directed turns out to be an identity-in-difference (a con-
crete universal) whose "inner structure" is entirely consti-
tuted by the necessary relations it has as part of a whole 
(RP, 108-14; FR, 179-84). 
But by 1924 Collingwood was less willing to grant any 
ground to the realist at all. In Speculum Mentis knowledge 
in its irreducible and simplest state is an activity of ques-
tioning and answering, and the attempt to identify knowledge 
as anything less than this is sharply dismissed: 
A crude empir1c1sm imagines that knowledge is composed 
wholly of assertion: that to know and to assert are iden-
tical .... Knowledge as a past fact, as something dead 
and done with--knowledge by the time it gets into encyclo-
pedias and textbooks--does consist of assertion . . . . 
But those who look upon it as an affair of discovery and 
exploration have never fallen into that error. People 
who are acquainted with knowledge at first hand have al-
ways known that assertions are only answers to questions. 
( SM, 77). 
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Here we have a declaration that sounds like it could be a 
direct quote from the Autobiography. But as we have already 
seen, there is a great deal else in Speculum Mentis that does 
not. One noteworthy difference is that there seems to be a 
strong inclination to accept coherence rather than P-Q-A corn-
plexes as a touchstone of truth: Collingwood makes it clear 
from the start that the various claimants to the title of 
truth--his five "forms of experience"--are to be tested on 
their ultimate self-consistency, that is, the coherence they 
exhibit in attempting to live up to their own claims (SM, 44-
45). The "self-consistency" that Collingwood has in mind, 
however, is not merely freedom from propositional contradic-
tion: 
Now the characteristic mark by which a form of experience 
is shown to be satisfactory is simply that it is possible 
.... Any scheme ((i.e. form of experience)) which is 
in itself contradictory or nonsensical cannot redeem 
((its)) promises, because it cannot be put into execu-
tion; but if there is any scheme of life which is inher-
ently consistent and therefore, ideally speaking, practi-
cable, we may safely assume that this is the scheme to 
adopt. Self-consistency, then, is our test.5 (SM, 44; 
cf. SM, 250). 
Collingwood immediately adds that any criterion of truth rest-
ing on a presumed correspondence either with human nature or 
5cf. F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality (Oxford, 
1893), p. 120: "Is there an absolute criterion? ... Ulti-
~ate reality is such that it does not contradict itself; here 
1s an absolute criterion. And it is proved absolute by the 
fact that, either in endeavoring to deny it, or even in at-
tempting to doubt it, we tacitly assume its validity." 
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with the facts about the world is a mistake, because both of 
these are inherently doubtful: what human nature is and. what 
the facts about the world are, are both open to legitimate 
questioning (SM, 45). So it is apparent that if the usual 
form of "coherence" is not exactly what Collingwood has in 
mind as a criterion of truth, "correspondence" of conscious-
ness and object is no longer acceptable. Nor did he appear 
to entertain it seriously again for the remainder of his pub-
lished career. 
Speculum Mentis also in part corrects, in part devel-
ops his earlier views on logic. As in Religion and Philosophy, 
what Collingwood is seeking is a philosophical logic, by which 
he apparently meant something like Kant's transcendental log-
ic, i.e. a logic which does not regard mental acts considered 
in abstraction from their reference to objects. It must 
therefore be not the formal logic of the "abstract universal" 
(the unity, identity, or sameness of a concept which is indif-
ferent to the variation or inter-relation of its own in-
stances), but the dialectical logic of the "concrete univer-
sal" (an identity-in-difference, or a unity to which differ-
ence is essential) (SM, 162-63). Collingwood's strategy in 
both of these early works is to argue that the very attitude 
of consciousness that regards all concepts or universals as 
abstract also prevents the latter from being identified in any 
meaningful way with their objects or instances--in a word, 
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from referring. In Religion and Philosophy Collingwood lim-
ited himself to the case of religious consciousness, and calls 
such an abstract attitude with respect to religious objects 
"psychology" (RP, 40; FR, 75-76) (although he does also speak 
of "abstract history"--this being the "mere verbal description 
of events without any attempt at understanding them," and ab-
stract philosophy as "the dry criticism of formal rules of 
thinking without any attempt at grasping their application"--
RP, 51; FR, 85). In Speculum Mentis such an attitude towards 
objects of knowledge is taken to be characteristic of science 
as such (SM, 158-63). In both cases the reification of the 
abstract universal, that is, making it an object of thought 
"separate" from its instantiations, is taken as characteris-
tic of the "realistic" point of view (SM, 189, 252, 282-85). 
But in Speculum Mentis objects of knowledge are not described 
as "real things" or "facts" independent of anyone's knowing 
of them, but rather are taken as the objective correlates of 
acts of knowledge (SM, 11, 159, 287, 293-95, 310). And as a 
consequence the tendency to regard logic merely as a psycho-
logical science (a tendency opposed by such diverse thinkers 
as Bradley and Frege) is overcome to some extent, and logic 
is allowed to have its own innings--that is, to present its 
case as a justification of science as an autonomous discipline. 
But since it is in Speculum Mentis that both Q-A logic 
and formal logic (as the justification of science) make their 
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appearance, it is necessary here to assess their relationship 
in order to see if Collingwood's view in the Autobiography, 
which presents the former as an alternative to the latter, is 
reflected in his second major work. As we shall see, the link-
ing concept between the two is bound up with the activity of 
"supposal" or hypothesis formation, which remains somewhat am-
biguous--as one might expect, since at this stage his recon-
ciliation philosophy was still incompletely worked out. 
3. Science and Supposal. 
The form of experience which regards its objects only 
as particulars of a universal, as members of a class, or as 
instances of a law, Collingwood calls "science" (SM, 158-63). 
Whether the abstract concept makes its appearance as a Pla-
tonic form, a medieval universal, or a Renaissance law of na-
ture, the characteristic viewpoint of scientific conscious-
ness is that it distinguishes between universals and particu-
lars, and assumes that the former can be abstracted by thought 
--i.e., separated or isolated and studied apart from its in-
stances (SM, 159-60, 180). Such an attitude is variously de-
scribed by Collingwood as the abstractness of the scientific 
concept (SM, 162), the principle of the transcendence of the 
universal to the particular (SM, 179), or the relation of dif-
ference without identity (SM, 243). In any event it asserts 
the reality of the abstract concept as indifferent to its ex-
emplifications or to the mutual relations its instances have 
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other than as members of a class (SM, 162-63). Furthermore 
the abstract universal of science is contrasted with the con-
crete universal of history: 
Classification is the key-note of the scientific spirit; 
but classification is nothing but the abstractness of the 
scientific concept. For a class as such is a collection 
of individuals without any mutual cohesion or organization 
except their common membership of the class. They have no 
reference to each other, but only to the universal; and 
each one refers to the universal in precisely the same 
way as every other. As soon as they refer to the univer-
sal in different ways, or, what is the same thing, as 
soon as they develop a system of mutual relations between 
themselves, they cease to be a mere class and become an 
organized and articulated system; and the universal ceases 
to be an abstract universal (class-concept) and becomes a 
concrete universal, or one to which the differences be-
tween its particulars are relevant. (SM, 162-63). 
The point at which science cannot maintain its object as an 
abstract universal, and is forced to assert the reality of the 
concrete universal is, therefore, the point at which science 
ceases to survive as an autonomous form of experience and be-
comes dependent on another form of consciousness, viz. history 
(SM, 180, 186-87; cf. 193). 
That point occurs when scientific consciousness at-
tempts to deal with "facts," or to refer to objects and events 
given in sensuous appearance. In its most elementary and 
primitive form science is constructed in accordance with an 
! priori or deductive ideal: it is the attempt to work out 
the implications of the concept of a class as such, known in-
dependently of all experience (SM, 164). Since the relations 
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of an indeterminate plurality of abstract units (the members 
of a class) to a determining unity (the class itself) is pre-
cisely what constitutes the numerical series, mathematics is 
the one and only.§! priori science. Mathematics "is simply 
the theory of order, where order means classificatory order, 
structure in its most abstract possible form" (SM, 165). Pure 
mathematics deals with classes (e.g. numerical sets) whose 
members are themselves classes (numbers) (SM, 169). But if 
it claims to be objectively true, mathematics turns out to be 
an illusion: it is "the truth about nothing," since it is "the 
description of the structure of a null class"(SM, 185). 6 
The attempt to import some sensuous content into 
these empty class-concepts gives rise to the second phase of 
science: science on the empirical or inductive model--an or-
dered knowledge of "facts" (SM, 177; cf. 168). But the in-
ductive method (observation and experiment) does not super-
sede .§! priori deduction; on the contrary, induction itself 
presumes a principle variously described as the uniformity of 
nature, the law of universal causation, etc. which induction 
is unable to establish by its own methods, and which rests on 
the principle of uniformity itself (SM, 178-79). If it is 
6This seems to be a variant of Russell's paradox--the 
class of all classes both is and is not a member of itself. 
For Collingwood's further use of this paradox, see SM 169, 189, 
and 192. Collingwood does not, however, seem to apply it to 
mathematics itself, but only to mathematics insofar as it 
claims to be objectively true. 
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not to presume the very principle that it seeks to prove, em-
pirical science is forced to alter its conception of its own 
object, and this leads to the third phase of science: science 
7 
as supposal. 
Science asserts, not the actual truth, but what would be 
true if something ((else)) were true which is laid down 
as an hypothesis. It asserts, never that S is P, but that 
if there were an S it would be P. Its procedure therefore 
consists, first, in making an assumption, secondly in de-
ducing consequences of that assumption. Throughout this 
process it never makes an assertion, in the sense of a 
categorical judgement, at all. Its judgements are hypo-
thetical from the beginning to end. (SM, 183).8 
Such a process is utterly gratuitous: without a basis in pre-
vious assertions, Collingwood insists, no hypothesis can be 
framed at all, much less relevant or illuminating hypotheses 
(SM, 79). Supposal without a framework of assertion is arbi-
trary and meaningless; but supposal within a framework of as-
sertion is something more than merely hypothetical. Its ob-
7
collingwood, true to a long standing tradition in 
British philosophy, does not provide his reader with anything 
but scant clues about the historical representatives of these 
movements. The third phase has taken place "almost within 
living memory" in the latter part of the 19th century, and is 
represented by the "critical movement" and "scientific prag-
matism" (SM, 180-82). There is no hint in Speculum Mentis 
that any movement in science follows this one. 
8
collingwood casts the hypothetical assertion in 
subject-predicate form but it is clear that it applies equally 
to propositional functions: the procedure of "making assump-
tions" and then "deducing the consequences of these assump-
tions" is appropriate for propositions, since what is assumed 
is a proposition, not merely the subject of an assertion. 
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ject is not only something possible (viz. the alternatives en-
visaged in the hypothesis) but something actual, and this is 
beyond the reach of mere supposal (SM, 187-88, 191, 199). Un-
less science is to remain a tissue of hypotheses, and fact is 
therefore permanently to elude the grasp of science, it must 
have a categorical basis in actual assertions. ( SM, 185). 
On this objective ambiguity founders the autonomy of 
science. If the objects of science are pure concepts (mathe-
maticals, universals), they are true of nothing actual at all; 
but if science intends its laws to apply to real objects it 
cannot deal with the latter by means of purely abstract con-
cepts; and finally, if science says that its object is neither 
a null class nor something strictly speaking actual, but only 
something possible, it renders its conclusions abritrary. The 
issue cannot be settled from within scientific consciousness 
alone, and the attempt to settle it from without gives rise 
to "scientific philosophy"--that form of dogmatism which, in 
the guise of formal logic and metaphysics, presents itself 
as a justification of the scientific attitude (SM, 271). 
Since the deduction of consequences from hypothetical 
assertions is governed by the rules of formal logic, the lat-
ter is taken (by the critical and pragmatic defenders of the 
third, and presumably still current phase of science) as the 
justification of the methodology of science. But mathematical 
or formal logic constructs its deductions in a categorical 
172 
fashion: its statements are demonstrably true of every pos-
sible object--true, that is, categorically. Insofar as.formal 
logic is the categorical basis for the (hypothetical) mathe-
matical formulation of scientific assertions, mathematical 
truths themselves are taken as "true without qualification of 
the entire world, actual and possible" (SM, 184-85). Unfor-
tunately this conflicts with the conclusion that mathematics 
had reached about itself as the "theory of order"--viz. that 
it is the description of the structure of a null class, the 
truth about nothing. Formal logic of itself is not able, 
therefore, to extricate third-phase science from its diffi-
culties: laws that are categorically true of every possible 
object are true of everything in general, but of nothing in 
particular. Formal logic may be able to distinguish valid 
from invalid inferences, but without metaphysics as its neces-
sary correlate, such a vindication of the principles on which 
scientific thinking is founded may only be true for thought 
alone, and not for thought that is directed to an object (SM, 
272-73). 
(W)e must demonstrate that what we have hitherto called 
logic or the theory of ((scientific)) thought is really 
metaphysics or the theory of reality, and that what we 
have called the laws of thought are the laws of being. 
But this is precisely what we cannot do. Metaphysics is 
impossible ((on scientific grounds)); for its task is to 
vindicate the objective validity of the ways in which we 
think, and if there are any flaws in our methods of 
thought, these will affect our metaphysical theory of re-
ality and introduce into it the very mistakes which by 
its help we had hoped to eradicate. Hence the theory of 
being as distinct from thinking (metaphysics) will only be 
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the theory of thinking as distinct from being (logic) ex-
pressed in different terminology, but subject to the same 
fatal weakness, namely that just as logic can never.ana-
lyze real thinking--thinking that, going on in the logi-
cian's mind, always lies behind ((i.e. beyond)) his analy-
sis--so metaphysics can never analyze real being, being as 
it is in itself untainted by thought. (SM, 273-74). 
In short, scientific consciousness is left permanently and ir-
reparably without justification because its principle of ab-
straction renders its objects (individuals, particular matters 
of fact) utterly beyond the reach of its principles (laws, ne-
cessary principles of order) (SM, 185-86, 277). 
What science is left with as a justification of its 
own viewpoint is a psychology of abstract consciousness which 
fails for the very reasons that Collingwood had advanced in 
Religion and Philosophy--viz. since it fails to take into ac-
count the truth or falsity of the thought it examines ab ex-
tra, as an event, it cannot justify itself as anything more 
than another mental event alongside the first (rather than an 
explanation of the thought it claims to be observing) (SM, 
274-77). Psychology (or, more properly, psychologism) marks 
the point at which scientific consciousness fails to achieve 
wisdom or self-conscious self-justification, just as history 
marks the point at which science fails to achieve concrete 
knowledge of fact--the difference being that history provides 
the justification of the scientific attitude that psychology 
cannot (SM, 186, 193). But of this we shall have more to say 
in the immediately following chapter. 
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It is important to realize (both for an understand-
ing of the argument in Speculum Mentis and for an assessment 
of the relationship of Q-A and formal logic) that when a form 
of experience is show to fail in its claim to be the whole 
truth about its object, it is exposed as an error, but it is 
not thereby utterly discredited and completely rejected. 
Since it is an error that consciousness makes about itself, 
that error is overcome only when it is criticized and shown 
to rely on something other than itself for its validity (SM, 
244-45, 255, 288-91, 296-97). Consequently when scientific 
consciousness "collapses" it does not collapse into nothing, 
but leaves behind "solid assets" in the form of a pure science 
of mathematics and an empirical-hypothetical science of nature, 
with mathematical logic and metaphysics as their partial jus-
tification, and the psychology of concrete mind as their ab-
solute justification (SM, 271-72, 277-78, 280, 317; cf. "ST", 
73-75). One of the "solid assets" for Collingwood's philoso-
phy is the status of questions and answers in this context. 
And since the purpose of this excursion through one 
portion of Collingwood's "phenomenology of error" 9 was to as-
9c£. SM, 289; Collingwood rejects this title as a de-
scription of what he is doing, but in at least one sense of 
the term "phenomenology"--as a description of how states of 
consciousness appear or manifest themselves--it is still a 
correct description of what he is doing in Speculum Mentis. 
Collingwood rejects the term because he claims not only to be 
merely describing, but also stating the truth about the forms 
of experience he is describing. 
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sess the relationship between Q-A logic and formal logic, it 
is time to make good our previous assertion that the con-
necting link is an ambiguous notion of hypothesis or supposal. 
The entertainment of an hypothesis is, according to Speculum 
Mentis, equivalent to the asking of a question: 
Science is explicitly supposal. But supposal itself ... 
is identical with questioning, which is the cutting edge 
of the mind, an activity not self-contained or independent, 
but implying behind it a body of information or assertion 
.... But it is the facts that are true; the scientific 
simplification of them into instances of laws, abstract 
particulars of abstract concepts, is not true but arbi-
trary, useful no doubt, but useful precisely because it 
is not asserted as true but merely entertained in the form 
of a question. (SM, 186). 
But the entertainment of an hypothesis in the form of a ques-
tion turns out to be a complex mental function, since hypo-
thesis formation is identified not only with questioning but 
also with "intuition": 
The paradox of science may be expressed by calling it in-
tuitive thought. Intuition is the questioning, immediate 
side of experience: thought is the asserting, explanatory 
side. Science is explicit to itself as thought, but it 
turns out on inquiry to be identical with the questioning 
activity; that is, it realizes the contradiction of a type 
of thought which is not thought precisely because it is 
thought's opposite, intuition. (SM, 188). 
Collingwood is quick to add that the division of experience 
into intuition and thought is an abstract fiction, and repre-
sents only a distinction between two sides of the indivisible 
whole of experience--"an immediate, intuitive, or questioning 
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side" and a "mediating, reflective, logical or assertive 
side," the former being called sensation and the latter, 
thought (SM, 95, 188; cf. "ST", 57-58). But the willful en-
forcement of this distinction by scientific consciousness is 
another manifestation of its self-contradictory or paradoxi-
cal nature: 
It is this falling-back upon intuition that constitutes 
the irrationality, the arbitrariness of all science. The 
assumptions made by science cannot be justified under 
criticism; their only justification is the frankly irra-
tional fiat of the scientist's will. The concept is for 
him an abstraction, that is to say hypostasized into a 
thing, reified; hence it cannot be explained by thought, 
it can only be intuited, and this intuitive attitude 
towards a concept is what is meant by assumption in sci-
ence. (SH, 189). 
It is at this point that the ambiguity of hypothesis 
or assumption becomes apparent--a ghost that not only remains 
unexercised in the body of science, but which survives to 
haunt Collingwood's Q-A logic. If assertion is the minimum 
activity claiming truth or falsity (SM, 59-60), then (with re-
spect to assertion) hypothesizing, questioning, and intuition 
have one and the function: each is a suspension of the activ-
ity of asserting (SM, 78-79, 186, 188-89). But there are im-
portant differences which such an identification overlooks, 
and which are crucial not only for formal logic but for a Q-A 
logic which seeks to replace it. 
(1) Questions are not merely non-assertions, they are 
proto-assertions--non-assertions about to become assertions. 
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It may be true that "supposal and questioning are at bottom 
the same thing" (insofar as asking a question, like framing 
an hypothesis, means contemplating the non-existent in the 
form of several alternatives, only one of which may be exis-
tent), but "true questioning is a suspension ((of assertion)) 
which looks forward to a renewal of this asserting activity, 
in the shape of an answer" (SM, 78-79). "Hypothesis" as Col-
lingwood uses the term in Speculum Mentis vacillates between 
these two senses--i.e. proto-assertion and non-assertion--
and it is not until the Essay on Metaphysics that the distinc-
tion is clearly made between questions, assertions, supposi-
tions, and presuppositions (EM, 21-33). 
(2) In Speculum Mentis meaningful questions do have a 
hi-directionality, looking both forward to an answer and back-
ward to other assertions (SM, 79), but there is no clear re-
cognition that the assertions which ground questions may be 
non-factual but yet meaningful--i.e. function as what he was 
later to call "presuppositions." Instead Collingwood leaves 
the reader to decide whether the categorical assertions, which 
are logically prior to hypotheticals (SM, 183: cf. "ST", 64), 
are necessarily or only factually true. Thus, for example, 
within two pages he speaks about the mind "categorically as-
serting a concrete fact" (when it sets about framing hypothe-
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10 ses), and about mathematical logic being "categorically true 
of every possible object" (SM, 184-85). These are the factual 
and the inferentially necessary senses, respectively, of the 
term. It is not until the Essay on Philosophical Method that 
Collingwood would try again to say what he means by a "cate-
gorical assertion" (EPH, 117-36). 
(3) Underlying both of these ambiguities is a basic 
equivocation on the use of the phrase, "mental activity," 
which leaves mental dispositions (conscious attitudes involved 
in raising questions, framing hypotheses, asserting a proposi-
tion, etc.) undistinguished from logical functions (formal 
properties of interrogative sentences, hypothetical assertions, 
. 1 . . ) ll Th . 1 d . categor1ca propos1t1ons, etc. 1s ea s to certa1n puz-
1 0
cf. EPH, 45-46 (1924): " ( S) cientific thinking is an 
abstract thinking, historical thinking a concrete thinking. 
In other words, because the object of science is not a fact 
but an abstract type or form, the judgement of science is al-
ways hypothetical: 1 if A, then B, 1 where it is not asserted 
that A exists in the world of fact . . . . Whereas the object 
of history is the fact in all its actuality, and therefore the 
historical judgement is categorical . . . . The ideal of his-
tory, then, is to be a single categorical judgement, articu-
lated into an infinity of coherent categorical judgements, as-
~erting the reality and expounding the nature of an infinite 
1ndividual world of fact articulated into an infinity of in-
dividual facts. 
11The closest Collingwood comes in Speculum Mentis to 
recognizing the difference is at SM, 79, where he speaks about 
the "empty form of questioning," questions which ask nothing, 
m~re "marks of interrogation." But he is not here explicitly 
d~stinguishing between mental dispositions and logical func-
tlons, but rather two sorts of mental activities, one with 
and one without a background of factual assertion. 
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zling and unresolved contradictions which mask rather than il-
lustrate Collingwood's thought in Speculum Mentis, and provide 
obstacles to the success of his Q-A logic. (a) On the one 
hand questioning is identified with explanation and intellec-
tion. The characteristic mark of the former processes is 
their "immediacy" (i.e. their spontaneous actuality, their 
positivity, or in general their lack of dependence on some-
thing other than themselves) (SM, 95, 188). Questions are 
thus immediate, and answers mediate. (b) On the other hand 
questions are identified with the logical function of asser-
tion cast in the hypothetical mode, while answers are identi-
fied with the corresponding categorical function (SM, 183, 
186). In this sense questions are mediate (their truth de-
pends on something further being asserted), and answers are 
immediate (they actually assert something positive--something 
true or false). It is not until Collingwood wrote the chap-
ter on language in the Principles of Art that logical and psy-
chological functions are distinguished (PA, 225-69). 
Collingwood does not seem to be alarmed at these con-
clusions in Speculum Mentis, since he presumes that such argu-
ments demonstrate that questions and answers are not independ-
ent abstractions, but are both mental activities, and there-
fore have the characteristic marks of all mental activity--
viz. 12 mediacy and immediacy (cf. SM, 80). 
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But when Colling-
wood calls the distinction between question and answer an 
"ideal distinction," and adds that "the process of knowledge 
is ... not so much an alternation of question and answer as 
a perpetual restatement of the question, which is identical 
with a perpetual revision of the answer," the ensuing "iden-
12 Cf. SM, 188-89, where parallel arguments concerning 
mental and logical functions are put forward to illustrate the 
irrationality of the abstract distinctions made by science: 
(a) "Intuition and thought are not two separate activities 
which are somehow united in the body of human experience. Ex-
perience is an individual whole in which two sides can always 
be distinguished: an immediate, intuitive or questioning side, 
which is hypostatized in abstract psychology into the faculty 
of sensation, and a mediating, reflective, logical side, which 
is called thought. Thought is the one, sensation the many. 
What characterizes the intuitive or sensuous side of experience 
is just its manyness or perpetual difference from itself, flux, 
novelty, or creation. What characterizes the logical or re-
flective side is its self-identity, permanence, unity. Now we 
have already seen that science consists in the separation of 
these two distinct elements, and the attribution of reality to 
thought while denying it to sensation. But division as such 
is the characteristic of sensation as opposed to thought: 
thought unifies what sensation divides. Therefore any given 
thing which is made the field of an unreconciled division is 
thereby placed under the head of sensation, for the character-
istic unity of thought has been denied to it. If experience 
as a whole is now divided into two separate parts, thought and 
sense, it becomes by this very definition wholly sensuous, and 
each part of it is a sensuous, not an intelligible, object." 
(SM, 188-89). (b) "This argument is more familiar, though 
more superficial, when stated in terms of logic. The univer-
sal has its very life and being in its particulars, of whose 
multiplicity it is the unity. If now it is disentangled from 
those particulars and set apart by itself, it becomes not 
their universal but another particular object, thus losing pre-
~isely its intelligibility (universality) and becoming an ob-
Ject of mere intuition, a thing that we no longer think but 
only imagine. It is this falling-back upon intuition that con-
stitutes the irrationality, the arbitrariness of all science." 
( SM, 18 9) . 
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tity" which "contains all diversity within itself" (SM, 80) 
appears dangerously similar to that absolute night in which 
all cows are black. The result, in short, is as unfortunate 
for his Q-A logic as it is for formal logic: if truth and 
falsity are functions of the Q-A complex and there is no ade-
quate way to distinguish within that complex what counts for 
a question and what counts for an answer, then it seems there 
may be no adequate criteria for distinguishing between truth 
and falsehood either. It is not until the early chapters of 
the Essay on Metaphysics that he attempted to disentangle Q-A 
complexes and truth criteria (EM, 21-48). 
4. Conclusion: Three Logics. 
From the evidence that we have just examined it does 
not appear that there is any systematic "question-and-answer 
logic" as such mentioned in any of Collingwood's writings 
through 1924, and a glance at the articles from this date un-
til 1932 does not yield any significant indication that would 
change this judgement. Thus we find Collingwood writing in 
"The Nature and Aims of a Philosophy of History" (1925) that 
the way in which a problem arises for an historian must con-
vey some hint of the direction in which evidence for its so-
lution is to be sought, and that in doing so he argues to and 
from this evidence, so that there is in the last analysis no 
distinction between his sources and his conclusions (EPH, 52-
53). While this gives the observant reader of the Autobiog-
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~phy some confirmation of the use of Collingwood's Q-A prin-
ciple that in arguing back from a propositional answer (the 
conclusion) to its question the same piece of evidence states 
the answer and allows the historian to identify the question, 
it does not explicitly suggest that this was a conscious appli-
cation of a systematic Q-A logic. And again Collingwood 
writes in "The Philosophy of History" (1930) that 
a question must be asked with some reasonable expectation 
of being able to answer it, and to answer it by ((genuine)) 
thinking; otherwise it leads nowhere, it is at best idle 
"wondering" . . . . We express this by saying that a ques-
tion does or does not "arise." To say that a question 
arises is to say that it has a logical connexion with our 
previous thoughts, that we have a reason for asking it and 
are not moved by mere capricious curiosity. (EPH, 137). 
We see at work another of the principles of Q-A logic cited in 
the Autobiography, but without any explicit mention of presup-
positions and their logical efficacy in causing such questions 
to arise. In fact the omission of any explicit discussion of 
presuppositions or presupposing in these early writings ren-
ders suspicious the autobiographical suggestion that he had 
formulated Q-A logic as such (including the theory of presup-
position) in the years between 1916 and 1918 when he returned 
to Oxford. And once again we must add that this suggestion 
is rendered even more suspicious by his failure to mention any-
thing about dialectical logic and his early absolute idealism. 
But perhaps we are allowing ourselves to be misled by 
Collingwood's use of that vague and sometimes all-inclusive 
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word, "logic," as well as by his tendency in the Autobiography 
to offer Q-A logic as an actual replacement or substitute for 
formal logic. In Chapter VIII we shall take a hard look at 
this claim and try to settle the issue of whether and to what 
extent Collingwood's Q-A logic is "logic" in this sense at all. 
For now we can only make several tentative statements based on 
the evidence provided in the writings we have been examining. 
We note, first of all, that we have three labels to attend to, 
if not three logics: formal logic (F-logic), dialectical log-
ic (D-logic), and Q-A logic. Collingwood's conception of log-
ic tends to view it in epistemological terms, but he does al-
low that logic in general is concerned with the justification 
of some form of knowledge. If it is to be a truly philosophi-
cal logic, it must justify not only the conclusions reached by 
a body of knowledge, but the way in which it reaches these 
conclusions. The way in which conclusions are reached is by 
a systematic question-and-answer process, the success or fail-
ure of which is not measured by any external criteria, al-
though in empirical science, at least, the conclusions arrived 
at can be shown to be free of contradiction by formal logic. 
But a body of knowledge must not only be free from contradic-
tion; it must also be able to demonstrate that in its process 
of development the methods that it employs for the discovery 
and verification of these assertions do not conflict with the 
ideals which this knowledge sets for itself. This is the role 
of dialectical logic. It would therefore appear that Q-A, F-, 
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and D-logics are ordered in a developing series such that Q-A 
and F-logics are opposed and complementary phases by which 
knowledge comes to be (Q-A logic), and retains itself in be-
ing by resisting criticism (F-logic), but are both prelimin-
ary to the dialectical measurement of explicit performance 
against implicit promise (D-logic). We hasten to add that 
this suggestion of the relationship between the three logics 
that appear in Collingwood's writings was never made explicit 
by him, and is our own reconstruction of their apparent rela-
tionship at this point in our investigation. 
Before passing on to the next step of our survey of 
the early works, we must make some final comments about D-
logic. At least one of Collingwood's interpreters, whose 
views this author greatly respects, has stated that Religion 
and Philosophy is Collingwood's only non-dialectical book, and 
that his moment of kairos came between his first and second 
books, because Speculum Mentis is a dialectical essay where 
its predecessor is not (Mink, MHD, 20, 242). To this we can 
only comment that if Collingwood discovered dialectic, it 
could not have come as much of a surprise. For on his own 
principles philosophy does not bring us to know things of 
which we are simply ignorant, but brings us to know in a dif-
ferent way things which we already knew in some way (EPM, 161). 
Dialectic could therefore only be something of which he was 
already aware, so that when it became explicit it was only a 
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refinement of a reflection on an experience with which he was 
already familiar. We therefore cannot accept any inter~reta­
tion of Collingwood which presumes that there was any such 
"event" in the intellectual development of his philosophy, 
and especially when no such event is acknowledged in the Auto-
biography. 
But the evidence of Collingwood's writings forces us 
to admit that not only does the explicit use of dialectical 
concepts, judgments, and inferences show an order of develop-
ment, but also the use of the term dialectic has a peek-a-boo 
career in Collingwood's published writings. So far as this 
development is concerned, Religion and Philosophy presents us 
with the spectacle of an analytic of concepts and principles, 
but does display a propensity for expressing first one side of 
an issue and then the opposing viewpoint, and only does so in 
order to resolve the issue by showing how the two opposing 
viewpoints can be reconciled. Furthermore the discussion of 
"concrete identity" (which evolves quite naturally into that 
of the concrete universal of Speculum Mentis) is prominent in 
Religion and Philosophy, and is opposed to the abstract univer-
sal of "false logic." In Speculum Mentis the concrete univer-
sal emerges as an "identity-in-difference" whose characteris-
tics are those of a scale of forms, but one which lacks the 
unity of both differences of kind and differences of degree 
that Collingwood later specified for such a scale in the Essay 
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13 ~Philosophical Method (SM, 208; EPM, 54-57). Therefore 
from Religion and Philosophy to Speculum Mentis to the Essay 
~ Philosophical Method there is a continuous development of 
the idea of defining something not by subsumption under a uni-
versal and abstract class, but by showing how its meaning in-
eludes others which are related by opposition and distinction, 
embodying differences of both degree and kind, and where the 
variable is identified with the generic essence. 
But on the other hand the term dialectic appears and 
disappears in Collingwood's writings, sometimes in a most 
confusing manner. While the term is not mentioned in Religion 
and Philosophy, it is over-used in Speculum Mentis, mentioned 
with modesty in the Essay on Philosophical Method (e.g. EPM, 
12, 210), disappears altogether in the Autobiography and the 
Essay on Metaphysics 14 but re-appears in more classical cos-
13The reader must be patient with the use of such jar-
gon at this stage of our investigation--the terms will be ex-
plained in future chapters. But it is well to bear in mind 
that (1) where Religion and Philosophy argues that where two 
terms are "not differentn-they are therefore identical, and 
(2) Speculum Mentis argues that two terms in a dialectical 
series are related to one another in kind only, and not in de-
gree, (3) it is only after the Essay on Philosophical Method 
that terms in a scale of forms are declared to differ both in 
degree and in kind from one another. Therefore if Religion 
~ Philosophy is a non-dialectical book, so is Speculum 
Mentis--i.e. on the standards of dialectic set in the Essay 
on Philosophical Method. 
14There is only one reference to dialectic in the 
Essay on Metaphysics, and that is in connection with Hegel's 
use of it, which is not treated in a flattering manner (EM, 
318). 
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tume in The New Leviathan. 15 Nor can one simply relate the 
sudden prominent usage of the term in Speculum Mentis either 
with his recognition of its systematic implications (since 
such a description is present in Religion and Philosophy in 
the analysis of "concrete identity") or with the properly 
philosophical use of the implicit-explicit distinction (since 
this is not a distinction reserved for philosophical dialec-
tic: at SM, 93 it is applied to psycho-analysis in the Freud-
ian sense--the interpretation of dreams is not the bringing 
into consciousness of that which was unconscious, but the 
bringing into explicitness that which was implicit). 
A more promising direction for uncovering Collingwood's 
mature understanding of the term is in the posthumous publica-
tion, The Idea of History. In a chapter on Hegel in Part I, 
Collingwood takes up Croce's criticism of Hegel's philosophy 
15At NL, 24.63-24.68 Collingwood writes of dialectical 
thinking, defined as "the readiness to give up something which 
at a certain time you settled on as true." As an example Col-
lingwood cites Plato's discovery that the way to find one's 
way about in a Heraclitean world is to think dialectically--a 
Heraclitean world being one in which change from X to not-X or 
vice versa is constantly occurring. At NL, 27.82 Collingwood 
writes of the dialectical spirit as the spirit of agreement 
and compromise in the ensuing discussion--see NL, 24.61, 27.9). 
And at NL, 24.57-24.61 Collingwood writes of dialectical dis-
c~ssion, where one's aim is to show that both disagreeing par-
tles in an argument are correct. NL, 24.57 contrasts dialecti-
cal and eristic discussion, and declares that all logic is 
concerned with discussions. In all these usages Collingwood 
seems to have in mind a sense of the term derived from classi-
cal Greece, i.e. the sense which emphasizes the manner of con-
ducting a debate involving disagreeing parties. 
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of history which appeared to Croce to be a "gigantic blunder 
produced by confusing two quite different things: namel"y op-
position and distinction." Then he continues: 
Concepts, Croce says, are related by opposition: good and 
bad, true and false, freedom and necessity, and so forth; 
and the theory of their relation, he admits, has been well 
expounded by Hegel in his theory of dialectic, which de-
scribes the way in which any concept stands in a neces-
sary relation to its own opposite, generating it at first 
and then negating it, so that the way in which the concept 
lives is by creating and overcoming oppositions. But the 
individual things which are the instances of concepts are 
never related to each other by way of opposition, only by 
way of distinction: consequently the relations between 
them are not dialectical, and in history, which is the 
history of individual actions and persons and civiliza-
tions, there is consequently no dialectic .... (IH, 
118-19). 
It is interesting to note, before turning to Collingwood's 
comments on this Crocean criticism, that in The New Leviathan 
Collingwood remarks that logic applies to propositions only 
because it applies in the first instance to concepts (NL, 7.33, 
7.39, 11.35). Following this line of thought one might con-
clude that D-logic applies primarily to concepts, and F-logic 
to propositions. But extrapolating this analogy is not very 
promising, since Q-A logic is not obviously inferential, where 
F-logic is, and so is D-logic. Nonetheless there is some 
point in the observation that the center of gravity, so to 
speak, of D-logic is concepts, which emphasizes the semantic 
unity of terms, and has as its central concern the meaning of 
terms, whereas F-logic takes as its minimal unit the proposi-
tion that can be the bearer not only of meaning but of truth 
or falsity. However in the passage that we are presently 
considering Collingwood is pursuing a different line of. 
thought: 
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Plausible though Croce's view is, it does not really get 
to the heart of the problem. It implies that in talking 
of history we should never use words like opposition or 
antagonism, and synthesis or reconciliation: ... we 
ought only to say that they are different: we ought not 
to speak of an opposition, but only a difference, between 
Whigs and Tories, or Catholics and Protestants. Now it is 
true that we do not need to use terms like opposition (let 
me call them dialectical terms), when we are talking only 
of the outward events of history; but when we are talking 
only of the inv1ard thoughts which underlie these events 
it seems to me that we cannot avoid them. (IH, 119). 
To pursue his argument from the Idea of History any further 
would get us into the subject of the next chapter, where we 
shall have a chance to observe how his concept of history de-
veloped in the early writings. For now we wish to call atten-
tion to the usage of opposition as a "dialectical" term, and 
synthesis as a term of reconciliation. 
As we proceed with our investigation of Collingwood's 
logical views it will be well to bear in mind that "dialectic" 
may represent a number of different meanings in his writings, 
so that we might recognize, for example, that as the methodi-
cal program we have called D-logic it stands in a relation 
With F-logic and Q-A logic so as to appear to form a scale of 
forms, from another point of view any such scale can itself be 
defined as "dialectical." And again, while the analysis of a 
concept into opposing principles may be called a dialectical 
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relationship and the synthesis of this opposition may be 
called a rapprochement (so that analysis, dialectic, and re-
conciliation may be interpreted as three phases of complete 
philosophical thought), from a more inclusive sense of the 
term (e.g. the one so frequently used in Speculum Mentis) 
all rapprochement is dialectical. It may well be that Colling-
wood omitted explicit reference to dialectic and dialectical 
logic in the Autobiography because the term is capable of 
such a multitude of meanings that it was virtually useless for 
painting the kinds of sharp contrasts that he wanted to eli-
cit for the purpose of highlighting what he regarded as cen-
tral to his philosophical development. 
But while we may charge Collingwood's Autobiography 
with an error of omission, and even with being somewhat mis-
leading in that it suggests to the reader that his early Q-A 
logic already made explicit the role of presuppositions, it 
is at least accurate to the extent that the early writings do 
show evidence of a stress on the role of questioning in the 
process of knowledge. We can also say that nothing we have 
found would give any indication that had he had such a com-
plete Q-A logic he would have done anything but embrace it 
wholeheartedly at this point in his development, since its 
spirit is present from Speculum Mentis onwards, and many of 
its principles are explicitly stated in the early writings. 
CHAPTER V 
HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY 
1. Introduction. 
There can be little doubt that Collingwood felt that 
his greatest contribution to philosophy would be his reconcili-
ation of philosophy and history. The Autobiography describes 
in some detail how the two activities between which he divided 
the majority of his time, his actual work in Roman-British his-
tory and his philosophical lecturing and writing, gradually 
converged, and how this synthesis not only was in large measure 
responsible for breaking with the epistemology of his realist 
tutors at Oxford, but also was the foundation for the develop-
ment of his rapprochement philosophy. If we are to understand 
how and why he recognized this relationship to be axial not 
only for his development but for interpreting his entire phil-
osophical outlook, we must take a careful look at how this 
philosophy of history took shape in his early writings. And 
since the Autobiography specifies that this development can be 
found in his essays of the twenties (A, 107, 116-17), it is 
this group of articles that we must spend most of our time on 
in this chapter. 
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But what is it that needs reconciling? If "the phil-
osophy of" something merely means, as Religion and Philosophy 
asserts, the careful reflection upon that subject (RP, 15; FR, 
53), what is problematic about a philosophy of history? In 
the Autobiography the opposition is approached from the direc-
tion of the realism-idealism controversy: realists assumed the 
existence of permanent philosophical problems which could be 
analyzed independently of their historical setting, so that 
the historical question of what someone thought about one of 
these "eternal problems•• was distinct from the philosophical 
question of whether or not he was right (A, 59-68). In addi-
tion to this mistake, the realists assumed that all knowledge 
was a simple apprehending or intuiting of some unaffected re-
ality, which failed to recognize the essential role of inter-
pretation of evidence in the case of historical knowledge (A, 
25-26, 39-40). But from the other side, in the practice of 
his historical studies Collingwood found that those historians 
he most respected knew and cared little about philosophy (A, 
83), so that the need for a reconciliation from this direction 
was simply the absence of any serious philosophical reflection 
on the subject-matter of history. Not only did realist phil-
osophers neglect history as a form of knowledge not assimilable 
to their sense-bound epistemology, but historians neglected 
philosophy and therefore failed to pay sufficient attention to 
the foundations of their own science (A, 85-90). 
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When we turn to the early writings we find out that 
it was not merely neglect that is involved in the distanti-
ating of philosophy and history, but a basic difference in 
orientation of each that must be overcome. As we shall see 
in the next two sections, Collingwood's earliest attempts at 
the philosophy of history tend to assume that philosophy is 
the realm of the universal and history the realm of the par-
ticular, and the resolution of the conflict that arises when 
it is assumed that truth resides either with the universal or 
the particular is by rooting both in a "concrete identity" or 
"concrete universal"--an individual which is both universal 
and particular at once. While the idea of an individual his-
torical event as something which is both universal in meaning 
and concrete in objective reference is an idea which as a long 
and continuous development in Collingwood's philosophy of his-
tory, the focus of it shifted gradually away from the object 
of history and towards the thinking role of the historian, 
and it is this development that Collingwood is anxious to indi-
cate in his Autobiography. 
It is also quite a natural course of thought from the 
point of absolute idealism, as we saw in Chapter III; for if 
the c~n ground of all idealism is the role of the mind as 
both active and passive (FR, 275, 277), then to view the his-
torian as a merely passive receptacle for the transmission of 
fact as ''something independent of my own or your knowledge of 
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it" is on a collision course with the philosophical view of 
knowledge as active, and ultimately with the philosophical de-
mand for self-knowledge. Just as Gentile distinguished be-
tween the realistic concept of change in material objects and 
the idealistic concept of the history of mind, and argued that 
reality is history (FR, 274), so Collingwood would distinguish 
between physical events and re-enacted historical acts, and 
argue that mind is what it does, and what it does is to make 
history. The path to self-knowledge then is through history, 
for it is history which narrates what it is that man has done. 
But the reconciliation of philosophy and history devel-
ops as Collingwood's concept of rapprochement became more com-
plete. 
2. The Identity of History and Philosophy. 
In the earliest form that Collingwood's reconciliation 
between history and philosophy takes, the two are simply equat-
ed: philosophy and history are the same thing. In Religion 
and Philosophy the identity between philosophy (like that be-
tween religion and philosophy, and between religion and moral-
ity) is established in two ways: first by criticizing the 
Views which hold them to be separate, and then by showing that 
they are mutually dependent on one another. In the case of 
history its abstract separation from philosophy has been held 
by those who maintain either that historical facts are independ-
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ent of the philosophical constructions or interpretations that 
are placed on them (historical positivism), or by arguing that 
the past as such is unknowable because it depends on inferences 
based on fallible data (historical scepticism). Neither of 
these anti-historical arguments can withstand criticism. His-
torical positivism fails because the distinction between his-
torical interpretation and historical fact cannot be main-
tained: historical interpretation is just historical fact fur-
ther specified. If one "construction" that is put on fact dif-
fers from another, it is not merely two "ideas" superimposed 
on one fact: one was an historical fact and the other a his-
torical error (RP, 46; FR, 80). Similarly, anti-historical 
scepticism fails because it is not just historical data used 
in inference that is fallible; the same can be said of all 
data. "If inference as such is to be distrusted, the evidence 
that leads us to distrust it is discredited with the rest" as 
another misreporting of a well-attested fact. (RP, 44; FR, 
79). 
But not only do arguments for positivism and scepticism 
fail to dislodge historical thought, but we cannot do without 
either philosophical or historical thought, since they co-
imply one another: 
In the first place, it appears that history cannot exist 
without philosophy. There is no such thing as an entirely 
non-philosophical history. History cannot proceed without 
philosophical presuppositions of a highly complex charac-
ter. It deals with evidence, and therefore makes episte-
196 
mological assumptions as the value of evidence; it de-
scribes the actions of historical characters in terms 
whose meaning is fixed by ethical thought; it has con-
tinually to determine what events are possible and what 
are not possible, and this can only be done in virtue of 
some general metaphysical conclusions. (RP, 46-47; FR, 
81). 
We shall see in Chapter VII that at least one of these "meta-
physical conclusions" (actually a presupposition) mentioned 
here is taken by Collingwood from Bradley's The Presupposi-
tions of Critical History, which Collingwood would later 
acutely criticize (IH, 238-39). It is interesting to note 
that this is the first reference to "presuppositions" which we 
have encountered in Collingwood's writings, and it occurs in 
the context of an argument that identifies philosophy and his-
tory. The argument continues by showing tha philosophy needs 
or presupposes history: 
It is equally certain that philosophy is impossible with-
out history; for any theory must be a theory of facts, and 
if there were no facts there would be no occasion for 
theory . . . . History must be regarded not as a mechanical 
process, nor yet as a gradual accumulation of truths, but 
simply as objectivity; as the real fact of which we are 
conscious. History is that which actually exists; fact, 
as something independent of my own or your knowledge of it. 
In this sense there would be no philosophy without it; for 
no form of consciousness can exist without an object. (RP, 
47-49; FR, 81-83). 
Collingwood draws the conclusion that the relation of history 
to philosophy is that neither can exist without the other, or 
as he says, "each presupposes the other" (RP, 49; FR, 83). 
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Each is knowledge; and if they are different, they must 
be the knowledge of different objects. How can we dis-
tinguish these objects? History, it is sometimes said, 
is knowledge of the particular, philosophy knowledge of 
the universal. But the particular is no mere particular; 
it is a particular of this or that universal; and the uni-
versal never can exist at all except in the form of this 
or that particular .... History, like philosophy, is 
the knowledge of the one real world; it is historical, 
that is, subject to the limitation of time .... It is 
philosophical, that is, all-embracing, universal, for the 
same reason; because historical fact is the only thing 
that exists and includes the whole universe. History a 
parte objecti--the reality which historical research seeks 
to know--is nothing else than the totality of existence; 
and this is also the object of philosophy. History ~ 
parte subjecti--the activity of the historian--is invest-
igation of all that has happened and is happening; and 
this is philosophy too .... (T)he philosophical pre-
suppositions of history are not something different from 
the history itself; they are philosophical truths which 
the historian finds historically exemplified. History 
and philosophy are therefore the same things. (RP, 49-51; 
FR, 83-85) . 
As can be seen from this argument, Collingwood had not 
at this point penetrated very deeply into the nature of histor-
ical thought. As he refined the concept he would narrow the 
object of history from "the knowledge of the one real world" 
or "the totality of existence" to res gestae--deeds of men, 
done in the past. And even in Speculum l•Ientis he showed dis-
satisfaction with such wholesale identities as he proposed 
in Religion and Philosophy. Since it is not a settled part of 
his mature outlook, we shall not engage in criticism of the 
argument here (although we shall do so in examining the con-
cept of rapprochement identity in Chapter VI). But while one 
may quarrel with the argument here, the spirit of reconcili-
ation is certainly present here, its only flaw being that the 
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resulting rapprochement between history and philosophy is less 
a marriage than a fusion. While he continued to use the strat-
egy of "co-implication and therefore identity" in arguing for 
the reconciliation of any two forms of consciousness, he be-
came more careful (a) to specify the differences between them 
as well, (b) to distinguish what any form of consciousness is 
implicitly from what it is explicitly;1 and (c) to locate them 
not as co-ordinate species of the genus, "knowledge," but rath-
er as successors on a scale of forms. 
3. The Concrete Universal as Absolute Object. 
This is evident in Speculum Mentis, where philosophy 
and history are described as having aims insofar as they both 
essentially assert concrete reality and deny simple abstrac-
tion. Therefore "the identification of philosophy with his-
tory is far less violent and misleading than its identifica-
tion with science, religion, or art." But it is immediately 
added that "all such identifications are barren abstractions," 
since to "assert the identity without the difference or the 
difference without the identity is to turn one's back on re-
ality and amuse oneself with paradoxes" (SM, 246). The dif-
ferentiating feature of philosophy as opposed to history, as 
1cf. SM, 108, n. 1, where Collingwood acknowledges 
t~at in Religion and Philosophy he had overlooked the distinc-
t~on between implicit and explicit--roughly, the distinction 
between its "promise" or what it indirectly implies (implicit) 
and its "performance" or what a form of consciousness directly 
asserts (explicit). 
• 
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presented in Speculum Mentis, is that in philosophy subject 
and object are identified, whereas for historical thinking 
concrete fact is always assumed to be something independent 
of the knowing activity of the historian (SM, 241-43, 249). 
That is why Collingwood calls modern realism, in which the ob-
ject is presumed to be unaffected by the knowing of it, the 
historical form of dogmatism. 
Now these appear to be paradoxical assertions if taken 
in conjunction with what Collingwood says about the reconcili-
ation of philosophy and history in the Autobiography. (a) If 
it is philosophy, and not history, that is the form of con-
sciousness in which subject and object are identified, then 
how can history be the "self-knowledge of mind" that Colling-
wood intended it to be? And (b) if the form of dogmatism pe-
culiar to the historian is realism, then how can realism be 
"a philosophy which erred through neglecting history"? We al-
ready know part of the answer to the second question from Chap-
ter III: what makes history dogmatic is its unquestioning ac-
ceptance of the concept of fact as something independent of 
anyone's knowledge of it, which is the fundamental concept un-
derlying realism. Since there are as many forms of realism as 
there are of dogmatism, historical realism follows scientific, 
religious, and artistic realism. What makes historical realism 
an error is its assumption that this is the whole story, and 
what is neglected is the higher concept of history in which 
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fact and the knowledge of fact are reconciled in self-con-
sciousness--i.e. the philosophical concept of history .. But 
this leads us back to the first question, and ultimately to 
the development of the concept of history in Collingwood's 
early writings. The first stage in this development we have 
just reviewed in Religion and Philosophy. The second is in 
Speculum Mentis, which we will consider in this section. The 
third is in the essays on history that appear in the decade of 
the twenties, which we will examine in the immediately follow-
ing section. 
The recognition that the form of experience known as 
history is an improvement on abstract science is an achieve-
ment of the Renaissance, and is solidified in the experimental 
method of Renaissance scientists. "Experiment means the re-
cognition of fact, and experimental science means the asser-
tion of fact, even if only mutilated fact, as the true presup-
position of scientific thought" (SM, 201-202). 2 The first to 
recognize this explicitly, says Collingwood, was Descartes: 
2The reader would be correct to assume that by the 
"assertion of fact" at this point Collingwood means something 
more than the utterance of a statement that something or other 
is a fact or is the case. In Speculum Mentis to assert a fact 
means to assert it as true, which is more than merely observ-
ing it. To be asserted as scientifically true it must be cap-
able of withstanding Baconian cross-examination, which means 
subjecting a fact to the sort of treatment an hypothesis gets 
in the laboratory. Cf. SM, 53. 
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All science, said Descartes, rests upon the one indubi-
table certainty that I think and that therefore I exist. 
Now the thought and existence of which Descartes spoke 
were not abstractions--anything thinking anything, or any-
thing somehow getting itself thought about .... Des-
cartes meant what he said; and what he said was that the 
concrete historical fact, the fact of my actual present 
awareness, was the root of science. He was only going one 
step beyond Bacon, for whom the root of science was na-
tural fact: Descartes, more profoundly, saw that before 
natural fact can be of any use to the scientist he must 
observe it, and that the fact of his observing it is the 
fact that really matters. Science presupposes history and 
can never go behind history: that is the discovery of 
which Descartes' formula is the deepest and most fruitful 
expression. (SM, 202). 
If it is surprising to find Descartes' cogito translated as 
"the fact of my actual present awareness," and given credit 
for expressing the discovery that "science presupposes his-
tory,"3 it is nonetheless revealing of Collingwood's early 
view of the matter: the recognition of the historical element 
of science is the first stage of both a revolution in science 
(the development of the experimental method) and the beginning 
of a revised awareness of history (SM, 202-203). 
It also brings into focus an early association of his-
tory as a form of knowledge and perception as a level of mental 
activity. The early annalists or historical compilers were not 
aware of their reliance on perception, but as the concept of 
3As we shall see, this is not the last of Colling-
wood's creative interpretations of Descartes and the history 
of philosophy: cf. EPM, 10-25, 124-26, 155-60; EM, 185-90. In 
~ Idea of History Descartes is treated as an historical 
sceptic, and Vice's anti-Cartesianism is hailed as the real 
beginning of scientific historiography (IH, 59-70). 
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history developed the role of perception, as opposed to sen-
sation, became more explicit. 
Sensation is the false or abstract account of perception. 
In perception we are immediately aware of our object, 
which is a concrete and therefore historical fact: per-
ception and history are thus identical. But the immediacy 
of perception does not exclude mediation, it is not ab-
stract immediacy (sensation) but implicitly contains an 
element of mediation (thought) .... Perception is ex-
plicitly immediate, but it always contains within itself 
mediation (thought, "interpretation of sense-data," "in-
ference from the immediately given," or whatever one likes 
to call it) and is therefore never abstract immediacy .. 
. . History is thus, as a specific form of experience, 
identical with perception. (SM, 204-205). 
Just as perception requires an element of memory insofar as an 
object of perception is grasped not all at once or immediately 
but serially, or as a "synthesis" or reconstruction, so also 
the annalist or writer or memoirs is someone whose reminiscen-
ces rely on memory--one's own or that of a "source"--for its 
narrative sequence. But such a reliance on memory must, to 
retain even the rudiments of reliability, distinguish between 
memory and pure imaginative fantasy, and this requires the ex-
ercise of a selective criterion (SM, 213-14). The earliest 
forms of historiography were dominated by various mixtures of 
the true criterion of history with ideals drawn from other 
forms of experience, so that in historians like Herodotus and 
Thucydides factual coherence was mixed with aesthetic or dram-
atic effect (SM, 214-16). It is only in the eighteenth cen-
tury that the concept of fact becomes explicit and such errors 
were overcome to reach "historians' history" (SM, 216). 
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But it is at this point that fact is elevated to the 
level of the absolute: 
There is thus no feature of experience, no attitude of 
mind towards its object, which is alien to history. Art 
rests on the ignoring of reality: religion, on the ignor-
ing of thought: science, on the ignoring of fact; but with 
the recognition of fact everything is recognized that is 
in any sense real. The fact, as historically determined, 
is the absolute object. The mark of the absolute object 
is individuality, for individuality is concreteness. The 
object as individual is the whole of what exists, and this 
is concretely articulated into parts each of which is 
again individual, and so to infinity .... The object, 
as a system of fact so organized, is objective throughout, 
for every part is a true microcosm, and is truly infinite. 
(SM, 218-19). 
It is to this extent that history achieves what art, religion, 
and science could not. For where esthetic consciousness ex-
presses itself in a monadic work of art, but while each such 
work is its own cosmos, it is only so by ignoring not only 
other works of art but the everyday world in which the artist 
lives and works (SM, 84, 219). Religious consciousness locates 
its individuality in God, "the monad of monads, a cosmos whose 
structure is that of the absolute object"--but whose individu-
ality stands over against that of the world "whose very nature 
is to be outside him," and therefore leaves the absolute in-
dividuality of God unattained (SM, 219). Scientific conscious-
ness replaces the concept of God with the concept of law, but 
with the consequence that "(w)hat is individual and organized 
as a system of individuals is not the world but only the con-
cept" which keeps law separated from true individuals to the 
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extent that any such individual is only a particular instance 
of the law. The failure of each of these forms of experience 
is redeemed by the success of history, which reaches the idea 
of an object "beyond which there is nothing and within which 
every part truly represents the whole." 
This absolute whole is the concrete universal; for con-
crete universality is individuality, the individual being 
simply the unity of the universal and the particular. The 
absolute individual is universal in that it is what it is 
throughout, and every part of it is as individual as it-
self. On the other hand it is no mere abstraction, the ab-
stract quality of individualness, but an individual which 
includes all others .... The principle of its structure 
is not classification, the abstract concept, but the con-
crete concept, which is relevance, or implication .. 
(T)he concrete universal is the daily bread of every his-
torian, and the logic of history is the logic of the con-
crete universal. (SM, 221). 
It is doubtful whether every historian would recognize 
that his "daily bread" consisted of "the concrete universal" 
in the sense of being the "system of systems, the world of 
worlds"--including the later Collingwood himself, as we shall 
see in Chapter IX: while the historian brings to his study an 
~ priori concept of the past, as well as presuppositions about 
the coherence of the past, he feels himself under no obligation 
to consider the whole of it as an absolute object consisting 
of an infinity of facts (IH, 240-45, 303). In fact it is un-
der the burden of such a goal that history collapses by the 
"inner dialectic" of its own version of the monism-pluralism 
dilemma. If history exists, its object is an unknowable in-
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finite whole; and if its parts are atoms, then history disap-
pears and science takes its place, with its own unresolved 
problems of universality and particularity (SM, 234). In 
either case, the absolute object remains unachieved. 
Thus history is the crown and the reductio ad absurdam 
of all knowledge considered as knowledge of-an objective 
reality independent of the knowing mind. Here for the 
first time we place before ourselves an object which sat-
isfies the mind; an object individual, concrete, infinite, 
no arbitrary abstraction or unreal fiction, but reality 
itself in its completeness .... The progressive alien-
ation of the mind from its object is in history complete. 
The world is triumphantly unified as object, only to find 
itself separated from the mind by a gulf which no thought 
can traverse. (SM, 238). 
We shall resume this discussion in the next chapter, 
where we shall be concerned with the rapprochement identity of 
absolute knowledge as it is presented in Speculum Mentis, but 
at this point we must make several observations about the con-
cept of history herein presented. The reader has no doubt 
wondered why it is necessary for history to postulate itself 
as an absolute object at all, for if it were not for this the 
final "reductio ad absurdam" would not occur at all. It ap-
pears that the chapter on history is only a stage along the 
way to establishing the demands of absolute knowledge--i.e. 
the demand for an object that will fully satisfy the mind. 
What mind? The mind of an absolute idealist, one concludes--
for there is only token effort to take into account the actual 
praxis of historians in Speculum Mentis, other than the occa-
sional remarks about Herodotus and Thucydides, Mommsen and 
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Gibbon. What we are confronted with instead is what amounts 
to a very abstract view of the subject matter, one which tends 
to assimilate historical thinking to perception and memory, 
and the historical object to the world of fact--all of it. 
Little consciousness is exhibited of the uniqueness of human 
acts in the range of facts, of the need for cross-examination 
of facts by the historian's critical intelligence, or the 
legitimate role of the historian's pressuppositions in this 
process. 
We are therefore a long way from the view of history 
presented in the Autobiography--but this itself is consistent 
with the autobiographical interpretation, since Collingwood 
states that in these years the rapprochement between history 
and philosophy was incomplete, and was subject to a long and 
painstaking development. The evidence for this development 
is contained in the essays written between 1920 and 1930, and 
to these we must now turn. 
4. The Ideality of History as a Scale of Forms. 
There is no clearer index to Collingwood's views on 
the philosophy of history than that which can be obtained by 
careful attention to these essays from the decade of the twen-
ties. In them one finds a gradual shift away from a defini-
tion of history solely in terms of the realism-idealism con-
troversy and toward a clear recognition of the multi-layered 
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senses of the term. Between these two ends of the scale we 
shall find not only most of the "principles of history"·men-
tioned in the Autobiography making their appearance, but we 
shall also see parallel discussions of both the static logic 
of historical assertions (for example concerning "categorical 
judgements" and "the concrete universal") and the dynamics of 
history in terms of processes and dialectical development. 
A.--In "Croce's Philosophy of History" (1921) and "Can 
the New Idealism Dispense with Mysticism?'' (1923) Collingwood 
writes, as we have already seen, as a sympathetic critic of 
Italian and German idealism, and in the process of his discus-
sion of this philosophy he formulates (and explicitly approves) 
the notions of a "living past," history as dealing with 
thought, and the basic process of "re-thinking" past thoughts 
(EPH, 6-10; FR, 274-75). 
History goes on in the mind of the historian: he thinks it, 
he enacts it within himself: he identifies himself with the 
history he is studying and actually lives it as he thinks 
it, whence Croce's paradox that "all history is contempor-
ary history." ... History is thought, annals the corpse 
of thought. But has thought a corpse? and if so, what is 
it like? ... Croce's general "philosophy of the spirit" 
supplies him with a ready-made answer. Nothing exists 
but the spirit; but the spirit has two sides or parts, 
thought and will .... Thought is the synthesis of sub-
ject and object, and its characteristic is truth; will is 
the creation of an object by the subject, and its charac-
teristic is utility .... Annals are not thought but 
willed; they are constructed--"drawn up"--by the historian 
for his own ends. (EPH, 6-7). 
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In this 1921 essay Collingwood goes on to criticize Croce for 
mixing idealism with naturalism (which, we recall, is a-syno-
nym for realism), and he calls on Croce to purge his philoso-
phy of its naturalistic elements in order to "reach the point 
of absolute idealism" which the essay appears to assume to be 
a step forward (EPH, 22). While Collingwood is critical of 
Croce for reducing philosophy to the methodological moment of 
history, and for absorbing philosophy into history (EPH, 20-21), 
the idea of a living history of thought remains untouched. It 
comes fairly close to the "first principle" of history as Col-
lingwood formulated it in the Autobiography (A, 110). 
In the 1923 essay Collingwood presents in even strong-
er terms the contrast between the idealistic and the naturalis-
tic view of history. We already quoted the passage in which 
Collingwood contrasts Croce and Gentile on the issue of the 
"metaphysic of being" which presents a philosophy of the real-
istic concept of change, and a "metaphysic of knowledge" which 
presents a philosophy of idealistic concept of history (FR, 
274). Although Collingwood does not explicitly state the ex-
tent to which he would subscribe to either Croce's position or 
Gentile's, these passages do show an awareness of a distinc-
tion between process in general and historical processes. When 
taken in conjunction with his charges against Croce, it is not 
unreasonable to infer that Collingwood leaned toward a view on 
the ideality of history not significantly different (at this 
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point) from that of Gentile. By 1923, Collingwood appeared 
to have accepted the basic ideality of history, i.e. that 
thought is essential to it. Later Collingwood will drop the 
idealism-realism emphasis, while retaining the distinction 
between natural change and historical processes. 
B.--In "Are History and Science Different Kinds of 
Knowledge?" 0922) and "The Nature and Aims of a Philosophy 
of History" (1924), Collingwood examines the epistemological 
claims of history vis-a-vis other forms of knowledge. These 
two essays represent a position intermediate between that of 
Religion and Philosophy (in which various forms of knowledge 
are identified insofar as they are directed toward the same 
intentional object) and that of Speculum Mentis (in which forms 
of knowledge are distinguished on the basis of the manner in 
which they grasp their intentional objects--as successive ap-
proximations to the truth). 
In the 1922 essay Collingwood denies that there are 
any epistemological grounds for a distinction between history 
and science: "when both are regarded as actual inquiries the 
difference of method and logic wholly disappears" (EPH, 33). 
It is not the case that the scientist deals with the univer-
sal and the historian with the particular exclusively, nor 
that it is the function of the scientist to generalize and of 
the historian to particularize; both deal with the world of 
individual fact, and both activities involve the interpreta-
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tion of individual facts in terms of general concepts (EPH, 
26-27). 
Interpretation is not the employment of a previously con-
structed tool (concept) upon a separately-given material 
(fact): neither the concept nor the fact is "possessed" 
(thought and observed respectively) except in the presence 
of the other. To possess or think a concept is to in-
terpret a fact in terms of it: to possess or observe a 
fact is to interpret it in terms of a concept. Science 
is this interpretation . . . . The object which the sci-
entist cognizes is not "a universal," but always a par-
ticular fact, a fact which but for the existence of his 
generalizing activity would be blank meaningless sense 
data. His activity as a scientist may be described alter-
natively as the understanding of sense-data by concepts, 
or the realizing of concepts in sensation, "intuiting" 
his thoughts or "thinking out" his intuitions .... 
(T)here is no such thing as knowledge either of the par-
ticular or of the universal, but only of the individual: 
and ... the sense-datum (pure particular) and concept 
(pure universal) are false abstractions when taken sepa-
rately ((and)) yet, as elements in the one concrete object 
of knowledge, the individual interpreted fact, are capable 
of being analytically distinguished. (EPH, 28-29). 
In the 1924 essay Collingwood seems to reverse his 
earlier position: he declares that "history and science are 
not identical a parte subjecti" because "scientific thinking 
is an abstract thinking, historical thinking a concrete think-
ing" (EPH, 45). We recall from Religion and Philosophy that 
by "a parte subjecti" Collingwood understands precisely the 
activity of the knower gua historian, scientist, etc.--in con-
trast to "a parte objecti" which refers to the reality or ob-
ject studied by a given form of knowledge (RP, 51; FR, 84-85). 
In short, Collingwood seems to be saying here that, contrary 
to his earlier judgment, there is an epistemological ground 
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for distinguishing science from history--the distinction be-
ing that between abstract and concrete thinking respectively. 
The apparent contradiction is reconciled somewhat when 
one pays careful attention to the shift of levels between the 
two essays--the first dealing with the praxis of the two kinds 
of inquiry (" ... regarded as actual inquiries ") , the 
second with the ideals of the two forms of knowledge. The dis-
tinction is important for an understanding of Collingwood's 
emerging philosophy of history, and the point of view which he 
adopts in Speculum Mentis. Both science and history, he wish-
es to tell us, deal with individual facts, and both make use 
of generalizations and the application of generalizations (par-
ticularization) to concrete cases. But each proposes a differ-
ent ideal for itself. 
Ideally, historical thought is the apprehension of a world 
of fact. Actually, it is the presentation by thought to 
itself of a world of half-ascertained fact: a world in 
which truth and error are at any given moment inextricably 
confused together. Thus the actual object of actual his-
torical thinking is an object which is not "given" but 
perpetually in process of being given .... The philoso-
phy of history, therefore, is a study of historical think-
ing: not only psychological analysis of its actual pro-
cedure, but the analysis of the ideal which it sets before 
itself. Historical thought is one among a number of atti-
tudes taken up by the mind towards the objective world; 
it is an attitude which assumes that there exists a world 
of facts--not general laws, but individual facts--inde-
pendent of the being known, and that it is possible, if 
not wholly to discover these facts, at any rate to discov-
er them in part and approximately. The philosophy of his-
tory must be a critical discussion of this attitude. (EPH, 
44). 
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But this distinction (based on mental dispositions, 
be it noted) still does not extract Collingwood from his dif-
ficulties, since (a) to distinguish between what a form of ex-
perience or thought is ideally from what it is in practice, or 
actually, is, on Collingwood's own grounds, to commit the err-
or of realism (SM, 313; cf. RP, 8, 29-33; FR, 47, 66-68); and 
more seriously, (b) the historian does not always deal with 
the same set of "facts" as does the scientist--a point which 
Collingwood had already acknowledged in his 1923 essay on the 
New Idealism, wherein he recognized that the facts with which 
the historian is concerned are consciously performed processes 
in contrast to the events of nature: "that which has a history 
... is a mind, for matter may change but it cannot be said 
to have a history" (FR, 274). To be subject matter for sci-
ence an event must merely be capable of being thought. With 
events that are already thoughts the scientist has no direct 
concern, since the facts which he is proposing to explain are 
not artifacts but rather natural events. 
Collingwood makes no note of these objective distinc-
tions in his 1924 essay since he is limiting himself to a dis-
cussion of the differences in ideals between history and other 
forms of knowledge. Consequently he stresses the manner in 
which the historian, as opposed to the scientist, seeks to ex-
press his judgments about the "facts" he is investigating. 
Although both hypothetical and categorical forms are used in 
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science and history, the scientist seeks to express his judg-
ments primarily in the hypothetical mode, in which the a~tece­
dent is the ground of the consequent ("if equals be added to 
equals, the sums are equal"), whereas the historian aims at 
categorical judgments. "The ideal of history, then, is to be 
a single categorical judgment, articulated into an infinity of 
coherent categorical judgments, asserting the reality and ex-
pounding the nature of an infinite individual world of fact 
articulated into an infinity of individual facts" (EPH, 46). 
The historian assumes the objective independence of these facts 
from the knowing mind, so that "these actual happenings are 
always the object of his thought, and never his thought it-
self"--this being the realistic bias of the historian (EPH, 
46-47). 
As in Speculum Mentis, which was published in the same 
year as the essay under consideration, Collingwood is unclear 
about what he understands by "categorical judgement," and his 
example does not clarify his usage. Collingwood uses as an 
example of a categorical judgment used by scientists the state-
ment: "all whales are mammals"--which he then criticizes as 
not truly categorical since it "does not imply an enumeration 
of all actual whales but rather tells us that whatever we can 
identify as a whale, if and when we do so identify anything, 
we can further identify as a mammal." The implication seems 
to be that (a) categorical judgments do imply an actual enu-
meration of all the entities involved--that is, some sort of 
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quantification; and (b) that categorical judgments as used by 
scientists refer to their objects only hypothetically, and 
hence fail to be truly categorical. In the 1924 essays the 
doctrine of categorical judgments is vague, and requires fur-
ther clarification. 
But Collingwood does further specify what sort of 
"single categorical judgement" the historian's ideal would be, 
and what the limitations of such an intentional object would 
be. 
The infinite whole of fact which it is the historian's 
business to determine is . . . a world whose centre is the 
historian's "immediate" perception, and whose radius is 
measured by the depth to which he can see into the signi-
ficance of that perception . . . . The world of every his-
torian is limited by the limits of his knowledge .... 
Each historian sees history from his own centre, at an 
angle of his own: ... so the various "perspectives" of 
historians are arranged in a "space of perspectives;" each 
historian is a monad which mirrors the universe from a 
point of view that is irrevocably not any other's point of 
view .... But a monad has no windows, and the historian 
as such cannot do the work of co-ordinating the infinity 
of possible perspectives. He can only travel from one per-
spective to another . . . . But in reflecting, that is 
philosophizing, about his own thought he recognizes that 
he is a monad, and to realize that one is in the "egocen-
tric predicament" is to transcend it. When thought returns 
upon itself and faces the question of its own relation to 
its object, by criticizing the point of view from which it 
has regarded that object it transcends this point of view. 
(EPH, 53-55)4 
4Although Collingwood twice uses the expression, 
"space of perspectives" in this essay, it never again occurs 
in his writings. The term strikes the reader familiar with 
Husserl and Lonergan as similar to the notion of "horizon." 
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It is here that we have the rudiments of an answer to 
the first of our two paradoxical questions at the beginning of 
Section 3. Although the historian's ideal is to articulate a 
single categorical judgment, in practice he is always partial-
ly separated from the object of his thought, so that his 
thought and its relation to its object is at best one of sim-
ilarity and not one of total identity. As an historian, then, 
"he is always the spectator of a life in which he does not 
participate: he sees the world of fact as it were across a 
gulf which, as an historian, he cannot bridge" (EPH, 47). But 
as a philosopher the historian can also reflect on the fact 
that he himself "is part of the world of fact, and that his 
own historical thought is a product of the historical process 
which he is studying" (EPH, 47). In other words the historian 
gua historian is limited by his "realist" assumption about the 
independence of the facts he is observing, but the historian 
gua philosopher is capable of transcending (by sympathetic in-
terpretation and by critical reflection) this separation of 
subject and object. History is therefore the "self-knowledge 
of mind" when it becomes self-consciously or critically reflec-
tive about itself, or when it becomes philosophy. (Cf. EPH, 
85-86). 
Furthermore the way in which history becomes critical-
ly reflective is by attending to the way in which historical 
problems arise within the historian's own experience (EPH, 51-
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53). Before something can become an historical issue "the 
problem must arise within historical thought; it must, t-hat 
is to say, arise somehow out of the attempt to perceive more 
adequately the world that exists here and now for our percep-
tion" (EPH, 53). 
Hence although Collingwood does not use the terms "en-
capsulation" and "re-enactment" in this essay, the concepts 
and their relationships are the same as those which he ex-
presses in the historical principle which we have called 
"HIST-3" (number 5 of Table 4) in our summary of the Autobiog-
raphy. The experience in question, says Collingwood, 
is . subject to the distinction between truth and 
falsehood: hence we have not only to read, but to criti-
cize. The recognition of this truth is what differenti-
ates history in the higher sense of the word from the mere 
absorption and repetition of stories .... This critical 
work is sufficiently difficult to require somewhat elabor-
ate training, which involves the incidental construction 
of ... historical methods. As the word method suggests, 
these sciences consist of empirical generalizations or 
rules of procedure, instructing the student how to proceed 
in typical cases .... Their business is to solve the 
problem "how can the historian check his sources"? to 
which the general answer is, "the historian who knows his 
business can always invent methods of checking any 
source." (EPH, 51-52). 
The only element lacking in this account, as compared to that 
of the Autobiography, is the fully developed notion of the 
"real life" or "practical problems" which constitute the "su-
perficial or obvious present" of the historian: these elements 
are added in his 1930 essay, "The Philosophy of History," 
Which we will consider presently. 
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But we must observe in passing that in the above pas-
sage Collingwood is beginning to relate several concepts .which 
are of very high importance for his later philosophy: (1) he 
is beginning to acknowledge explicitly that there are levels 
of meaning to the concept of history; (2) he recognizes that 
in the higher sense of the term, truth and falsehood are dis-
tinguished by means of critical thinking; (3) that this criti-
cal thinking gives rise to historical methods; and (4) that 
these methods consist of rules of procedure on how to proceed 
in typical cases. Furthermore (5) it is noteworthy that in 
this 1924 essay (as well as in Speculum Mentis, published the 
same year) he first recognizes that "the various forms of 
thought (art, science, history, philosophy) are not species of 
a genus," but rather form what he was later to call a "scale 
of overlapping forms" such that "art and science are con-
tained in history, not excluded from it: yet contained in a 
form transmuted by their subordination to the historical end," 
while history "is not contained in this manner in art or sci-
ence" (EPH, 48). 
Similarly, the philosopher must in a sense be an historian 
and the historian in a sense a philosopher; but the phil-
osopher is suppressed in the historian, and the historian 
is preserved but subordinated in the philosopher; history 
is included in philosophy while philosophy is excluded 
from history. (EPH, 49) 
Here we catch a partial glimpse of an answer to the 
second of our two paradoxical questions at the beginning of 
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the previous section of this chapter: the realist is a phil-
osopher who attempts to ignore the history of his own subject 
matter, which, on Collingwood's view, is a self-stultifying 
process. Not only is realism the root of all forms of formal-
istic and abstract dogmatism (which would mean, in terms of 
the account given in Speculum Mentis, that it erred as much 
through neglecting history as it did through neglecting art, 
religion, and science--that is, it neglected them as concrete 
but partial modes of thought), but it is a philosophy which 
neglects the historical appreciation of concrete fact, which 
is its own basis. The full flowering and ultimate consequence 
of the realistic attitude towards the objects of knowledge is 
history; but to deny that subject and object can ever be re-
conciled to one another (which is the same thing as to affirm 
that objects of knowledge are unaffected by the knowing of 
them) is to prevent the historical viewpoint from ever reach-
ing its highest point of development--viz. a self-consciously 
critical process, the self-knowledge of mind. 
C.--But the complete answer to our two questions is 
possible only by an explication of two further lines of 
thought: (1) the idea of history as a developmental process, 
and (2) the nature of historical evidence. The latter is de-
veloped in two essays published in 1928 and 1930, which we 
shall consider shortly; the former is worked out in three es-
says in which Collingwood deals with the cyclic view of his-
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tory and its companion notion (in the 19th century at least) 
the idea of historical progress. 
In "Oswald Spengler and the Theory of Historical 
Cycles" (1927) Collingwood criticizes Spengler for writing 
history as though he were describing a natural phenomenon, 
which reduces it to so many episodes in the natural life-
cycle of an atomic "culture," which is elevated to the status 
of a thing with definite characteristics. Collingwood's ob-
jection to Spengler is similar in strategy both to his pre-
vious criticism of Croce and to his later criticism of Toyn-
bee: an historian cannot treat his subject matter as if it 
were a natural entity with physical properties subject to na-
tural laws, because it commits the positivistic error of re-
garding as given what in fact is constructed by the active 
process of interpretation on the part of the historian. 
These are not superficial flaws . . . . They are sacri-
fices of truth to method; they are symptoms of a logical 
fallacy which underlies the whole book and has actually 
been erected into a principle. The fallacy lies in the 
attempt to characterize a culture by means of a single 
idea or tendency or feature, to deduce everything from 
this one central idea without recognizing that a single 
idea, asserted in this way, calls up its own opposite in 
order to have something to assert itself against, and 
henceforth proceeds, not by merely repeating itself, but 
by playing a game of statement and counter-statement 
with this opposite .... (W)here ((Spengler)) fails is 
in thinking out what he means by "characteristic." He 
thinks that the characteristic is a fundamental something 
whose logical consequences flow smoothly and unopposedly 
into all its manifestations; whereas it is really the dom-
inant partner in a pair of opposites, asserting itself 
only so far as it can keep its opposite in check and 
therefore always colored by the hidden presence and under-
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ground activity of this opposite. (EPH, 63, 65). 
Now while Collingwood does not explicitly use the expressions 
"event" and "process" in this passage, it is clear that his 
critique of Spengler is based on the historical principle we 
have called "LG" in our summary of the Autobiography. Any 
single idea, tendency, or feature of a culture in history 
"calls up its own opposite" with which it plays a game of 
statement and count~r-statement--becomes, in the terminology 
of the Autobiography, a process the components of which are 
not static characteristics that do not change, but rather 
"turn into one another": 
(W)hile recogn~z~ng that a given culture has a certain 
self-consistent character, a fundamental idea which is 
working itself out into a complete social life, we must 
assert that this idea or character is not static but dy-
namic; it is not a single unchanged thing ... but a pro-
cess of spiritual development, an idea which grows out of 
other ideas, in an environment of other ideas, which as-
serts itself against these other ideas through a process 
of give-and-take in which it modifies them and is modified 
by them in turn. (EPH, 73). 
In "The Theory of Historical Cycles" (1927) and "A 
Philosophy of Progress" (1929) Collingwood continues to de-
velop the concept of history as a living thought-process rath-
er than a dead set of events--first by showing that the cycli-
cal view of history is a function of the limitations of the 
historian's own knowledge, and secondly by locating the theory 
of historical cycles within the context of range of possible 
viewpoints that the historian can take toward his subject 
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matter. 
In the 1927 essay Collingwood stresses the need for a 
unifying principle in history in contrast to its pluralizing 
tendencies, which culminate in taking its data as so many 
atomic events. In addition to being held together subjective-
ly by the historian's own thinking, it is held together objec-
tively by a continuity of problems the successive resolutions 
to which form the fabric of history. So far as the historian 
can see history as a whole, he sees it "as a continuous devel-
opment in which every phase consists of the solution of human 
problems set by the preceding phase" (EPH, 87). 
But that is only an ideal for the historian; that is what 
he knows history would look like if he could see it as a 
whole, which he can never do. In point of fact, he can 
only see it in bits; he can only be acquainted with cer-
tain periods .... At any given moment, therefore, the 
historian can only present an interim report on the prog-
ress of historical studies, and there will be gaps in it. 
These gaps will appear as breaches in continuity, periods 
in which the historian loses track of the development . . 
.. In this condition, we see history split up into dis-
connected episodes, each episode forming a relatively in-
telligible whole, separated from its neighbors by dark 
ages. That is the point of view from which we see history 
in cycles .... The cyclical view of history is thus a 
function of the limitations of historical knowledge. (EPH, 
87-89). 
In "A Philosophy of Progress" (1929) Collingwood sets 
out to answer the question he had posed in his 1927 essay on 
historical cycles: do the moral categories of good and bad 
have a place in the evaluation of the course of history (EPH, 
77)? His answer, in brief, is that "whether you think the 
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course of events is an upward or a downward course depends not 
on it but on you" (EPH, 109)--that is, on the presupposi.tions 
of the historian. Three views are possible: the Greco-Roman 
view in which history is a process of increasing decadence 
from a presumed golden age; the 18th and 19th century European 
view of history as giving evidence of progressive improvement 
of human conditions and man's ability to solve his perennial 
problems; and the more recent theory of historical cycles, in 
which there is an alternation between periods of decadence and 
of progress (EPH, 104-105). Since the third is nothing more 
than a combination of the first two, the real question is one 
which gets at the basis on which one measures progress or dec-
adence, and Collingwood suggests that in the end the question 
is not so much factual or theoretical as much as it is practi-
cal. The historian who works to preserve and improve what he 
finds of value in the world and who therefore continues to 
find the world as it is a better place on the whole than it 
was, will view history as on the whole a progressive develop-
ment leading to the present. One who resigns himself to in-
activity finds it on the whole a worse place than it was in a 
previous age; he feels that a past age is not again achievable, 
and therefore writes as a pessimistic historian who views his-
tory as decadence. And finally, one who finds that some 
things at the present time are degenerate and require improve-
ment (e.g. a present form of government) while others are al-
ready notably better (e.g. architecture and engineering) will 
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find both elements of progress and decadence in history, and 
opt for some version of a theory of historical cycles. ·But in 
any case the question is decided by the limitations in the 
present practical life of the historian: 
The question whether, on the whole, history shows a prog-
ress can be answered, as we now see, by asking another 
question. Have you the courage of your convictions? If 
you have, if you regard the things which you are doing as 
things worth doing, then the course of history which has 
led to the doing of them is justified by its results, and 
its movement is a movement forward. (EPH, 120). 
Here we not only have an illustration of Collingwood's use of 
"HIST-4" to solve an historical problem, we also have the sec-
ond phase of the answer to the first of our two paradoxical 
questions. The process of history is taken by the historian 
as consisting of events that occur independently of his know-
ing them, but upon critical examination the nature or meaning 
of these events is determined by the historian's judgment. 
This judgment is limited by the limitations of the historian's 
own mind. But these limitations are not merely theoretical, 
they are also practical: at the level at which the historian 
is both agent and patient, or at the level in which subject 
and object are identified, the historical processes are addi-
tionally determined by the historian (e.g. whether or not they 
shall be progressive, retrogressive, or cyclical). 
D.--If such a conclusion as this seems to destroy the 
last shred of historical objectivity, the balance is restored 
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in two further essays, "The Limits of Historical Knowledge" 
(1928) and "The Philosophy of History" (1930), which complete 
the sketch of Collingwood's development of the concept of his-
tory prior to 1932, and before he had written the series of 
lectures which were later to be published as The Idea of His-
tory. 
The 1928 essay argues that although the historian is 
limited by the quantity and quality of the evidence he has at 
his disposal, this does not mean that the historical sceptic 
is correct in his claim that history is "the doubtful story of 
successive events." On the contrary, historical scepticism is 
only the negative aspect of a full definition of history which, 
when confronted by conflicting evidence, cannot stop short at 
the critical confrontation of one statement by its contradic-
tory, but must proceed to the dialectical task of showing why 
one statement must be revised on the basis of another--why, in 
short, criticism is a phase in the complete process of histor-
ical thinking, which must present its arguments on the basis 
of all relavent evidence (EPH, 96). What the historian is 
seeking is not "what really happened," since this has about 
the same status as the Kantian unknowable "thing in itself." 
The past referred to by historical thinking is not, that is, 
what is demanded by that permanent tendency in all thought 
which is "sometimes called the plain man's realism--to think 
of the object as a 'thing in itself,' a thing out of all re-
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lation to the knowledge of it, a thing existing in itself and 
by itself" (EPH, 99). Such thinking leads to the notion. of 
a specious past--a "limbo where events which have finished 
happening still go on," where the past is something still ex-
' ,. isting in a "~ol\..,.oS T"OlTO~ of its own; a world where Galileo' s 
weight is still falling, where the smoke of Nero's Rome still 
fills the intelligible air, and where interglacial man is still 
laboriously learning to chip flints" (EPH, 101). On the con-
trary, what the historian seeks is a present filled with those 
symbols of the past which Collingwood calls "evidence." 
An event that has finished happening is just nothing at 
all. It has no existence of any kind whatever. The past 
is simply non-existent . . . . What the historian wants is 
a real present . . . . He wants to reconstruct in his mind 
the process by which his world--the world in those of its 
aspects which at this particular moment impress themselves 
on him--has come to be what it is. This process is not 
now going on . . . . He is trying to know the past . . . 
as it appears from its traces in the present .... (A)ll 
historical thought is the historical interpretation of the 
present. By leading to the present, it has left its 
traces upon the present; and by doing that, it has sup-
plied the historian with evidence concerning itself, a 
starting point for his investigations. (EPH, 101-102). 
The process of historical criticism, therefore, is a process 
of confronting one piece of evidence with another, related 
piece, from the point of view of establishing how the histori-
an's own present came to be what it is (EPH, 98-99). 
Thus far Collingwood has only determined that the his-
torian's knowledge of the past is limited by evidence, and 
that this evidence must be something that constitutes part of 
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the historian's own present. In "The Philosophy of History" 
(1930) he not only refines the notion of evidence, but ~lso 
adds a second set of limitations to historical thought, con-
nects historical inquiry with Q-A logic, again attacks the 
realists' conception of a specious past, and outlines several 
of the remaining "principles of history" with which we are al-
ready familiar from the Autobiography--all this within the 
very compact space of the four concluding pages of the essay. 
First, with respect to evidence and the limits of his-
torical knowledge: 
History is knowledge of the past, and the past consists 
of events that have finished happening. The past does not 
exist and cannot be perceived; our knowledge of it is not 
derived from observation and cannot be verified by experi-
ment .... We come to know the past, not immediately, 
but by interpreting evidence. This evidence (or data) is 
something that exists in the present and is perceived by 
the historian .... But data are not enough. They must 
be interpreted. This requires principles, and the body of 
principles constitutes historical method or technique. Some 
of these principles are scientific in character, that is, 
they concern particular groups of evidence . . . . Some 
are philosophical, that is, they apply universally to all 
evidence whatever, and compose the logic of historical 
method. It is to this that we must refer such problems 
as, the nature and limits of negative evidence, the possi-
bility of analogical argument, and so forth. Data, on the 
one hand, and principles of interpretation on the other, 
are the two elements of all historical thought. (EPH, 136-
37). 
This is one of those passages where the reader is confronted 
with a direct contradiction. Did not Collingwood, after all, 
state in the Autobiography that history is not concerned with 
past events (which begin and end) but with processes (which do 
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not)? Was this not the "first principle" of history ("LG")? 
Here the interpreter must tread with extreme caution, but in 
the process he will make a discovery of the first importance 
in understanding how to treat the many direct contradictions 
one finds in Collingwood's writings. Making use of his "di-
alectical principle," Collingwood often begins an expository 
section of his writing by making a statement that he thinks 
corresponds to the ordinary beliefs of his reading audience, 
and then in successive sentences and paragraphs, leads him be-
yond this point to the position he wishes to establish. 5 In 
this case Collingwood is starting from the point of view of 
the "plain man's realism"--that history is knowledge of an ob-
ject, the past, which exists independently of his knowing it--
and leads him to a modified notion of history as knowledge of 
a significant present. This is manifestly his intention, and 
it is made clear by filling in the first ellipsis in the above 
quote, and adding the concluding paragraph of the essay: 
5cf. CRC, 9 May 1935, Collingwood to Ryle, p. 15: 
"(I)n the work of any competent philosopher I find that the 
part played by systematic fallacies is partial only; repeated-
ly, when real difficulties arise, his insight into the subject, 
sharpened by the sense of the difficulty, leads him to reject 
the fallacy even at the cost of inconsistency and to adopt a 
better procedure than that which he had followed .... Now 
this being so, a philosopher named as the victim of a fallacy 
might ... say to me: 'You pillory me unfairly; on page X, it 
is true, I do fall into your fallacy; but on page Y I correct 
it; you ought to take my work as a whole, and interpret X in 
the light of Y; if you did so you would see that the error was 
only a temporary slip at worst; and, at best, you might wonder 
whether it was not merely the exploration of a provisional 
point of view. '" 
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A "realistic" theory, according to which knowledge is the 
"apprehension of a really existing object," is ruled out 
as absolutely inapplicable to history .... (T)he his-
torian does not select, because no past facts are "there" 
before him, to select from, until he has put them there 
by sheer historical thinking .... Finally, since the 
past in itself is nothing, the knowledge of the past in 
itself is not, and cannot be, the historian's goal. His 
goal, as the goal of a thinking being, is knowledge of the 
present .... But, as historian, he is concerned with 
one special aspect of the present--how it came to be what 
it is. (EPH, 136-39). 
We shall have occasion in the sequel to examine many 
other instances where Collingwood seems to take back with one 
hand what he had given with the other, but in the meantime we 
should note that a successful gloss on these passages would be 
something like the following: "Although from the point of 
view of the plain man's realism history is taken to mean know-
ledge of the past, where the past consists of events that have 
finished happening, since the past does not exist (as the re-
alistic theory might lead one to suspect) one must revise the 
notion of the past to mean that aspect of the present which 
gives indication (evidence) of how it has come to be what it 
is--and this is the past the historian is concerned with." 
Such a reading does not violate Collingwood's "first principle 
of history," and in fact makes sinse of the complete passage 
--especially its final paragraph. But be it noted, it still 
does not get Collingwood out of the woods, because the reader 
is still puzzled by what it would mean for historical objec-
tivity for the historian to "put" facts before himself "by 
sheer historical thinking." For a clarification of what this 
229 
means we must next pay note to the role of Q-A logic in his-
torical thinking: 
The beginning of historical research is therefore not the 
collection or contemplation of crude facts as yet unin-
terpreted, but the asking of a question which sets one off 
looking for facts which may help one to answer it .... 
And the question must be asked with some reasonable ex-
pectation of being able to answer it, and to answer it by 
genuinely historical thinking . . . . We express this by 
saying that a question does or does not "arise." To say 
that a question arises, is to say that it has a logical 
connexion with our previous thoughts, that we have a rea-
son for asking it and gre not moved by mere capricious 
curiosity. (EPH, 137) 
Now although there is no mention in this passage of Q-A logic 
as such, it is clear (e.g. from the discussion of a question's 
"arising" by logical connection with the historian's own pre-
vious thoughts) that he has Q-A logic in mind, just as he had 
described it in the Autobiography--short, that is, of an ex-
plicit discussion of the relation of questions and presupposi-
tions.7 Hence this passage confirms that as of 1930 Colling-
6cf. CRC, loc. cit., p. 17: "Thus it seems to me that 
the individual 'proposition' assented to on any given occa-
sion is assented to only in a context, never by itself; and 
this context is not a fortuitous context but a necessary one; 
I mean, 'It is not yet noon and the sun is shining' won't do 
as a substitute for 'It is not yet noon and it is half-past 
eleven.' The context is not (may I say?) a merely psychologi-
cal context, consisting of anything else that we may happen to 
be thinking at the time; it is a logical context, consisting 
of other things which if we didn't think we couldn't think 
what ex hypothesi we are thinking." 
7This distinction would not be in the province of the 
working historian anyway; and not even, according to the Essay 
.£!.!. Hetaphysics, the task of the metaphysician. It is the task 
of the logician. See EM, 54. 
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~ood was making use of the principle of history which we have 
labelled "ARCH-1," and two of the corollaries of "HIST-3" in 
our summary of the Autobiography. 8 
Finally one finds an explicit statement of "ARCH-3" 
in the 1930 essay: 
All history must be the history of something particular, 
and the most we can ever do is to express the present 
state of knowledge concerning this particular subject. 
As no history can be universal, so no history can be final 
.... All history is thus an interim report on the prog-
ress made in the study of its subject matter down to the 
present; and hence all history is at the same time the 
history of history . . (EPH, 138). 
Here again we have Collingwood apparently contradicting him-
self, and then revising his previous statement. In the first 
part of the paper he states that second-order reflection on 
history, viz. the philosophy of history, must show how his-
tory "is somehow a universal and necessary characteristic of 
things, not merely a particular and contingent characteristic 
of a certain group of things" ( EPH, 122). 
"The philosophy of something" is a legitimate phrase 
only when the "something" in question is no mere frag-
ment of the world, but is an aspect of the world as a 
whole--a universal and necessary characteristic of things . 
. . . If there is to be a philosophy of history, history 
must be ... a universal and necessary human interest, 
the interest in a universal and necessary aspect of the 
wor 1 d. ( EPH, 12 2-2 3 ) . 
8It also, incidentally, states what Collingwood means 
by a question "arising"--i.e., that the question has a "lQg-
~ connection with our previous thoughts, that we have a 
reason for asking it . . . . " ( SM, 13 7). 
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If history is concerned with a "universal and necessary aspect 
of the world," then how is it that "all history must be the 
history of something particular"? And how can all history be 
at the same time the history of history without infinite re-
gress? The answer, insofar as one is possible on Colling-
wood's grounds, is the same for both problems: "history" is 
an equivocal term, with layers of meaning which it is the work 
of the philosopher to distinguish--but to distinguish in a 
manner which cannot but violate the expectations of someone 
committed to the logic of the abstract universal. If one con-
siders history in terms of its limitations (both by its given 
evidence and by the historian's own principles of interpreta-
tion) history always deals with something particular; but if 
one regards history as that aspect of the present which ex-
plains how that present carne into being, history deals with a 
universal and necessary aspect of the world. This sort of 
distinction is only possible from the philosophical point of 
view--the historian is not explicitly aware of it. But Col-
lingwood views these levels of meaning of the concept of his-
tory not as several static definitions separate from one an-
other but as themselves part of a developmental process in 
which the idea of history is progressively realized. 
In the intermediate part of the 1930 paper (clearly 
a prototype of his later lectures on The Idea of History--cf. 
EPH, xxxiii) Collingwood shows how the step which elevates 
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history to the rank of a philosophical science was taken: 
The essence of this development is the doctrine of the 
individual judgement. Ordinary logic distinguishes the 
individual judgement "This S is P," from the universal 
judgement "All S is P." Now, says Croce, "This S is P" 
is history, "All S is P" is science. But whenever we say 
"All S is P" we have before our minds a "this S." .... 
"All S is P" means "This S, in its character asS, is P." 
When the element of individuality is taken away we have, 
not a universal judgement "All S is P," but nothing at 
all. This conception can be expressed by saying that all 
knowledge is historical knowledge (individual judgement) 
and that science is history with its individual reference 
neglected. (EPH, 135-36). 
We shall have occasion in the sequel to return to this theme 
in connection with some of Collingwood's later remarks about 
historical and scientific judgments, about the concrete uni-
versal, and about the structure of philosophical concepts. 
But for now it is sufficient to notice that the formal opposi-
tion between universal and particular judgments is taken (by 
Croce and, on approval, by Collingwood) to be overcome by the 
individual judgment of history, which is not merely a particu-
larized universal judgnent, but a judgnent distinguishable 
from a particular judgment as the base-line of its intelligi-
bility (when individuality is taken away we do not have a uni-
versal judgment but "nothing at all"). 9 But such distinctions 
as these are made by the philosophy of history which, as Col-
lingwood was so often to point out, is not something differ-
ent or separate from history itself, but is history with its 
presuppositions made explicit (cf. EPH, 125). 
9This view: is later criticized by Collingwood (IH, 303). 
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5. Conclusion. 
In our survey of Collingwood's essays in the phil-
osophy of history between 1920 and 1930 we managed to find 
direct or indirect evidence which sustantiates his claims in 
the Autobiography concerning the development of his ideas on 
the relation of philosophy and history--with one notable over-
sight. One principle that is totally missing in these essays 
is the one we have called "HIST-4"--history as the science of 
human affairs. It is the absence of this principle that mars 
his discussion of the object of history, so that it seems that 
the object of history is the whole of changing reality, and 
hence "science is history with its individual reference neg-
lected." 
Now it so happens that not only is this principle the 
central issue of his 1936 British Academy lecture, "Human Na-
ture and Human History" (IH, 205-31; cf. A, 116-17, n. 1), 
but the principles of history which we have called "HIST-1, 
-2, -3, and -4" appear almost verbatim in this essay. Even 
assuming that Collingwood read the substance of his 1936 lec-
ture back into his earlier essays on the philosophy of history, 
and that therefore the development of his ideas on the rela-
tionship of philosophy and history was not as complete as he 
said it was as of 1930, the real question that arises in un-
derstanding Collingwood's early reconciliation between history 
and philosophy concerns the manner in which he finally dis-
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tinguishes them within some sort of unity. For what kind of 
unity would that be? History, science, art, etc.--his "forms 
of experience" in Speculum Mentis--are not, he insists, spe-
cies of a common genus, "knowledge," as the realists had as-
serted. That meant that each of the forms of experience has 
an epistemology proper to it. At the same time Collingwood 
feels obliged to show that all forms of experience are mani-
festations of a single process, mental activity, and are 
therefore variations on a single theme. 
We have already had occasion to notice that Colling-
wood was not entirely successful in his several attempts to 
distinguish history from other forms of knowledge solely on 
the grounds of the manner in which they express their judg-
ments. In his 1922 essay on science and history he admitted 
that both of these forms of experience make use of particular 
and universal judgments and therefore cannot be separated on 
the basis of the sorts of judgments they use. But in his 
1930 paper he asserts that the judgment peculiar to history is 
individual judgment ("This S is P") which he distinguishes 
both from the particular judgment ("Some S is P") and from the 
universal judgment ("All Sis P"). But since judgments of 
science are merely the judgments of history with their indi-
viduality suppressed, it follows (as Croce had said) that "all 
knowledge is historical knowledge" and that "science is his-
tory with its individual reference neglected" (EPH, 136). But 
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then it would seem that science is a species of history, or 
that both of these are (as Speculum Mentis seems to leave one 
believing) unsuccessful forms of philosophy. In any event 
we have the sort of genus-species situation within knowledge 
that Collingwood had hoped to overcome. On the other hand the 
attempt to distinguish different sorts of knowledge on the 
grounds of their subject matter is equally unsuccessful. If 
history deals with a "universal and necessary aspect of 
things"--i.e. their "becoming"--then it is clear that it is 
indistinguishable from the science of nature, since everything 
in nature is also subject to a process of becoming (EPH, 122-
24). Starting from either direction then, one arrives at the 
conclusion that the forms of knowledge are indistinguishable 
from one another. "Everything," Collingwood writes in 1930, 
"has a past; everything has somehow come to be what it is; 
and therefore the historical aspect of things is a universal 
and necessary aspect of them" (EPH, 124). On this account 
.. 
there would not only be a history of Greece and Rome, but of 
the San Andreas Fault and the moon. 
Perhaps Collingwood assumed that the reader would re-
call what he had written in his 1923 essay on the New Ideal-
ism, where he says that "that which has a history . is 
a mind, for matter may change, but it cannot be said to have 
a history" (FR, 274), and would supply this reservation as the 
distinguishing feature of history. But he does not tackle the 
236 
issue explicitly in his published writings until his British 
Academy lecture of 1936, where it is assaulted head on and 
solved in the manner described in the Autobiography. 
The thesis which I shall maintain ((writes Collingwood in 
"Human Nature and Human History")) is that the science of 
human nature was a false attempt--falsified by the analogy 
of natural science--to understand the mind itself, and 
that, whereas the right way of investigating nature is by 
the methods called scientific, the right way of investi-
gating mind is by the methods of history . . . . Since the 
time of Heraclitus and Plato, it has been a commonplace 
that the entire world of nature is a world of "process" or 
"becoming." But this is not what is meant by the histor-
icity of things; for change and history are not the same 
. . . . (H)uman history shows change not only in the in-
dividual cases in which ... ideals are realized or par-
tially realized, but in the ideals themselves .... The 
processes of nature can therefore be properly described as 
sequences of mere events, but those of history cannot. 
They are not processes of mere events but processes of ac-
tions, which have an inner side, consisting of processes 
of thoughts; and what the historian is looking for is 
these processes of thought. All history is the history 
of thought. (IH, 209-11, 215--emphasis mine). 
Collingwood's solution to the problem then is to dis-
tinguish between two classes of intentional objects--mere 
events and "actions" of historical agents, the latter having 
deliberate thought as part of its essential structure. Na-
tural science deals with the former, history with the latter. 
But Collingwood is also saying something further in this es-
say, and that is that the processes with which historical in-
quiry deals are developments of a self-making mind (IH, 226). 
What exactly "mind" is, and what part "thought" plays in the 
life of men with minds, is something that Collingwood works 
out in some detail in The Principles of Art and The New Levi-
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athan. But the notion of mind as a self-making activity is 
explicitly present in Speculum Mentis, and goes as far back 
as Religion and Philosophy. 
In the latter Collingwood wrote, it will be recalled, 
that "there is no such thing as human nature in the sense of 
a definite body of characteristics common to every man," and 
that therefore "the question to be asked about mind is not 
what it is, but what it does; a question with which the logic 
of things and qualities does not deal" (RP, 164-65; FR, 266). 
In Speculum Mentis the doctrine of mind as a self-making ac-
tivity is put forward as the final realization of all know-
ledge: 
Knowledge polarizes itself into abstract or erroneous and 
concrete or true. Abstract knowledge is the same as err-
or, because, separating what is thought to be from what 
is, it erects that which it thinks into a false object 
over against itself, an external world .... But in con-
crete knowledge the mind sees itself face to face, and 
knows even as it is known. Here the object is the subject 
. . . in the sense that the object finds its very life 
in being known by the subject, the subject in knowing the 
object .... In an immediate and direct way, the mind 
can never know itself: it can only know itself through 
the mediation of an external world, know that what it 
sees in the external world is its own reflection. Hence 
the construction of external worlds--works of art, reli-
gions, sciences, structures of historical fact, codes of 
law, systems of philosophy, and so forth ad infinitum--
is the only way by which the mind can possibly come to 
that self-knowledge which is its end. (SM, 313-15). 
In Collingwood's view the process of creation of these "ex-
ternal worlds"--of art, religion, science, history (as histor-
iography), and philosophy--is the very process of history, and 
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the historian in the very best sense must be the one who can 
recreate all these processes over again by "re-thinking"_ them 
in his own historical imagination. In the process of doing 
so, and in confronting the "evidence" of these worlds in a 
critical fashion, he not only discovers the past to which he 
is heir but re-creates that past, and in the process builds 
the structure of his own consciousness: 
Man has been defined as an animal capable of profiting 
by the experience of others. . . . The body of human 
thought or mental activity is a corporate possession, 
and almost all the operations which our minds perform 
are operations which we learned to perform from others 
who have performed them already. Since mind is what it 
does, and human nature, if it is a name for anything 
real, is only a name for human activities, this acquis-
ition of ability to perform determinate operations is the 
acquisition of a determinate human nature. Thus the 
historical process is a process in which man creates for 
himself this or that kind of human nature by re-creat-
ing in his own thought the past to which he is heir. 
(IH, 226). 
That such a view, so eloquently expressed and so close to the 
standpoint of European existentialism, would bring Colling-
wood to loggerheads with behavioral psychologists requires no 
special demonstration; we shall see in a future chapter how 
this aspect of Collingwood's philosophy developed into the 
anti-positivistic polemic in the Essav on Metaphysics. His 
antipathy to behavioral psychology is neither something entire-
ly new in his philosophy nor is it inconsistent with its cen-
tral tenets. We have already seen that as early as Religion 
~Philosophy Collingwood assaulted "psychology" as the pseudo-
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science of mind, since it treats of mental activities as mere 
events (RP, 42; FR, 77). And we have had occasion to notice 
that Collingwood's fundamental view of human mentality makes 
deliberate activity (in a manner yet to be explained) its cen-
tral and irreducible aspect. But the issue of immediate in-
terest here is the support that one finds throughout Colling-
wood's philosophy, and not merely in the period following the 
appearance of the Autobiography, for the reconciliation of 
history and philosophy through the concept of mind as a self-
making activity. Although "HIST-4" does not appear explicitly 
prior to the 1934 British Academy Lecture, it is a principle 
latent but operative in his early philosophical writings, and 
takes no great feat of interpretive skill to discern in his 
discussions concerning history. 
It remains to pull all of these strands together into 
some sort of summary of our survey of Collingwood's earlier 
reconciliation of philosophy and history. What we have seen 
emerging from Collingwood's essays on the philosophy of his-
tory is a discussion which not only confirms most, if not all, 
of what he had said about his discovery of the "principles of 
history" as he described them in the Autobiography, but in ad-
dition a fuller discussion of several of these topics which 
parallels and complements the autobiographical sketch. The 
main ideas of this complimentary account can be summarized in 
tabular form as follows: 
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TABLE 6 
THE MEANINGS OF HISTORY 
1. (EPH-1) "History" is an ambiguous term, the meanings of 
which display a progressive and orderly development with 
both a temporal and logical structure, the highest point 
of which relates the diversity of these meanings in the 
unity of a philosophical concept. (EPH, 39-40, 124-25). 
2. (EPH-2) History understood as the ideal of the historian 
is the knowledge of a unified and meaningful whole of acts 
of historical agents, expressed in a single categorical 
judgment. (EPH, 46). 
a. The objective aspect of this ideal is the drama of 
history as a single developmental process, which con-
sists of the successive resolution of problems relat-
ing to human self-consciousness (in the form of art, 
religion, science, etc.). 
b. The subjective aspect of this ideal is the continuity 
of this drama provided by the historian's own con-
sciousness, i.e. his expectation that the object of 
history will be an organized and coherent whole. Min-
imally this is the view that history has a plot. 
(EPH, 37, 111, 137-38). 
3. (EPH-3) History understood as the practice of the histor-
ian consists of the two fundamental elements: historical 
data, or evidence, and principles of interpretation. Each 
of these limits the ideal anticipations of the historian. 
( EPH, 13 7). 
a. Objectively, historical thinking is limited by the 
evidence which provides the data for historical analy-
sis. Such data (i.e., traces of the past existing in 
the present) requires critical analysis before serving 
as evidence of (for or against) any historical think-
ing at all. -(EPH, 136). 
b. Subjectively, historical thinking is limited by the 
historian's own "point of view"--the principles of in-
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terpretation he brings to the data he is analyzing. 
Such principles include the nature and limits of 
negative evidence, the possibility of analogica~ ar-
gument, views of history as cyclic or linearly pro-
gressive, etc. (EPH, 89, 137). 
4. (EPH-4) At the level at which theory and practice (and 
subject and object) are identified, the historian is also 
an historical agent, not only observing history but making 
it. This is the philosophical concept of history, in 
which subject and object are identified--where, in the 
case of history, the historian is both agent and patient. 
(EPH, 46, 49, 120). 
5. (EPH-5) The philosophical concept of history is concerned 
with a fully articulated answer to the question, "How has 
the world (of human affairs) as it now exists come to be 
what it is''? The answer to this question is conceived as 
the first stage of an activity to either keep it that way 
or to initiate an alteration of it. (EPH, 89, 92, 102, 
109, 120; cf. EPA, 144). 
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One must pay careful attention therefore to which 
level of significance the particular use of the term "history" 
refers in any given passage in Collingwood's writings. To ac-
cuse Collingwood of "radical historicism" in his later years 
(as critics do who read the Essay on Metaphysics without see-
ing it in the context of his other writings on history) may 
be either utterly true or totally false, depending on what one 
understands by "history" and "historicism." As a philosophi-
cal concept, history is identified with philosophy, and there-
fore the reduction of philosophy to history is the identifica-
tion of philosophy with itself--a harmless tautology. On the 
other hand as an empirical concept (the collection of events 
which Collingwood calls raw data, or the uninterpreted evi-
dence, of history), history is not only not identical with 
philosophy, but can hardly be said to be identical with it-
self. Nevertheless in our examination of Collingwood's later 
philosophy of history we shall have to attend to the manner 
in which he tries to retain a criteria of historical objectiv-
ity while yet rejecting the realistic historian's emphasis on 
extra-mental "facts." But meanwhile we must turn now to what 
Collingwood understood by his "identities" in conjunction 
with the issue of what he expected of a "rapprochement" phil-
osophy, and therefore what method he used to achieve this end. 
CHAPTER VI 
RAPPROCHEMENT, RELIGION, AND ABSOLUTE KNOWLEDGE 
1. Introduction. 
Just as in his discussions of Q-A logic and the phil-
osophy of history, Collingwood made his approach in the Auto-
biography to the discussion of a need for a new branch of phil-
osophy, devoted to the work of reconciliation, from a critique 
of realism. 
It was during World War I and his daily reflections 
on the Albert Memorial that he discovered the "vulgar error" 
of the realists--their false belief that problems of philoso-
phy were eternal, and that different philosophies were differ-
ent attempts to answer the same questions (A, 60). The first 
instance he cites of his own clear recognition of the truth 
about eternal problems came in political theory, where it be-
came obvious to him that the political theories of Plato and 
Hobbes are not two theories of the same thing--the "nature of 
the state"--because there were genuine differences between the 
ideal states (and not just the empirical ones) being discussed 
in each case, ideals that are ignored in treating them as if 
each intended the same thing (A, 61). There is a relation be-
tween them, but the relation is not the sameness of an abstract 
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universal, but the sameness of an historical process; and the 
difference between one thing which in the course of that pro-
cess has turned into something else (A, 62). Collingwood 
went on, he says, to apply this "clue" to the problems of eth-
ics and metaphysics, and in the case of the latter it bore 
fruit in his ultimate discovery that metaphysics is an histor-
ical science (A, 63-65). And finally, he found that his dis-
covery could be generalized to the whole field of philosophy: 
"By degrees I found that there was no recognized branch of 
philosophy to which it did not apply" (A, 67). 
Later in the Autobiography (in Chapter XII, "Theory 
and Practice") Collingwood picks up the discussion of rapproche-
ment again and spells out the nature of his reconciliation in 
ethics. In addition to his reconciliation of history and phil-
osophy (as instanced in his reflections on the political no-
tion of the state) he was also working on a rapprochement be-
tween theory and practice in order to counteract the "moral 
corruption propagated by the 'realist' dogma that moral phil-
osophy does no more than study in a purely theoretical spirit 
a subject matter which it leaves wholly unaffected by that in-
vestigation" (A, 147). In so doing he subjected the familiar 
topics and problems of moral philosophy first to an historical 
treatment (to show, presumably, how the problem developed as 
an historical process wherein the differences were truly inte-
gral to it and changed the nature of the problem as it devel-
oped), and secondly to an analytic treatment (which, by criti-
245 
cal argumentation, both differentiated the problem into its 
correlative parts, and then showed them to be aspects of one 
and the same identical entity). Naturally enough in a chap-
ter on theory and practice, the example Collingwood used was 
one of action--first distinguished as moral, political, and 
economic, and then unified insofar as every action is moral, 
political, and economic--not separated into three classes, 
but seen as three characteristics, distinguished and yet 
united in any actual act (A, 148-49). 
We have recalled these passages here to remind the 
reader not only of the anti-realist context of Collingwood's 
remarks about rapprochement, but also to recall the two phases 
(historical and analytic) of his earlier reconciliational 
philosophy. We have said enough in the previous section about 
the historical phase of his rapprochement methodology to give 
the reader a sense both of how he felt it should be carried 
out and what its intrinsic and unresolved problems were. In 
this section, therefore, we shall concentrate on Collingwood's 
"analytic" phase. In doing so we must pay heed to one further 
proviso: 
These were the lines on which I treated the subject in my 
lectures of 1919. I continued to lecture upon it yearly 
during the whole remainder of my life at Pembroke College, 
with constant revision. The scheme I have just described 
obviously represents a stage in my thought at which the 
rapprochement between history and philosophy was very in-
complete . . . . The rapprochement between theory and prac-
tice was equally incomplete. I no longer thought of them 
as mutually independent; I saw that the relation between 
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them was one of intimate and mutual dependence, thought 
depending upon what the thinker learned by experience in 
action, action depending upon how he thought of himself 
and the world . . . . But this was only a theoretica1 ~­
lrochement of theory and practice, not a practical one. 
A, 149-50). 
If we are to approach this topic in Collingwood's early writ-
ings, therefore, in the spirit of the Autobiography, we must 
not only take into account the sense of the term "analytical" 
as used by Collingwood, but also the fact that he regarded 
this "analytic" to be incomplete. How it was completed (and 
the sense in which his early analytic was incomplete) Colling-
wood leaves to the reader to work out for himself (A, 149). 1 
The evidence from Collingwood's writings is insuffi-
cient to establish what the actual topic was to which he first 
applied his rapprochement method; although he lectured on eth-
ics and political philosophy since 1919, his first publica-
tions specifically on these subjects were not until six years 
later (cf. "EPS," 1925), and by then both Religion and Phil-
osophy and Speculum Mentis had appeared. While it is true 
that he treated the subjects in ethics and political science 
in these later publications much as he says he did in the Auto-
biography, for our purposes the earliest instance, in his pub-
1The only further clue the reader has from the Auto-
biography is Collingwood's unreserved praise for his Essay on 
Philosophical Method, which he recommends as his "best book 
in matter; in style, I may call it my only book" (A, 117-18). 
The reader must conclude that as of 1933 rapprochement metho-
dology was fairly complete. 
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lished writings, of rapprochement is in the area of religious 
philosophy. Not only is religion as a "unified life of ·all 
the faculties" the first published topic on which Collingwood 
exercised his early reconciliational technique, but it pro-
vides us with an index as to how that technique was modified 
between 1916 and 1924, when Collingwood once again dealt with 
the subject in Speculum Mentis. 
2. Religion, Philosophy, and the Incomplete Rapprochement. 
At the time of his writing of Religion and Philosophy 
(published in 1916, but written some time earlier--see RP, v) 
the analytic phase seems to be only recourse Collingwood re-
sorted to in his treatment of philosophical problems, the his-
torical phase being only implicit in what he was saying, not 
in what he actually did. 2 We have already seen an example of 
this analytic phase in Collingwood's treatment of the identity 
of philosophy and history. Consequently we expect him to be-
gin with a pair of concepts presumed to be isolated or "sepa-
rated" from one another. In this case the reconciliata (the 
2Actually Speculum Mentis, for all its discussion of 
history and its relation to philosophy, does not actually dis-
play in its compositional format any more concern for the his-
torical development of its subject matter than does Religion 
and Philosophy, except that the former has that same vague re-
ference to historical development of forms of experience as 
does Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind. But cf. SM, 50-55 (an 
"ages of man" analogy), and21-=18T. 
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term we shall henceforth use for viewpoints to be held toge-
ther in the relationship of rapprochement) are religion·and 
philosophy. But from the first words of the book we are aware 
that the orientation of the discussion to follow is primarily 
philosophical: 
This book is the result of an attempt to treat the Chris-
tian creed not as a dogma but as a critical solution of 
a philosophical problem. Christianity, in other words, is 
approached as a philosophy, and its various doctrines are 
regarded as varying aspects of a single idea which, ac-
cording to the language in which it is expressed, may be 
called a metaphysics, an ethic, or theology. (RP, xiii). 
Collingwood also specifies the sense in which he understands 
the terms "religion" and "philosophy," at least for the pur-
poses of discussion in this book: 
Just as every man has some working theory of the world 
which is his philosophy, some system of ideals which rule 
his conduct, so every one has to some degree that unified 
life of all the faculties which is a religion .... We 
apply the term religion to certain types of consciousness, 
and not to others, because we see in the one type certain 
characteristics which in the others we consider to be ab-
sent. Further investigation shows that the characteris-
tic marks of religion, the marks in virtue of which we ap-
plied the term, are really present in the others also, 
though in a form which at first evaded recognition. (RP, 
xvii-xviii). 
Collingwood did not follow up these clues about the 
presence of one form of consciousness in other forms until 
1 M . 3 Specu urn entls, 
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and while it is interesting to note that 
the germ of his later doctrine of a "scale of forms" is _pres-
ent in this early discussion of the nature of religion, in 
Religion and Philosophy the strategy he follows is based not 
on the construction of a phenomenology of forms of experience, 
but rather on the analytic method of his earlier (and still in-
complete) rapprochement. Therefore he begins with what already 
amount to theories of religion, but theories which treat of 
religion as if it had no direct relationship to philosophy. 
Furthermore it is to be noted that Collingwood does not start 
out with a definition or description of religion that omits 
its philosophical aspect (e.g. "primitive religions") and then 
try to derive philosophy from this description. He starts out 
rather with "anti-intellectual" theories of religion--religion 
viewed as (mere) ritual, as conduct, or as feeling--that is, 
theories that deny that religion has an intellectual element 
and therefore deny that it is identical with philosophy. Each 
3rn addition to examining the relations of religion 
to philosophy, history, and conduct (morality), Collingwood 
recognized a "fourth question" concerning the relation of re-
ligion to art, but declined to deal with the issue in Religion 
and Philosophy, promising to discuss the nature of metaphor, 
prose, and the philosophy of language (all being in the pro-
vince of art) in a future volume (RP, xvi). In Speculum Men-
tis he recalls this promise, and indicates to his readers the 
extent to which he felt the earlier work to be deficient (SM, 
108, n. 1). 
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of these theories is then subjected to a critique, and in the 
process of denying the premise (that religion is mere ritual, 
mere conduct, or mere feeling, each without an intellectual 
element) he affirms the consequence that creed is not non-
essential to religion. 
(a) The claim of religion to be mere ritual is based 
on anthropology's examination of religions of lower culture, 
which purport to show that ritual is prior to creed. But Col-
lingwood argues that aside from the issue of what relation 
there is between primitive and modern religions (which may be 
one of analogy only), the theory still lacks an account of how 
ritual practices arise in the first place. The necessary na-
ture of ritual implies a grounding in fears, and the ritual 
act is performed because the primitive people assume the uni-
verse to be governed by certain powers, and that their acts 
will somehow please or influence these powers in ways benefi-
cial to the tribe. But such a judgment aboutthe nature of the 
powers that govern the universe is a primitive theory, and the 
belief that acts will influence that power is creed. (RP, 6-7; 
FR, 45-46). 
(b) Similarly the view that holds that doctrine has 
little or no bearing on conduct, and therefore holds that re-
ligion is primarily a system of rules guiding conduct, ignores 
the fact that action relies on knowledge of the situation 
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which calls for application of the rule. There is no such 
thing as conduct divorced from knowledge or knowledge divorced 
from conduct. Furthermore the conduct that is being recom-
mended presumes a judgment that certain sorts of conduct are 
good and others badt which is a judgment based on creed: it 
is the presumption of the truth of the moral creed that re-
sults in the good act. (RPt 7-9; FR, 46-49). 
(c) Finally, religion as pure feeling trades on the 
ambiguities of the word "feeling," which in some cases (as 
when it refers to very indefinite and indistinct states of 
mind) seems to rule out any truly intellectual element, but 
in others (as when it implies absolute and positive convic-
tion coupled with an inability to offer proof or explanation 
of the conviction) it does not rule out knowledge per se but 
actually means the same thing as knowledge, albeit unreasoned. 
But in the first case one could hardly call such feeling re-
ligious, because it does not hold to any truth at all, being 
too indistinct and indefinite (not all indefinite states of 
mind are therefore religious, nor are religious states of 
mind indefinite). And if feeling just means emotion, it must 
at least admit to a kind of emotion that is appetition for the 
desired thing--in this case, God--and consequently presumes 
some knowledge of God as desirable. In any event religious 
feeling requires some intellectual element. (RP, 11; FR, 49). 
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It can be seen from these arguments that if there is 
any "reduction" of religion that is to occur, at least Colling-
wood will not be content to let this be the humiliating reduc-
tion of religion to a lesser form of experience. Whether he 
allows for a kind of exalting reduction by assimilating it to 
a "higher" realm remains to be seen. But these passages (and 
especially when taken with the perceptive analysis of Christian 
beliefs concerning the fall and redemption of man, in the con-
cluding chapters of the book) show a refined sense of aware-
ness of the subject matter of religion, and an unwillingness 
to have it sullied by inappropriate and reductive comparisons. 
Now at this point the reader would expect (if the "an-
alytic" follows the pattern of the discussion of the relation 
of philosophy and history) a criticism of the view that phil-
osophy has no religious element, the implication being that if 
it is not the case that philosophy does not have a religious 
element, then philosophy must have an essential religious di-
mension just as religion must have an element of philosophy. 
In other words, insofar as philosophy is essential to religion 
and religion to philosophy, religion and philosophy mutually 
imply one another and are hence identical (that is, non-
separate). But what one finds instead in Religion and Phil-
osophy is an identification of the two by their object, 
coupled with a denial that there is any such thing as a sepa-
rate "philosophy of religion"--separate, that it, from theology 
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or creed. 
(T)he theory of knowledge or logic does not consider dif-
ferences of the object, but only processes of the subject; 
and therefore there is no distinction between the phil-
osophy of religion (as theory of religious knowledge) and 
the theory of knowledge in general. If there is a general 
philosophy of knowing, it includes religious knowledge as 
well as all other kinds; no separate philosophy is required 
.... If the philosophy of religion is indistinguishable 
from philosophy as a whole, what is the relation of phil-
osophy as a whole to religion or theology? Philosophy is 
the theory of existence; not of existence in the abstract, 
but of existence in the concrete; the theory of all that 
exists; the theory of the universe .... Now if phil-
osophy is the theory of the universe, what is religion? 
We have said that it was the theory of God and of God's 
relations to the world and man. But the latter is surely 
nothing more or less than a theory of the universe . . . . 
Religion and philosophy alike are views of the whole uni-
verse .... If religion and philosophy are views of the 
same thing--the ultimate nature of the universe--then the 
true religion and the true philosophy must coincide .... 
(RP, 15-18; FR, 53-55). 
We have already seen that Collingwood identified his-
tory and philosophy in much the same way--as both dealing with 
"knowledge of the one, real world." This occurs, in fact, in 
a chapter in which the relation between history and religion 
is being discussed, and the implication towards which the reader 
seems to be compelled is that since religion and philosophy 
are identical, and since history and philosophy are identical, 
religion is identical with history. The conclusion of the 
chapter even suggests that science is also not anti-religious, 
and therefore, by implication, identical with religion, phil-
osophy, and history. 
254 
It goes without saying that such a Mulligan stew of 
subjects is more than a reader can be expected to digest. To 
simply identify religion and philosophy seems not only to lead 
to the confused state wherein what can be said as proper to 
each is now predicable of the other (as if one could resolve 
an honest dispute about some aspect of reality by engaging in 
prayer or sacrifice, or that one might celebrate ritual syllo-
gism on a Sabbath morning and thereby appease a reasoning god), 
but renders suspect the autonomy of all other forms of thought 
as well. If two kinds of knowledge are identified by refer-
ence to their object, and if there is no distinction in the 
processes of the subject whereby a "philosophy of" something 
and a theory of knowledge in general may be distinguished, 
then there seems to be no remaining way of distinguishing be-
tween two ways of knowing the same thing, and consequently be-
tween science, religion, history, and philosophy. But then 
on what grounds can one even distinguish between subjective 
processes of knowledge and objective correlates of these pro-
cesses? 
These consequences of his position are not altogether 
evaded by Collingwood, as we see in a later chapter of Reli-
gion and Philosophy where he argues as follows: 
My imagination of a table is certainly a different thing 
from the table itself, and to identify the two would be 
to mistake fancy for fact; but my knowledge of the table, 
my thought of it in that sense, is simply the table as 
known to me, as much of the table's nature as I have dis-
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covered. In this sense, my "thought about" the table--
what I think the table to be--only differs from the table 
itself if and in so far as I am ignorant of the table's 
real nature. My thought of the table is certainly not 
something "like" the table; it is the table as I know it. 
Similarly, your thought of the table is what you know of 
the table, the table as known to you; and if we both have 
real knowledge of the table, it seems to follow that our 
thoughts are the same, not merely similar; and further, 
if the mind is its thoughts, we seem to have, for this 
moment at least, actually one mind; we share between us 
that unity of consciousness which was said to be the mark 
of the individual. (RP, 100-01; FR, 172-73).4 
Even with the proviso that in life "real knowledge" or the 
knowledge of the real nature of something (even artifacts, 
judging from the example) is seldom if ever perfect, so that 
"in a sense, no two people ever do, or ever could, think or 
will exactly the same thing" (RP, 106; FR, 177), such an as-
sertion puts an intolerable strain on the notion of identity. 
For even if my knowledge of the table were "real knowledge," 
it would seem strange to assert that my concept of the table 
is subject of predication in the same sense that the table is 
--and therefore capable of supporting articles placed on it, 
4In a footnote to this passage Collingwood denied that 
his argument placed him in an idealistic stance: "I believe 
that the argument I have tried to express contains little if 
anything which contradicts the principles of either realism 
or idealism in their more satisfactory forms." (RP, 101; FR, 
173). It is interesting to note that in his later philosophy 
when he puts forward his theory of historical re-enactment, 
which makes a similar claim to the identity of mind as in the 
present paragraph, he also juxtaposes it against both realists 
and idealists--see IH, 282-302. 
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capable of physical destruction with sufficient mechanical 
force, etc. And to assert that we never have "real know-
ledge" of anything seems to grant so much ground to scepti-
cism that the argument in point seems futile. 
Since Collingwood's rapprochement program is pre-
cisely one of showing that two forms of thought are not "sepa-
rate" but rather are "the same"--whether that sameness be the 
sameness of an historical process or the sameness of question 
to which they are the responses--it is clear that at the root 
of reconciliation philosophy is a notion of identity that on 
the face of it (from our above example) is under disruptive 
pressures which threaten to split it assunder. For (a) if 
"the same" means merely "not different," then when two forms 
of thought are said to be "the same" they are being said to 
be "not different," and in their indifference they are not 
only no longer two forms of thought (and so the comparison is 
fatuous), but they are also indistinguishable from nothing at 
all; 5 but (b) if "the same" means "similar in some, but not 
all characteristics" then when two forms of thought are said 
to be "the same" they are being said to be "similar and dis-
5The situation is aggravated rather than ameliorated 
in the case of the forms of knowledge, since Collingwood spe-
cifies their objects, in each case, to be the "whole universe" 
or "all of existence," which leaves no room..§! parte obtecti 
for a distinction between them. And since the forms o know-
ledge have been identified with each other and with philosophy, 
a distinction ..§! parte subjecti is also impossible. 
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similar" in specifiable ways--which is precisely what Colling-
wood seems to be denying. 
But lest we be charged with a case of unfair pillory, 
we hasten to add that Collingwood shows even in Religion and 
Philosophy that he is aware of the difficulty, and goes so far 
as to try to meet it head on. In the same chapter froQ which 
the table example is drawn (a chapter, incidentally, which 
deals with intersubjective identity as the grounds of possi-
bility for religious unity of God, man, and universe) Colling-
wood distinguishes between an abstract and a concrete unity, 
and says that "the unity whose possibility we are concerned 
to prove is the fully concrete identification, by their own 
free activity, of two or more personalities" not as a univer-
sal condition but as an ideal (RP, 106-07; FR, 178). 
A person is undoubtedly himself, and can never help being 
himself, whatever he does; but this merely abstract unity, 
this bare minimum of self-identity, is much less than 
what we usually call his character or personality. That 
is rather constituted by the definite and concrete system 
of his various activities or habits .... The same dis-
tinction applies to the unity of a society. In one sense, 
any kind of relation between two people produced a kind 
of social union and identification; in another sense, only 
the right kind of relation unifies them, and a different 
relation would destroy the unity. In the first case, 
their union is what I call the purely abstract unity; in 
the latter, it is the concrete unity that has to be main-
tained by positive and harmonious activity. (RP, 107-08; 
FR , 1 7 8- 7 9 ) . 
Aside from the question of what the "right kind of relation" 
might be, or by what criteria one decides rightness and non-
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rightness of relations, there is still the puzzling and as yet 
unresolved question as to what the distinction between ab-
stract and concrete unity refers to. Collingwood's answer 
seems to rely on a modification of the relation of whole and 
part: 
But is unity the same as identity? There seems at first 
sight to be a very decided difference between saying that 
two things are part of the same whole, and saying that 
they are the same thing; the parts of one thing seem to 
be themselves quite separate and self-existent things, 
possibly depending on each other, but each being what it 
is itself, and not the others; while the whole is simply 
their sum. We have already expressed doubts as to the 
strict truth of this conception .... (I)f a whole was 
to be knowable, it must be of such a kind that the parts 
are not simply added in series to one another, but inter-
connected in such a way that we can somehow say that each 
part is the whole. In that case each part would also be 
in a sense the others .... Each part has its own nature, 
its own individuality, which is in the strictest sense 
unique; and apart from the contribution made by each sever-
al element the whole would not exist. Change one part, 
and the whole becomes a different whole. Not only does 
the whole change, but the apparently unchanged parts 
change too. (RP, 108-10; FR, 179-80). 
Collingwood uses the instance of any whole consisting of 
three parts, x, y, ~--whether that whole be a machine with 
three working parts, a society of three members, a stanza of 
three lines, or a syllogism containing three propositions. 
In such a system the definition of the part x can only take 
the form of a definition of the whole xyz, since the "thing" 
itself is "only a relation, an interchange, a balance between 
the elements which at first we mistook for its parts" (RP, 
112-13; FR, 182-83). 
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The attempt to evade this analysis of relations and 
relata by pointing to the difference between what a thing is 
in itself and what it is in relation to its context or the 
whole of which it is a part is also, Collingwood says, unsuc-
cessful, since "the character or self of a thing, what it is, 
cannot be distinguished from its relations" (RP, 112; FR, 182). 
Even though its "internal relations" seem not to change when 
a change of context or of its "external relations" occurs, it 
is impossible to deprive a thing of every context (as one 
would presumably be forced to do to prove that what it is in 
itself is not affected by its context), so that one can do no 
more than to replace one context with another. 6 Whether the 
"context" be spatial or temporal does not greatly affect the 
argument, since "the history of a thing in the past and its 
capabilities for the future are as real as its present situ-
ation" (RP, 111; FR, 182). 
But even this analysis of the relationship of parts 
to whole, although presumed to be correct and even essential 
for his argument, is regarded by Collingwood as a variety of 
abstract unity. It is merely the lowest possible sort of 
6collingwood seems unaware that his argument at this 
point begs the question: to "change a context" does not ordin-
arily mean to deprive a thing of all contexts, so to assert 
the impossibility of the latter does not affect the argument 
that there is a difference between what a thing is in itself 
and what it is in relation to its context. 
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whole, the necessary, abstract unity of its elements. It is 
not yet the "contingent unity of co-operation" between con-
senting minds that is required for a community of persons. 
Since Collingwood wishes to show that all personalities are 
components of a whole (the universe) and therefore "necessar-
ily identified with each other and the whole, that is, with 
the universe considered as homogeneous with them, an absolute 
mind, God" (RP, 114; FR, 184), this minimum, abstract unity, 
although essential, falls short of the mark; it leaves us with 
an abstract God. 
(T)he error lies in mistaking this fundamental assumption 
for the final conclusion; in assuming that this elementary, 
abstract unity is the only one which concerns us . . . . 
To call this formless and empty abstraction "the Absolute" 
is merely to abuse language; and to suppose that this is 
all philosophy has to offer in place of the concrete God 
of religion is completely to misunderstand the nature and 
aim of philosophy .... The Absolute ... is not a la-
bel for the bare residuum, blank existence, which is left 
when all discrepancies have been ignored and all irregular-
ities planed away . . . . A real philosophy builds its 
Absolute (for every philosophy has an Absolute) out of the 
differences of the world as it finds them, dealing indi-
vidually with all contradictions and preserving every de-
tail that can lend character to the whole . . . . The form-
less and empty Absolute of this abstract metaphysic per-
ished long ago in the fire of Hegel's sarcasm ... ((as)) 
the pseudo-Absolute, the "night in which all cows are 
black" .... (RP, 114-16; FR, 184-86). 
We shall return in a moment to what Collingwood understands 
by "the Absolute," but for now we wish to show that in contrast 
to the abstract Absolute Collingwood proposes a "concrete iden-
tity of activity": 
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A mind is self-identical in this sense if it thinks and 
wills the same things constantly; it is identical with 
another, if it thinks and wills the same things as that 
other . . . . Now these two cases are typical first of the 
self-identity of God, and secondly of his identity with 
the human mind .... Further, this divine mind will be-
come one with all other minds so far as they share its 
thought and volition; so far, that is, as they know any 
truth or will any good. And this unity between the two 
is not the merely abstract identity of co-existence, but 
the concrete identity of co-operation. (RP, 116-19; FR, 
186-88). 
In Religion and Philosophy, however, Collingwood at-
tempts little more than to show how such a unity is possible; 
since he has not built his Absolute "out of the differences of 
the world" as he found them, but rather built them out of ab-
stract concepts by dialectical analysis, his philosophy of re-
ligion at this stage remains an unfulfilled promise. Further-
more the reader is left unsatisfied how there can be "other 
minds" at all, or how one distinguishes between the mind of 
God and the minds of men when they are thinking and willing the 
same thing. 
We have covered a lot of ground since initiating our 
discussion about Collingwood's rapprochement philosophy, and 
it may be helpful here to pause and survey the territory. (1) 
We have seen that Collingwood claimed in the Autobiography 
that prior to 1932 he had only partially worked out his ~­
prochement philosophy, to the point where he saw that the re-
lation between reconciliata was one of "intimate and mutual 
dependence." (2) As the first published example of this par-
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tial reconciliation we took up the analysis of religion and 
philosophy in the book of that name, his first publication. 
(3) In contrast to the reconciliation of philosophy and his-
tory which we examined in the previous section (and found to 
involve an argument that showed history and philosophy to mu-
tually implicate one another, and therefore to be "identical"), 
the reconciliation of religion and philosophy took a more com-
plex and circuitous route. (4) The strategy of the latter 
argument turned out to rely on the epistemological assumption 
that forms of knowledge, and even minds, which intend the same 
object are identical--thereby identifying religion and phil-
osophy as forms of knowledge about "all of existence" or "the 
universe," and incidentally identifying all other forms of 
knowledge as well. (5) Collingwood recognized that this was 
a kind of abstract identity, and attempted to correct this ab-
stract notion of identity with a discussion of "concrete iden-
tity"--which turns out to mean a contingent unity of the ac-
tivity of co-operation between minds. (6) Such an identity is 
the only true Absolute sought by philosophy and religion alike; 
therefore they are reconciled by sharing a common ideal object. 
On route from reconciliation to Absolute we discovered 
a number of subsidiary issues, which we shall find of impor-
tance in considering Collingwood's further development of the 
notion of rapprochement. (1) In Religion and Philosophy, at 
least, Collingwood displayed both a remarkable sensitivity for 
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the issues confronting persons who attempt to reflectively un-
derstand their religious consciousness, and an equal obteuse-
ness about the "division of knowledge" into provinces, to the 
point where the forms of knowledge--science, history, art--
appear as species of the genus, "knowledge" (although he never 
explicitly says this). (2) But in trying to sort out the con-
fusion that results from identifying forms of knowledge with 
each other, we discovered that for Collingwood there are levels 
of meaning for the concept of identity, just as there were le-
vels of meaning to the concept of history. So when two recon-
ciliata are said to be "identical" or "the same" one must care-
fully attend to which sense of "identity" is being used. We 
have observed at least three uses of the term so far: (a) a 
bare, abstract identity in which terms are related only as mem-
bers of a class or genus; (b) a (dialectical) identity of whole 
and part, in which relations and relata are so intimately con-
nected that any change in a part necessarily implies a change 
in the relations and in the whole, and vice versa; and (c) a 
concrete identity of mental activity, in which persons may co-
operate in thinking truth or in doing good. The first two in-
volve relations of necessity, the third a relation of contin-
gency. The first two are also abstract, the third is fully 
concrete. (d) vfuile the self-identity of the Absolute mind, 
or of God, is not specified as a fourth kind of identity, it 
is at least put forward as the limiting case of the concept 
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of identity--the self-identity of truth, in all its diver-
sity, with itself (RP, 117-20; FR, 186-190). (3) For each 
sense of the term identity there corresponds a sense of the 
term "separate"--so that there will be (a) separate members 
of a class (abstract separation--entities treated as mere 
instances of a class), (b) separate elements of an organic 
whole (dialectical separation), and (c) personal separateness 
(concrete separation--if the unity of cooperation breaks down, 
for example). We would have to presume that a separateness 
or disunity in the self-identity of the Absolute mind or God 
would be impossible; the disunity would occur between God and 
man, and would fall into the category of concrete separation. 7 
(4) Finally the reader is left to his own devices to decide 
what would constitute an instance of the first sense of the 
term, "identity," as well as its corresponding sense of separa-
tion, insofar as Collingwood's examples from the second mean-
ing (what we have called dialectical identity and separation) 
--namely a three-part machine, society, poem, or syllogism 
(he even refers later to the stones forming the arch of a 
house)--seem to leave little room for an example of something 
that is not an "organic whole." 
7This issue is taken up by Collingwood in the conclud-
ing chapters of Religion and Philosophy in the discussions on 
evil, the self-expression-or God in man (in the person of the 
Christ), and God's redemption of man (RP, 122-93; FR, 192-211, 
251-69). These are interesting and occasionally profound 
chapters and utterly repudiate the thesis that Collingwood 
had neither interest nor insight into the nature of religious 
consciousness. 
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3. Speculum Mentis: Rapprochement and Developing Series. 
Some of these themes and the issues they raise appear 
again in Speculum Mentis, and others in essays published be-
tween 1916 and 1926. In a footnote in Speculum Mentis Col-
lingwood proposes that his chapter on religion be taken as a 
correction of the views he put forward in Religion and Phil-
osophy, and says his "mea culpas" for the oversights of that 
earlier work: 8 
With much of what that book contains I am still in agree-
ment; but there are certain principles which I then over-
looked or denied, in the light of which many of its faults 
can be corrected. The chief of these principles is the 
distinction between implicit and explicit. I contended 
throughout that religion, theology, and philosophy were 
identical, and this I should not so much withdraw as qual-
ify by pointing out that the "empirical" (i.e. real but 
unexplained) difference between them is that theology makes 
explicit what in religion as such is always implicit, and 
so with philosophy and theology. This error led me into 
a too intellectualistic or abstract attitude towards re-
ligion, of which many critics rightly accused me; for in-
stance ... I failed to discover any real ground for the 
distinction not only between man and God, but between man 
and man .... (SM, 108, no. 1; emphasis mine). 
The way in which Collingwood revised the conception of 
his forms of knowledge and their relations is based on a more 
careful analysis of the language of art, religion, science, 
8The fact that Collingwood here and elsewhere expli-
citly acknowledges changes in his position on topics discussed 
in previous writings should alert the reader to beware of any 
claims by overzealous interpreters to find a radical consis-
tency in all of his writings. It should also, however, be a 
warning to all who claim a "radical conversion" where no such 
change of heart is acknowledged explicitly by Collingwood. 
For an other explicit acknowledgement, see PA, 288, n. 1). 
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and history, as well as on a careful delineation of what the 
claims of any one form are (explicitly) as distinct from what 
the limitations of these claims are (implicitly) when seen 
from a "higher" viewpoint. 9 He withdraws his previous asser-
tion that epistemology (in the guise of logic) "is a master-
science having jurisdiction over the whole field of know-
ledge"--which he now regards as "pure intellectualism" (SM, 
49); and he condemns all identifications of philosophy with 
religion, science, art, or history as "barren abstractions" 
9The "implicit-explicit" distinction, although singled 
out by Collingwood as very important and the essential differ-
ence between the argument in Speculum Mentis and that of Reli-
gion and Philosophy, is difficult to define in terms general 
enough to be acceptable to all levels of the scale of forms of 
knowledge as they are presented in the later work. Colling-
wood's characterization of the distinction tends to be in terms 
of mental dispositions. "In any given experience," he writes, 
"there are certain principles, distinctions, and so forth of 
which the person whose experience it is cannot but be aware: 
these I call explicit features of the experience in question 
.... On the other hand, an observer studying a certain form 
of experience often finds it impossible to give an account of 
it without stating certain principles and distinctions which 
are not actually recognized by the persons whose experience 
he is studying ... ((for example)) theology makes explicit 
certain principles which are implicitly, but never explicitly, 
present in religious consciousness; and in general what we 
call philosophy reveals explicitly the principles which are 
implicit in what we call everyday experience" (SM, 85, n. 1). 
However in the course of the argument it becomes clear that 
what may be implicitly assumed in one form of experience (e.g. 
religion) may become explicit either in the next form (e.g. 
science) which appears as its successor in t~eveloping ser-
ies, or by the "dogmatic philosophy" of that form itself--the 
philosophy which is engendered by a form of knowledge when it 
attempts to justify itself as a total outlook on reality. 
Roughly, then, the "implicit-explicit" distinction is the dis-
tinction between something presumed and something asserted by 
the expression of a form of experience. 
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(SM, 246; cf. FR, 91). Having served his time on the Pro-
crustean couch of logic, Collingwood is bent upon correcting 
his previous mistakes, and rises now to the occasion by . 
roundly condemning the view that the five forms of experience 
are species of a genus, which may be substituted for one 
another or taken up in any order. They now form a series, 
and in this series there is an element of denial and distinc-
tion: 
(O)ur forms of experience are not mere species of a genus, 
because each denies the others; and because they are not 
species they have not that indifference with regard one 
another which characterizes abstract logical classifica-
tions. They must form an order of some kind .... But 
what is even more important than the actual order is the 
suggestion of serial arrangement as such. For a series of 
terms implies that each term is as it were built upon or 
derived from its predecessor and therefore does not start 
in vacuo, is not wholly fresh embodiment of the universal, 
but is essentially a modification of the term before. 
Hence even if we only recognized three terms, and made a 
series by alternating them, abcabcabc ... , there would 
be no repetition, for the second a would be not the mere 
first a again, but ~ modified by having been developed 
through b out of c; the third a would be a modified by the 
same process in the second degree; and so-on. (SM, 55; 
cf. SM, 206-07). 
We now see a glimmering of an answer not only to the 
question of what the way was in which Collingwood modified his 
original rapprochement philosophy, but also the way in which 
the "sameness of question" turns out to be not the sameness of 
a universal but the sameness of an historical process. The 
modification consists in the addition of a notion of what Col-
lingwood would later call a "scale of forms" to the analytic 
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phase of his di-phasic (now tri-phasic) method of reconcili-
ation. We shall see in a moment the radical way in which 
this modifies the notion of identity; but just on the analogy 
of his three-term system, it is clear from the comparison of 
this system with that offered in Religion and Philosophy that 
there is a shift of emphasis here from the mere assertion that 
the change of relations in a three-term system implies a change 
in the relata (in a system of dialectical identity) to the 
specification of how that change affects the relationship. 
The terms are related not merely "internally" (Collingwood 
avoids the "internal-external" metaphor in Speculum Mentis) 
but in an ascending series, in an order of development, such 
that when a term changes it is changed through the agency or 
mediation of another term in the series into something further 
which incorporates the others (its predecessors) into itself. 
But this is the way that Collingwood had defined historical 
change in his 1927 and 1929 essays on the philosophy of his-
tory: history is a process of spiritual development, a dyna-
mic rather than static concept, in which ideas grow out of 
other ideas and modify these previous ideas while being modi-
fied by them (EPH, 73). The manner of identification of the 
forms of knowledge and the sameness of historical problems 
converge on the concept of a developmental series. 
Collingwood is quick to reassure the reader that al-
though the forms of experience and the stages of history dis-
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play a developmental structure, the life of mind is "not the 
rotation of a machine through a cycle of fixed phases," and 
consequently one should not expect to have his nose held to 
a "dialectical grindstone" (SM, 56). It will be recalled 
from Religion and Philosophy that the "identity of coopera-
tion" (which we now recognize as the identity of historical 
processes) was regarded as a contingent identity, and not a 
necessary one. Consequently it is not surprising that at the 
very beginning of a work which is to spell out the stages of 
development of a mind through successive forms of experience, 
stages which parallel the development of consciousness in man-
kind as a whole (cf. SM, 50-54), Collingwood should feel 
bound to deny that the relation between phases is one of com-
pulsion or necessity--and this importation of contingency is 
a measure of Collingwood's distance from Hegel. 
On the other hand (as will be recalled from our pre-
vious discussion of Speculum Mentis)--the test of each of 
these forms of experience (each of which claims not only to 
give the truth but "to give the absolute or ultimate truth 
concerning the nature of the universe, to reveal the secret 
of existence, and to tell us what the world really and funda-
mentally is" (SM, 41)) is to be its inherent self-consistency. 
The "prize of truth" for which they all strive is to be gained 
by the form of knowledge which is self-consistent, or which 
proves its claim by "demonstrating the necessary inconsistency 
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of the other forms" (SM, 45). But then it would seem that 
the grindstone of dialectical necessity that Collingwood seems 
anxious to keep away from the noses of his readers is kep·t 
whirling a few inches away (perhaps to sharpen an analytical 
blade). How does a form of knowledge, which retains its 
claim to truth by demonstrating both its inherent self-
consistency and the inherent and essential inconsistency of 
rival forms of knowledge--how does it do so without display-
ing itself as the necessarily true form of knowledge and the 
necessary successor to its predecessors? For if the other 
forms are inherently inconsistent, then it is clear that they 
cannot of themselves achieve ultimate truth, and therefore of 
necessity fail. 
By now the reader should expect that the solution to 
the problem will more likely be to revise the notion of ne-
cessity than to withdraw one or the other of the pair of con-
tradictory claims. 10 But to get an idea of how Collingwood 
actually viewed the manner in which such a series of terms 
are related we must (once again begging the reader's indul-
gence) take another look at the argument of Speculum Mentis. 
In so doing we shall deliberately take a different route from 
the one Collingwood laid out for his readers. Instead of be-
ginning with artistic experience and proceeding through the 
10This is Rubinoff's strategy: see CRM, 61, 176-83. 
These passages are also the most flagrantly Hegelian in his 
whole book. 
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others until we reach philosophy, we shall begin where we left 
off in our discussion of Q-A logic, i.e., with science, and 
work first backwards to religion and then art, and then for-
ward to history and philosophy. 
Our reason for this strategy is primarily to test this 
new requirement for rapprochement: for if (a) the forms of 
knowledge constitute a series wherein each term is a modifica-
tion of the one before, then in an analysis of a successor-
form one should find traces of its predecessor--traces that 
will, when analyzed show how the successor-form is "built 
upon or derived from" its predecessor. Thus in the analysis 
of science which constituted much of our discussion of Q-A 
logic, we should be able to detect a religious element, and 
in the latter an artistic element. And if (b) there is no di-
alectical necessity involved in the series then when we pro-
gress from science to history the latter will resolve the in-
consistencies of the former without being the necessary out-
come of it, or necessarily implied by it. In short, when 
viewed retrogressively there will be necessary relations ex-
hibited between terms in the series; when viewed progressively 
these relations will appear to be contingent. 
One more final note before beginning our survey. 
From our discussion of the analysis of science in Speculum 
Mentis we notice that scientific consciousness is character-
ized in terms of (1) the sort of ideal object it intends to 
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grasp, (2) the faculty of mind by which it habitually oper-
ates, (3) its characteristic mode of expression, and (4) its 
fatal weakness, or inner contradiction, that renders it to be 
an unstable mode of knowledge. Besides these four, Colling-
wood further characterizes it (5) by the consequences it has 
for human action, insofar as it generates, when taken as a 
guide for conduct, a particular form of ethics. While import-
ant for Collingwood's rapprochement between theory and prac-
tice, and therefore another partial confirmation of his con-
tention in the Autobiography that he sought to carry his pro-
gram of reconciliation even into the realm of ethics and con-
duct, we propose to ignore this fifth aspect here in order 
not to further tangle the knotted threads of our argument. 
4. Speculum Mentis: Retrogressive Identity. 
Science, as described in Speculum Mentis, is the con-
scious attitude of regarding its object always as an instance 
of a universal law (SM, 158-63). It operates by a faculty of 
understanding, which distinguishes between universals and par-
ticulars, and assumes that universals can be separated or iso-
lated (abstracted) by thought and studied apart from its in-
stances (SM, 166-67). Instances of such universal laws are 
not regarded as having mutual relations among themselves other 
than those specified by the law (SM, 162, 166-167). But sci-
entific laws are not merely statements of what would be the 
case if certain uniform conditions obtain (the hypothetical-
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deductive aspect of science), science also seeks to assert its 
laws as holding in the real world, and therefore referring to 
individuals or to the world of facts perceived by observers 
(the categorical-inductive aspect of science) (SM, 177, 183). 
In epigrammatic form, science is the form of consciousness 
which intends an object which can be expressed in universal, 
referentially true assertions. 
Now it is not difficult to see that this sort of con-
sciousness presupposes and depends for its existence on sub-
ordinate acts of consciousness. Scientific consciousness pre-
supposes a distinction between universals (concepts, laws) 
and the particulars (perceptions, instances) to which they 
apply--a distinction, Collingwood insists, which is essential 
and irreducible for scientific thinking, given the sort of ob-
ject (ideal) it intends. 11 But a distinction between a uni-
versal and something particular is a distinction between some-
thing merely entertained as a meaning (in imagination) and 
something to which this meaning refers as a real instance (in 
perception); it is not only an assertion, but an assertion 
with a referent, i.e., a real object (EPH, 135-36; cf. SM, 
11collingwood states that "mathematics, mechanism, 
and materialism are the three marks of all science," but he 
reduces all three of these essential characteristics of sci-
ence to the "assertion of the abstract concept"--they are all 
"products of the classificatory frame of mind" (SM, 167). 
For Collingwood's later view of what the characteristic marks 
of modern science are, see IN, 13-27. 
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238-39). It is, as we said, both hypothetical (a possible 
meaning) and categorical (referential). As hypothetical sci-
entific consciousness is the exercise of making supposals, 
of entertaining questions and formulating hypotheses--all of 
which imply the consideration of an object without reference 
to its truth or falsity, or to its existence or non-existence. 
This is the defining characteristic of imaginary objects, and 
Collingwood's claim is that imagined objects are what the 
forms of consciousness known as religion and art intend. For 
art the entertainment and expression of imagined objects is 
necessary and sufficient to it as a mental activity; for re-
ligious consciousness there is the additional requirement that 
its objects be taken as truly existing--it is not indifferent 
to the existence of its object as is artistic consciousness 
(cf. EPA, 137-41). 
Therefore it is clear that (1) if scientific conscious-
ness requires that its object be expressed in scientific asser-
tions, and (2) if scientific assertions essentially imply a 
distinction between universals and particulars, and (3) if 
this distinction demands expression in hypothetical assertions 
which (4) are not only entertained as possible meanings but 
also (5) are taken as categorically true, or as truly refer-
ring to particulars, and finally (6) if the latter two activi-
ties (that is, (4) and (5)) are characteristics essential to 
artistic and religious consciousness respectively, then (7) 
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we have demonstrated that scientific consciousness essen-
tially and necessarily contains elements (or structures) .that 
are characteristically religious and artistic. 
If this is an acceptable summary of the argument in 
the first three portions of Collingwood's "dialectic of ex-
perience" it seems to be saying too much and too little at the 
same time. Is it not asking too much to expect us to believe 
that before a law of nature is taken to be scientific it must 
first be grasped artistically and then religiously--first 
painted by an artist and then worshipped by a priest? 12 This 
12c 11 · d d · 1 · · · h · o ~ngwoo oes po~nt to an exp ~c~t ~n er~tance 
of religion and art in science, but he presents it in the form 
of a mental disposition--a "bias toward abstraction." He 
writes: "This bias is allowed unconsciously to control its 
development . . . . Because the abstractness of science is a 
perpetuation of the abstractness of religion, science most na-
turally arises out of a religion which has not overcome this 
abstractness, that is to say, out of a non-Christian religion. 
Hence European science has its roots in the religion of pagan 
antiquity . . . . Science in the modern world is science Chris-
tianized, science fed by a religious consciousness in which 
the primary abstractness of religion has been cancelled by the 
notions of incarnation and atonement. This gives the distinc-
tion between the a priori science of the Greeks and the empir-
ical science of the modern or Christian world. But religion, 
even in the form of Christianity, never really transcends its 
abstractness .... The aim of science is to avoid this fault; 
Greek science aims at avoiding the specific fault of Greek re-
ligion, modern science at avoiding that of Christianity, 
namely, its liability to misinterpretation in a sense which 
makes God an arbitrary tyrant, whose very gifts are an insult 
to a free man. The history of European science begins with 
the breakdown of a religious view of the world in the mind of 
ancient Greece, and the concepts of Greek science appear as a 
kind of depersonalized gods" (SM, 160-61). It appears that 
Collingwood would have agreed with Cornford against Burnet: 
"Principium sapientiae (quae scientiae) timor dei." 
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is something of the impression one gets by a forward reading 
of Speculum Mentis. But in reversing directions we see that 
it obviously is not what he has in mind. Collingwood is not 
speaking generically--he is not saying that one and the same 
object of consciousness is first taken as an art-object and 
then as a religious object and finally as a science-object. 
He is making what appears to be a logical point--that forms 
of consciousness and their characteristic modes of expression 
are bound to one another in a logically necessary fashion, 
such that in thinking scientifically one cannot help but also 
think (in an implicit way) religiously and artistically (but 
not necessarily vice-versa). 
But then is this not saying too little? Our previous 
objection concerning the reduction of the forms of conscious-
ness to one another as species of a genus seems to apply here 
as well. Surely in scientific consciousness there is an ele-
ment of creed, if one takes creed as the form ofexpression of 
a consciousness which assumes its object to be real and as-
serts itself in statements about that object that are assumed 
to be true and distinct from other statements about it which 
are false. But to take the object of religious consciousness 
to be creed in this sense is to reduce religion to its mode 
of expression, and this would be an error as grievous as 
merely taking it as an event in the brain, insofar as both ig-
nore what is properly and peculiarly being asserted by reli-
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gious statements. Religion is not particularly concerned with 
objects sliding down inclined planes or the displacements of 
fluids by solid objects of a given weight; and science is not 
particularly concerned with the effect that natural laws will 
have on the moral behavior of those who believe in them. Fur-
thermore religion expresses itself not only in credal asser-
tions, but in exclamations, questions, petitions, demands, 
apologies, etc. By focusing on the mode of expression, and on 
only one mode at that, Collingwood seems to be ignoring what 
it is that is being expressed Qy that mode, and this is the 
sort of formalism Collingwood had criticized psychology for 
employing. And nothing is added by relating a mode of expres-
sion to a faculty of consciousness, since the same objection 
can be raised about the mode of consciousness which takes its 
object a certain way, but does not specify what is peculiar 
to the object it is so taking. 
These objections would be more biting if it were not 
for the fact that Collingwood spends an entire chapter of 
Speculum Mentis trying to say what religion is, not only ge-
nerically (as a form of consciousness sharing characteristics 
with other forms) but specifically. Religion is a form of 
consciousness which intends an object which is a unified whole 
(like the object of art), which is ultimately real (like the 
object of science and unlike the object of art), and which is 
taken as sacred or holy--that is, deserving of adoration (un-
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like both science and art): 
God, we are told by theologians, is the ultimate reality, 
conceived as spirit; spirit omnipotent, omniscient, cre-
ative, transcending all sense of immediacy, yet immanent 
in his church. But this language, well enough in theology, 
is very far from natural to religion .... From the 
simple and unsophisticated point of view of the religious 
consciousness, it is not the spirituality nor the imman-
ence of God that is important, nor even his power or good-
ness, but his holiness, the necessity of falling down be-
fore him in adoration. This sense of the holiness of God 
is the explicit differentia of the religious experience. 
(SM, 118-19). 
As in Religion and Philosophy, Collingwood is anxious not to 
characterize religion in a reductive fashion, so he is at pains 
not to be content, as some writers on religion had been, to 
describe "the holy" as a feeling of uncanniness for the divine. 
If it is a feeling, writes Collingwood, and one which is a uni-
versal characteristic of religion, "it must be bound up with 
its essential nature, and capable of being deduced from it" 
(SM, 119). 
Holiness is to religion what beauty is to art. It is the 
specific form in which truth appears to that type of con-
sciousness. As religion, therefore, is a dialectical de-
velopment of art, so holiness is a dialectical development 
of beauty. Now religion is art asserting its object. The 
object of art is the beautiful, and therefore the holy is 
the beautiful asserted as real .... Further, holiness, 
like beauty, polarizes itself into the positively holy 
(God) and the negatively holy, that which we are forbidden 
to find holy or worship, the devil and all his works. But 
specifically, holiness is asserted as real, and therefore 
God is regarded as not our own invention, not a fancy work 
of art, but a reality, indeed the only and ultimate real-
ity. Hence that rapture and admiration which we enjoy in 
the contemplation of a work of art is in the case of God 
fused with the conviction that we here come face to face 
with something other than ourselves and our imaginings, 
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something infinitely real, the ground and source of our 
own being. It is this fusion which constitutes the sense 
of holiness, and forms the basis and motive of worship. 
Neither the real nor the beautiful is as such the proper 
object of adoration: it is only the aesthetic attitude 
towards ultimate reality, or conversely the elevation of 
beauty into a metaphysical principle, that constitutes 
worship. (SM, 119-20). 
Once again it is necessary to enter a caveat here 
against the possible misinterpretation of Collingwood's in-
tent. In analyzing religion as a form of consciousness which 
intends an object that is defined by holiness, and then by 
defining holiness in terms of the object of artistic conscious-
ness (the holy as the "beautiful asserted as real"), Colling-
wood is not simply saying that religion elevates an art-
object, asserts its reality, and then falls down in worship 
of it. That he does not mean this is clear from his comments 
about idolatry: 
(T)he enemy of religion is idolatry, or the attempt to 
worship an object which, however exquisite to the artist's 
eye, cannot claim to be the ultimate reality. The sin of 
the idolater is to worship his own works of art known to 
be such. This is not true religion, because true religion 
worships the real God, no mere figment of the imagination 
.... (I)n religion the mind becomes aware that it is in 
danger of illusion. God and religion are correlative; and 
to doubt the reality of God is to deny the validity and 
legitimacy of religion. There are no religions without a 
god or gods: what have passed by that name have been 
either philosophies, or religions whose gods have escaped 
the eye of the observer, or a kind of mechanical contriv-
ance put on the market by a deluded or fraudulent invent-
or. (SM, 119-20). 
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In defining religious consciousness as the artistic 
object asserted as real, therefore, Collingwood is attempting 
to characterize what is actually a unified whole by means of 
terms drawn both (a) from a lower form of consciousness (art), 
which forms one of religion's distinguishable (but not truly 
separate) elements, and (b) from within that form of conscious-
ness itself (the assertion of God as ultimate reality). But 
the lower term, in this case the artistic object, "the beauti-
ful," is transformed into something different--into "the holy" 
or something deserving of worship. If "the beautiful" is tak-
en generically, then "the holy" is a specification of that 
genus in such a way that the generic essence is modified by 
the specific difference of religious consciousness to the ex-
tent that it becomes identified with it: the genus, in short, 
is identified with the variable--the beautiful is asserted as 
real. 
Now we have just seen that a very similar state of af-
fairs appears to be the result of Collingwood's analysis of 
scientific consciousness. The genus provided by religious 
consciousness (creed: the assertion of the imagined object as 
real) is modified by what is specific to scientific conscious-
ness (the principle of abstraction) to become not an object of 
faith and worship but an object of scientific inquiry--the 
conception of reality as particular instantiations of univer-
sal laws. And we see again from this analysis that the object 
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of religion (God as ultimate reality) is not taken over by 
scientific consciousness without modification: laws of nature 
are not merely the worshipped God reduced to the status of 
universals. The object of scientific consciousness takes the 
generic essence of religious consciousness as already abstract: 
it takes up only the notion of an imaginary object asserted as 
real and leaves aside the sacred or holy aspect of the object 
of religious consciousness. It becomes, in terms Collingwood 
does not employ, wholly profane science. 
We see therefore a very important exemplification of 
what Collingwood's modification of the notion of identity was 
in Speculum Mentis. The relationship between forms of know-
ledge is as good an illustration as one can expect to find of 
what Collingwood meant by a "developing series" in which each 
term is a modification of the one before. It is also the ba-
sis upon which he will construct his analysis of a "scale of 
forms" in the Essay on Philosophical Method: "In a philoso-
phical scale of forms the variable is identical with the 
generic essence itself" (EPM, 60). We do not have to proceed 
much further in our retrogressive survey before discovering 
another anticipation of a doctrine in the Essay on Philosophi-
cal Method: in a scale of forms there is no zero end of the 
scale, the minimum realization of the generic essence lying 
not at zero but at unity (EPM, 81). In this case the minimum 
specification of the genus, "object of knowledge," is the ob-
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ject of artistic consciousness. 
It is no accident that art occupies the primary po-
sition in Collingwood's survey of the forms of experience be-
cause to be an object of consciousness at all is to be enter-
tained as an object in imagination, without which even per-
ception is impossible (SM, 204-05; EPA, 57). 
The first stage in this process ((viz. the life of spirit 
or awareness or consciousness)) is the life of art, which 
is the pure act of imagination. This is not only empiri-
cally the first stage observable in children and primitive 
peoples, it is necessarily the first stage. Awareness in 
itself . . . is an act of consciousness which presents to 
itself an object of whose relation to other objects it 
takes no cognizance .... (I)n religion that indifference 
to the distinction between real and unreal, which is the 
essence of art, is abolished. Religion is essentially a 
quest after truth and explicitly conscious of itself as 
such a quest. (EPA, 141). 
Once again it is necessary to enter a word of caution 
to avoid a misunderstanding. Collingwood is not saying that 
art first asserts, then withdraws the aspect of truth or false-
hood, or the reference to reality. Art is not asserting at 
all: its "apparent assertions are not real assertions but 
the very suspension of assertion"--and the non-assertive, non-
logical attitude towards an object of consciousness, the in-
difference to its reality or unreality, is imagination (SM, 
60). That is why art is prior to the other forms of conscious-
ness, and even the discussion of its essential nature as the 
activity of imagination is not taking place from within artis-
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tic consciousness itself, but is thought's way of describing 
its most primitive function. 
To imagine is to refrain from making a distinction which 
we make whenever we think: the distinction between re-
ality and unreality, truth and falsehood. Therefore im-
agining is not a kind of thinking, nor is thinking a kind 
of imagining, for each negates the specific nature of the 
other .... Hence the relation between imagination and 
thought is that thought presupposes imagination, but im-
agination does not presuppose thought . . . . As thinking 
presupposes imagining, all those activities whose theore-
tical aspect takes the form of thought presuppose art; 
and art is the basis of science, history, "common sense," 
and so forth. Art is the primary and fundamental acti-
vity of the mind .... It is not a primitive form of 
religion or science of philosophy, it is something more 
primitive than these, something that underlies them and 
makes them possible. (EPA, 54-55). 
But although artistic consciousness is the suspension 
of assertion (and it will be recalled from Chapter V that the 
suspension of assertion is one of the ways Collingwood defines 
a question and an hypothesis), it is not simply the "blooming, 
buzzing confusion" that William James ascribed to the world of 
pure sensation. Artistic consciousness has at least the co-
herence necessary to hold its object together as a single en-
tity, and in so doing it makes a rudimentary distinction be-
tween beauty and ugliness. It is this minimal activity that 
permits us to call it consciousness or mental activity at all. 
Insofar as imagination is a constructive activity (which ulti-
mately issues in the creation of works of art) it is a repre-
sentative of mental consciousness striving to see its world 
as a whole, the whole in this case being the imagined object, 
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the work of art (SM, 63-65). And even though art proclaims 
its refusal to be bound either by any necessary relation to 
the world of reality, or by the restrictive, rule-governed 
world of thought, it nonetheless utilizes, at least implic-
itly the minimum realization of thought in its application of 
the principle of beauty: 
Now this process of imagining a whole, or creating a work 
of art is . . . no mere rudderless drifting of images ac-
ross the mind; it is a process of unification in which the 
mind strives to see its world as a whole, the "world" be-
ing just the work of art which for the time being absorbs 
the whole gaze of the mind . . . (T)he whole comes into 
imaginary existence only in the critical process of exper-
imenting with its parts .... The law of this process, 
its guiding principle, is beauty .... Now art as such 
has nothing to do with principles or laws .... ((But)) 
beauty is not a concept. It is the guise under which con-
cepts in general appear to the aesthetic consciousness. 
Beauty means structure, organization, seen from the aesthe-
tic point of view, that is, imagined and not conceived. 
(SM, 65-66).13 
The work of aesthetic consciousness, then, is the creation of 
coherence in its minimal form. "When one imagines," writes 
Collingwood, "one must imagine something; it must be a defin-
ite and not a self-contradictory imagination, and hence the 
necessary unity of the work of art" (SM, 70). 
13Although the general sense of what Collingwood is 
saying about beauty and art is clear, it is difficult to un-
derstand how beauty can be the "law of this process" of uni-
fication, "its guiding principle-:"and still not be a concept. 
Perhaps Collingwood is trying to present it arter the fashion 
of Kant's a priori forms of intuition, space and time, which 
were also not concepts. Collingwood's later esthetic drops 
the notion of beauty altogether, while retaining the theory 
of imagination: see PA, 37-41, 137, and 149. 
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We see in the experience of art what Collingwood takes 
to be the minimum sense of unity--the identity of a coherent, 
imagined object in terms of structure or organization, its 
ability (from the point of view of consciousness) to be held 
before the gaze of consciousness as an object to it. To para-
phrase Collingwood, to be one is minimally to be a coherent 
object of imagination, without consideration of truth or fal-
sity, reality or unreality. But concern only for internal co-
herence is what is ultimately responsible for what Collingwood 
calls the "monadism of art:" 
Every aesthetic act is an individual internally organized 
by the harmonious fitting-together of subordinate aesthe-
tic acts . . . . Works of art always ignore one another 
and begin each from the beginning: they are windowless 
monads; and this is because they are acts of imagination, 
from which it necessarily follows that they are careless 
of mutual consistency and interested only in their inter-
nal coherence .... The work of art is a monad, and mo-
nadology is the philosophy of art. (SM, 71-72). 
Since art as imagination is necessarily the fundamen-
tal form of consciousness, it is clear that we have reached 
the end of the line in our retrogressive survey of the forms 
of consciousness (at least those starting with science and 
its subordinate forms) necessarily presupposes its predeces-
sors; each of the subordinate forms, that is, is a necessary, 
but not a sufficient condition for its superordinate form, 
without which it could not be what it is. And although Col-
lingwood is not altogether rigorous in exhibiting this de-
pendence at all the levels of description we found him giving 
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of the forms of consciousness (i.e. as intentional structures, 
as objects of consciousness, as modes of expression, and as 
faculties of mind), 14 the main outlines of the rapprochement 
identity, when approached retrogressively, are clear--and its 
ideal limit is the minimal form of unity as the coherent ob-
ject of imagination. 
5. Speculum Mentis: Progressive Identity. 
When Collingwood begins the chapter on science in 
Speculum Mentis he summarizes the failure of both art and re-
ligion to fulfill the promise that they hold out as being com-
plete and independent forms of consciousness. In so doing he 
takes up not what they are in themselves (forms of conscious-
14While it is relatively easy to find passages in 
Speculum Mentis and elsewhere that illustrate the retrogres-
sively necessary relationship of forms of consciousness, the 
basis for this relationship is given in terms of intentional 
structures (the way that consciousness intends its objects), 
faculties (imagination, understanding, faith, reason), and ty-
pical modes of expression (hypothesis, assertion, etc.), but 
not always in terms of their objects. When religious con-
sciousness transforms "the beautiful" into "the holy" the 
transition between objects, while highly abstract, is fairly 
explicit. But when science takes up its object one might ex-
pect that "the holy" would now become "the true" or "the ab-
stract universal" or some such entity. But Collingwood does 
not carry forward the analogy, perhaps because "the truth" is 
what is intended by all forms of thought as such, from science 
on up; or perhaps, again, because thought self-conscious of 
itself as such is best dealt with in its expressive mode in 
linguistic forms. But from the point of view of Speculum 
Mentis, Collingwood clearly felt that the different descrip-
tive terms we have distinguished were just different ways of 
characterizing the same entities--art, science, religion, etc. 
ness or intentional structures), nor what they intend as 
ideal objects, nor as faculties of mind, but the way they 
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manifest themselves--art as imaginative expression, and re~ 
ligion as credal assertion. It is in this form that they 
most clearly show their failure to achieve fully satisfying 
results. 
Art and religion, to the superficial observer, are forms 
not of thought but of language. Art ... is simply 
language itself, language in its pure form apart from any 
meaning .... Art is not pure language, but thought fail-
ing to recognize that it is thought, mistaking itself for 
imagination. Religion is ... a dialectical development 
of art, art realizing that it is not bare imagination but 
assertion, and then proceeding to misinterpret its own as-
sertions and to suppose itself to be asserting the image 
or word when it is really asserting the meaning of the 
word. In a special sense both art and religion are thus 
linguistic functions, forms of expression rather than 
forms of thought. (SM, 154). 
But if art and religion are both "phases in the history of a 
mind, preceding its attainment of complete mastery over the 
means of expression," science represents thought's completion 
of this development in the recognition that language is the 
servant of thought rather than either the whole of thought (as 
art assumes) or thought's master (as religion assumes) (SM, 
155). Scientific consciousness explicitly distinguishes be-
tween metaphorical and literal meaning, and hence between 
thought and language (SM, 157). It does so by the assertion 
of the abstract concept, as we have already seen, and the his-
torical locus of this event was in the world of post-Homeric 
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Greece, where scientific concepts appeared first in the guise 
of depersonalized gods (SM, 158, 160-61). Whereas (a) art 
fails completely to recognize the claim of thought on its con-
scious activity, being totally absorbed in the technique of 
expression, and (b) religion only minimally recognizes the 
claim of thought but misinterprets it by identifying thought 
with its own expression, language with reality, (c) science 
represents thought fully conscious of itself as thought, 
thought expressed rather than concealed (SM, 154-55). 
From the point of view of the modes of expression of 
the forms of consciousness, then, each is an incomplete ful-
fillment of what thought is trying to achieve: each only par-
tially conceives of an object which will fully satisfy its 
(the mind's) requirements. But when taken as ultimate and in-
dependent statements about what consciousness is, and what the 
relationship of consciousness is to its object, they are not 
only incomplete they are errors--mistakes that consciousness 
makes about itself and about its object. When made explicit 
by the labors of thought, these errors appear not as inade-
quacies of modes of expression but as actual contradictions 
within that mode. Thus art appears to non-assertively assert, 
religion to not mean what it says it means, and science ap-
pears to non-referentially refer (SM, 242-43; cf. SM, 311). 
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Now if one were of a formalistic cast of mind, which 
Collingwood clearly was not, one might easily demonstrate that 
from contradictory statements everything follows of necessity 
(because anything, including further contradictory statements, 
can be derived from any rule which allows contradictories to 
stand as simultaneously true). Therefore when any form of 
knowledge is shown to rest on a presupposition (when what it 
implicitly presumes is made explicit) that is inherently 
false, or self-contradictory, it would automatically rule out 
the possibility that any other form of self-consistent know-
ledge could proceed from it--and certainly not of necessity. 
Therefore from the collapse of one form of knowledge by self-
contradiction no other form of knowledge can follow of neces-
sity, and the progressive dialectical process, as we anticipa-
ted, would show no necessity: the relation of succession is 
not one of necessity but of contingency. 
But this is not Collingwood's route. We saw in a pre-
vious chapter (Chapter IV) that Collingwood's commitment to 
an anti-realist position concerning the relation of knower 
and known necessitated the conclusion that any such error 
that consciousness makes about its object recoils on itself, 
altering the nature of conscious activity itself (SM, 241). 
When a form of consciousness is shown to express itself in an 
inconsistent manner, like the rift in the sail of a schooner, 
it need not abandon ship, because it has a greater resiliency 
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than strict logic might allow. It can repair its own damages 
by transforming itself into something that at first sight it 
was not--spontaneous and reflective thought. Therefore imag-
inative consciousness (art) can recognize that it is not ut-
terly free of the imposition of thought, since it presumes a 
guiding principle of selectivity (the idea of relevance) in 
the construction of a coherent work of art (SM, 97). The con-
sciousness of this controlling element in artistic creation 
is the birthplace of art criticism, and of esthetic philosophy 
(SM, 98-100). The distinction that is introduced is one of 
form and content, of the manner in which meaning in art is 
expressed as opposed to what is being expressed by that form 
(SM, 96). This distinction is the beginning of scientific 
. 
15 d . . h d h . . consclousness, an recognlzlng t e anger t at artlStlc con-
sciousness may at this point cease to be itself and become 
science, esthetic philosophy--thought conscious of itself as 
art--resists the absorption of its primary form (artistic ex-
perience) by attacking science, perhaps in the form of an in-
tuitionism that is read back into science as its (science's) 
essential nature (SM, 262). Esthetic philosophy "reduces all 
philosophical problems to terms of imagination or intuition," 
which describe the world as one of pure change, a monadic 
world in which every event isnew in the sense of irrelevant 
15Notice that Collingwood here at least implicitly ac-
knowledges that it is possible to pass directly from art to 
science--but only through the intermediary of some sort of ex-
plicit thought process, such as art criticism. 
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to what went before (ibid.). 
The same dogmatic service of thought can be performed 
for the other forms of experience, and it is this polymorphous 
perversity (Collingwood of course does not use this phrase, 
apt as he may have found it) that prevents the phases of the 
dialectical series of forms of knowledge from becoming neces-
sarily successive. Once a form of consciousness has at its 
disposal a battery of modes of expression (questions, asser-
tions, supposals, etc.) provided by the capacities of thought, 
it can respond to the threat of destnrtion of itself by its 
own inner dialectic (self contradiction) either by becoming 
explicitly what it was only implicitly (rational thought, for 
example, instead of pure imagination; assertion instead of 
mere questioning) or by transforming itself into another form 
altogether (transforming the object of art into the object of 
religion, for example). Art can defend itself by becoming 
art-criticism or esthetic philosophy or it can allow itself to 
be absorbed by religion, science, or history as one of its 
essential constituents. Religion can develop a dogmatic de-
fense as theology, science can develop a dogmatic defense as 
metaphysics and logic, and history (peculiarly enough, as we 
noted earlier) can develop a dogmatic philosophy in the form 
of realism; or each could be transformed in its successor 
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(SM, 260-87). 16 
We have at this point shown, therefore, how Colling-
wood, true to his epistemological assumptions, has maintained 
the contingency of the forward motion of his process of re-
conciliation between the forms of knowledge. Progressive 
rapprochement identity (according to the position proclaimed 
in Speculum Mentis, at least) consists in the unifying acti-
vity of a form of consciousness, deliberately attempting to 
preserve its integrity by overcoming errors which become mani-
fest when its implicit assumptions are explicitly expressed. 
Since it can overcome error in a variety of ways, and with 
differing degrees of success, the possible modes of succession 
of thought forms are not fixed, and contingency in the progres-
sive direction is preserved. The ideal limit to the process 
of overcoming expressed errors is total self-consistency, or 
absolute knowledge. Such a knowledge would not only grasp its 
intentional object in a non-misleading way, but would also ac-
count for the errors that it has made in achieving this total-
ly adequate knowledge. Therefore it cannot intend an object 
that is utterly one, a bare blank identity (the abstract Ab-
solute), but a unity-in-diversity, one for which differences 
are essential, a "concrete universal." But a concrete univer-
16Although strictly speaking, tertium non datur, I see 
no reason why Collingwood would object to the suggestion that 
a form of experience could simply remain what it is, ignoring 
the contradiction within itself. 
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sal as an absolute object would have to be an infinite whole 
of fact, and a whole in which subject and object are not ·con-
ceived as separate, but identified. Ideal maximal progressive 
rapprochement identity, therefore, is one of complete identity 
of subject and object. 17 
Since there is a whole battery of problems that arise 
in connection with Collingwood's concluding chapters of Specu-
lum Mentis, especially concerning this progressive rapproche-
ment identity in the form of "absolute knowledge," we propose 
to deal with these problems as a series of disputed questions 
with which we will close this chapter. 
6. Disputed Questions. 
(1) Why do forms of consciousness succeed one another? 
Collingwood's descriptive phenomenology does not set out to 
answer this question, but it certainly does "arise"--even on 
his own sense of that term. If there is no necessity (meaning 
logical compulsion) in the forward direction in a scale of 
forms of knowledge, then it would seem not merely contingent 
that they succeed one another but utterly accidental, even 
gratuitous or miraculous. Is the reader to assume a "nisus" 
or innate striving toward greater adequacy of thought? Does 
17sources for the statements in this paragraph (the 
argument is nowhere, of course, stated as such by Collingwood) 
include: SM, 238-41, 288-97. More detailed, explicit refer-
ences will be given in section 6, question 2. 
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thought have an inborn natural tendency to supersede or over-
reach or transcend itself and thus create different forms of 
itself? Is the logical requirement of self-consistency a mo-
tive force at all levels of consciousness? 
In his "Outlines of a Philosophy of Art" (published 
one year after Speculum Mentis) Collingwood actually does po-
sit a "nisus towards self-consciousness" at all levels of con-
sciousness (EPA, 144), but in Speculum Mentis he does not give 
a consistent answer to this question. On the one hand, in the 
introductory and less precise passages of the book, Colling-
wood seems to lean towards the "nisus" thesis, if we may so 
call it, insofar as he assumes that the disease of modern man 
is self-alienation, the separation of the forms of experience 
one from another, and the cure for this disease to be their 
"reunion in a complete and undivided life" (SM, 36). But on 
the other hand, Collingwood denies that there is anything like 
a fixed "human nature" (SM, 296)--a denial he defended through-
out his lifetime, and against which he threw all the weight of 
his reflections on the nature of history as a "self-making ac-
tivity." But if there is no such thing as a fixed human na-
ture, not even in the minimal sense of the term, then it is 
hard to account for any tendency for consciousness to become 
altered at all. In fact it seems utterly groundless to assert 
that consciousness would seek to grasp a fully satisfactory 
object unless there are fundamental and irreducible character-
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istics of consciousness as an activity, and what could this be 
but a minimally essential human nature? 
Collingwood does not acknowledge the problem at all in 
Speculum Mentis, the assumptions upon which it builds its argu-
ment being (1) that knowledge and consciousness exist (but in 
a divided state), and (2) that these mental activities claim 
fully satisfactory ideal objects (cf. SM, 39). It is not un-
til he attempted a more complete analysis of mental activity 
in The Principles of Art and The New Leviathan that the 
emotive-expressive aspects of mental activity was fully inte-
grated into his philosophy of mind. 
(2) Even assuming that, for whatever reason, the forms 
of consciousness do succeed one another in a scale of develop-
ing forms, and in much the way Collingwood describes them, is 
there any end-point to the series? We have seen in our retro-
gressive survey of the forms of consciousness that there is a 
terminal point at the "lower" end inasmuch as the considera-
tion by consciousness of a whole object, its mere entertain-
ment by imagination, is the minimal sense in which intention-
ality can grasp its object at all. But we have also seen that 
the imaginary object is intended without consideration of its 
reality or unreality (i.e. without reference), and that this 
is the root sense of abstraction, insofar as the act which 
grasps an imaginary object does so by ignoring (Collingwood 
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will later say by "suppressing") its relations to any and all 
other objects. And abstraction, as the negative side of in-
tentionality, is also the act by which consciousness cuts it-
self loose from its object, or sets the object apart as "sepa-
rate" from itself. But this is the primitive act of separa-
tion of subject and object, the root error of realism. 
From this analysis it is not surprising that the re-
pair to the torn fabric of consciousness will be the reunifi-
cation of subject and object by an act that is the very oppo-
site of abstraction--viz. reconciliation. This in fact is Col-
lingwood's strategy in Speculum Mentis: the termination of 
the scale of forms is philosophy (which succeeds history), and 
whereas history achieves concrete knowledge (and therefore 
rectifies implicitly the abstractness of science), philosophy 
achieves absolute knowledge (and therefore overcomes the last 
vestige of abstraction in the form of history's separation of 
subject and object--the historian contemplating a world of 
facts, and not fully aware that he is more than merely an ob-
server of those facts) (SM, 238-39; cf. SM, 242-43, 311, and 
EPA, 143-44). 
We shall see in a moment what the subject matter of 
this absolute knowledge is, and how it leads to further dif-
ficulties unresolved in Speculum Mentis. For now it is suf-
ficient to notice that the argument that Collingwood provides 
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for us as a justification for the transition from history to 
philosophy does not appear to leave us with any alternative, 
and thus threatens the contingency of the forward dialectic. 
He not only argues (a) that if the distinction or separation 
between subject and object is invalid, then the last veil 
hung between the mind and its object falls, revealing (not 
Salome but) the mind itself in mirror reflection--the "specu-
lum mentis" of his title; but also (b) that on either of two 
mutually exclusive alternatives, the result (the identity of 
subject and object) follows: 
If subject and object are opposite, then they can only 
exist in synthesis: well and good. But if they are dis-
tinct concrete facts, they both fall within the world of 
fact, and of this world it remains true that everything in 
it determines the whole and everything else, it follows 
that subject and object are just as inseparable on this 
hypothesis as on the other. For the concept of the world 
of fact as the concrete universal has destroyed any dis-
tinction between a logic of opposition and a logic of dif-
ference.l8 The fundamental principle of history itself, 
namely, the concreteness of the object, thus makes it im-
possible for the object to ignore the subject, and compels 
us to recognize an object to which the subject is organic, 
in the sense that the subject's consciousness of it makes 
a real difference to it as a whole and to all its parts 
.... Being known, whether truly known or erroneously 
known, must make a difference to the object: to deny this 
... is to turn one's back on concrete thought and revert 
to the fallacies of abstraction. (SM, 244; emphasis mine). 
With this passage it appears that the veil is not so 
18collingwood here anticipates another doctrine of 
the Essay on Philosophical Method: "the kind of opposition 
which is found among philosophical terms is at once opposi-
tion and distinction" (EPM, 75). 
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much dropped as torn down, revealing not only the mirror of 
the mind but Collingwood's own presuppositions, and it be-
comes clear that the position he is advocating is naked epis-
temological idealism (albeit of an unusual variety). The sus-
picion (if one still needs convincing) is further confirmed in 
a later passage in a section dealing with the historical form 
of dogmatism, in which Collingwood praises German idealism for 
killing "scientific realism--the popular philosophy of today--
as dead as a door nail" ( SM, 28 7). 
But the admission also threatens Collingwood's entire 
philosophical enterprise in Speculum Mentis. For if the for-
ward movement of the dialectic of experience is not propelled 
by necessity, then the final transition, even more so than all 
the intermediate ones, seems hypothetical at best and arbitrary 
at worst. But the above passage, as the underlined words show, 
seems to contradict the thesis that the dialectical progres-
sion is not one of logical necessity. 19 The reader is shot as 
19cf. SM, 292-93: "Not that such creation of an ex-
ternal world is capricious. The mind cannot simply think what-
ever it pleases, or even imagine whatever it pleases. It is 
bound by the laws of its own nature to this extent, that even 
though it can deform its nature by misconceiving it, it can 
never deform it out of recognition, because misconceiving is 
after all a kind of conceiving. Its scientific concepts, its 
religious imagery, its aesthetic imaginings must grow out of 
the soil of fact, and that fact is just its own nature as that 
stands for the time being. This necessity of all its actions, 
ignored in the life of imagination, is though ignored not done 
away. It is transformed, by being ignored, from a ratio~al ne-
cessity to the blind necessity of instinct . . The d~scov-
ery of necessity ... is the achievement of the religious con-
sciousness; but this necessity is there from the first." 
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from an historical cannon into the realm of idealistic phil-
osophy. 
We shall see in the next question that Collingwood's 
attemp~to escape from the consequences of his own argument 
by denying that his position commits him to a metaphysical 
form of idealism are not convincing enough, as they stand, to 
exonerate his "absolute knowledge" from self-contradiction, 
and consequently from the necessity of positing even a further 
form of consciousness to repair the damage. 
(3) Does philosophy have an object? The reader of 
Speculum Mentis is well aware that Collingwood wants philosophy 
to be a form of knowledge that (a) is self-consistent, (b) is 
self-consciously reflective, and (c) achieves the object of 
self-knowledge in a manner that escapes, or overcomes, the 
errors of subordinate states of consciousness (SM, 45-46, 
247-49). We have just seen that Collingwood hopes to fulfill 
these conditions in the guise of absolute knowledge. By as-
serting that the differentia of absolute knowledge is the 
identity of subject and object (SM, 249), Collingwood argues 
that he has found a kind of knowledge that fulfills all the 
requisite conditions. (a) If it is identical with its ob-
ject, there is no "externality of the object," and therefore 
no place for necessary inconsistency to conceal itself. And 
(b) so also it is not knowledge of an object that is other 
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than itself, but is rather that object knowing itself. But 
(c) the problem of inconsistency arises once again the instant 
one attempts to see how such a knowledge achieves its object 
in a manner that escapes error. 20 
The reason for this is that the instant one attempts 
to import any content into the abstract formula "the identity 
of subject and object" the air becomes murky with the gaseous 
remains of previous errors. The object of philosophy, he 
says, is not that of art, religion, science or history because 
each of these forms of knowledge intend an object that is as-
sumed in some sense to be independent of the subject (SM, 306-
09). Yet what the philosophical form of consciousness reflects 
on is nothing other than the succession of worlds created by 
art, religion, etc. 
In an immediate and direct way the mind can never know 
itself: it can only know itself through the mediation of 
an external world, know that what it sees in the external 
world is its own reflection. Hence the construction of 
external worlds . . . is the only way by which the mind 
can possibly come to that self-knowledge which is its 
end. (SM, 315). 
Absolute knowledge, therefore, consists in nothing more than 
a survey of the succession of errors by subordinate states, 
20 In fairness to Collingwood it should be pointed out 
that he says that absolute knowledge is not secure from error, 
but rather it is called absolute because "in it there is no 
element of necessary and insurmountable error" (SM, 295). 
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recognized as such by a form of consciousness that takes its 
object to be nothing other than itself. But each of these 
subordinate forms of consciousness when recognized as illusory 
(erroneous portrayals of an object separate from the mind 
which contemplates it) are absorbed into philosophy: there is 
no "map of knowledge" because "there are no autonomous and mu-
tually exclusive forms of experience" (SM, 306). Philosophy 
is therefore the consciousness of something which is also the 
consciousness of nothing. 
The same conclusion follows if one proceeds in another 
direction--from a description of absolute mind. Here Colling-
wood's rejection of all possible content is even more sweeping. 
He says that whether the life of the spirit be described by a 
group of categories, a group of laws, a group of presupposi-
tions, a world of objects, or a series of stages, it is an 
erroneous description of absolute knowledge because the de-
scriptive terms are "versions of a single error: the error 
of abstraction, of failing to realize that subject and object, 
condition and conditioned, ground and consequence, particular 
and universal can only be distinctions which fall within one 
and the same whole, and that this whole can only be the infin-
ite fact which is the absolute mind" (SM, 310). But there-
cognition of this "infinite fact" is an act which "abolishes 
the notion of an external world other than the mind" (SM, 310). 
But then it would seem that the infinite world of fact is 
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abolished with the external world, the baby discarded with 
the bath water, and absolute knowledge is left with nothing 
to contemplate. 
Collingwood's attempts to evade the contradictory as-
pects of the concept only tend to add to one's puzzlement. 
For example he says that the abolition of an external world 
other than mind does not imply the abolition of the distinc-
tion between suject and object: 
These distinctions are only abolished by the coinciden-
tia oppositorum which is the suicide of abstract thought, 
and conserved by the synthesis of opposites which is the 
life of concrete thought .... But in abolishing the no-
tion of an external world other than the mind we do not 
assert any of the silly nonsense usually described by un-
intelligent critics as idealism. We do not assert that 
the trees and hills and people of our world are "unreal" 
or "mere ideas in my mind," still less that matter is 
nothing but a swarm of mind-particles. The very essence 
of trees and hills and people is that they should be not 
myself but my objects in perception: they are not sub-
jective but objective, not states of myself but facts 
that I know. None the less, my knowing them is organic 
to them .... They and I alike are members of one whole, 
a whole which the destruction of one part would in a 
sense destroy throughout . . (SM, 310-11). 
But then what is this "whole" in which "subject and object are 
identified" and which nevertheless is one for which externality 
is an illusion; which is an "infinite world of fact" and yet 
not "one stupendous whole" (SM, 299)? How does a synthesis of 
opposites differ from a coincidence of opposites, unless the 
identity that is that synthesis is identifiable, describable~ 
recognizable? If absolute knowledge is self-knowledge, and if 
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in it subject and object are identified, and if self-knowledge 
is only possible through the intermediation of subordinare 
forms, then how is it possible for objects of consciousness 
not to be "mere ideas in my mind"? Is it any wonder then that 
in the "progressive reduction of art, religion, science and 
history to philosophy" not only is it the case that "each one 
of these lives disappears; but philosophy itself disappears as 
completely as any" (SM, 293), leaving not so much as the smile 
of the Cheshire cat? 
Now one might grant that what Collingwood is dealing 
with in these enigmatic passages is a mystery surpassing un-
derstanding, the mystery of self-consciousness and its exist-
ence in a world that appears external to the mind which none-
theless knows it. One might grant that in grappling with such 
a mystery one cannot help but lapse into forms of speech that 
are contradictory, the sort of language familiar to mystics 
and spiritualists. One might be so lenient with him, were it 
not for the fact that Collingwood himself is claiming consis-
tency for what he is saying, that he uses logical criteria 
for deciding if the claims of consciousness can live up to 
their expressed performance, and that what he has led the 
reader of Speculum Mentis to expect is a coherent account of 
what it means to be a fully adequate form of knowledge. 
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Therefore we cannot rest content with accepting this 
state of affairs as a fitting conclusion to his search for 
rapprochement. We have the right to demand that if a "higher" 
form of consciousness is itself inconsistent on logical 
grounds, if it cannot live up in its performance to what it 
had promised, we must either (a) declare it to be an excep-
tion to the rule of consistency, or (b) posit an even higher 
state of reflective consciousness to further repair the dam-
ages. But it is easy to see that so long as a state of con-
sciousness is distinct from its object, alternative (b) leads 
to an infinite regress, and therefore the goal of Speculum 
Mentis (and progressive rapprochement) will be forever frus-
trated, because self-knowledge will never be possible: it in-
volves a contradiction in terms. And the first solution (a) 
acknowledges that the criteria of consistency (a supposedly 
higher form of consciousness--absolute knowledge) be affirmed 
as itself inconsistent. But then why not absolve any of the 
lower forms from an equivalent necessity to be self-consistent? 
Why not stop the series with history, for example? What need 
is there for philosophy? 
As we shall see in a future chapter, Collingwood's so-
lution was to opt for alternative (a), which is what we might 
expect for someone who felt himself to be committed to the So-
cratic view of philosophy as self-knowledge. But in taking 
this route Collingwood provided philosophy with one of those 
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rare occurrences--a bonafide metaphysical paradigm. If the 
criteria of consistency is itself inconsistent it may be so 
either by (1) asserting something to be both true and false 
at the same time and in the same manner, or (2) by asserting 
something that is neither true nor false. In the Essay on 
Metaphysics Collingwood took the latter option, and spelled 
out the consequences of this doctrine as a theory of "abso-
lute presuppositions" which are the basis for truth and fal-
sity without being themselves true or false (EM, 21-33). 
(4) If absolute knowledge collapses for want of a co-
herent object, how are the various forms of consciousness de-
scribed in Speculum Mentis reconciled to one another? Or does 
Collingwood's early rapprochement philosophy end in complete 
disaster? Is retrogressive identity the only acceptable basis 
for rapprochement? 
We have had occasion in previous chapters, and this 
chapter is an extension of these reflections, to remark on 
the peculiar usage that Collingwood has for terms that appear 
as key words in all of the contradictory texts cited above--
"other than ... , separate from ... , identical with .. 
. , the same as ... ," etc. These terms, and the under-
standing of them in context, count greatly toward contributing 
to the sense or nonsense of what Collingwood is trying to say 
in these highly elliptical and abstract passages. It is also 
crucial for an understanding of rapprochement philosophy, 
since the entire effort of reconciliation is to show that 
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the reconciliata are not "other than" or "separate from" each 
other, but are rather "identical" or "the same as" each other 
as parts of a "concrete whole." 
Now we recall from section 2 of this chapter that in 
Religion and Philosophy four sorts of identity can be dis-
tinguished--abstract, dialectical, concrete, and absolute. 
The first two were bound, we noted, by relations of necessity, 
the latter two by relations of contingency. We also noted 
that each had a corresponding sense of "separate." If we come 
fresh from this discussion to the present problem in Speculum 
Mentis, we notice several interesting shifts in meaning, and 
as usual with Collingwood, a small investment of careful at-
tention to these shifts yields dividends for the interpreta-
tive speculator. 
If we return, for example, to the transition from his-
tory to philosophy we notice that the object of history is 
taken to be the "concrete universal" and that this "infinite 
whole of fact" is taken to be an object that ostensibly satis-
fies the mind: 
There is thus no feature of experience, no attitude of 
mind towards its object, which is alien to history. Art 
rests on the ignoring of reality: religion, on the ignor-
ing of thought: science, on the ignoring of fact; but with 
the recognition of fact everything is recognized that is 
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in any sense real. The fact, as historically determined, 
is the absolute object. The mark of the absolute object 
is individuality, for individuality is concreteness. The 
object as individual is the whole of what exists, and this 
is concretely articulated into parts each of which is 
again individual, and so to infinity .... The object as 
a system of fact so organized, is objective throughout, 
for every part is a true microcosm, and is truly infinite 
. . This absolute whole is the concrete universal 
. . It is the system of systems, the world of worlds . . . 
The principle of its structure is not classification, the 
abstract concept, but the concrete concept, which is re-
levance, or implication ... and the logic of history is 
the logic of the concrete universal. (SM, 218-21). 
Aside from the fact that it is hard to see why an absolute 
mind knowing such an object would not be "one stupendous 
whole" (SM, 299) if its object is a "system of systems" and a 
"world of worlds," we notice an additional peculiarity in this 
passage. The description of the concrete universal corres-
ponds fairly closely to the description of both dialectical 
and concrete identities as we discovered them in Religion and 
Philosophy. (1) The relations and relata are connected not 
as abstract particulars subsumed under an equally abstract 
genus, but as parts of a whole such that the parts reflect 
the whole and the whole reflects the parts--therefore a di-
alectical identity. But (2) they are also described as con-
crete in the sense of individual--and thus (like the identity 
of cooperation between minds in Religion and Philosophy, 
wherein the two minds share that unity between them which is 
taken to be the mark of the individual, and therefore become 
one mind) a concrete identity. If Collingwood is truly press-
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ing these two sorts of identity into doing service in the 
single notion of the concrete universal, then it is not sur-
prising that we should find in it relations of both necessity 
and contingency, since dialectical identity involved relations 
of necessity, and concrete identity involved relations of con-
tingency. In the concept of the concrete universal, then, we 
have an attempt to express the overlapping of two senses of 
identity; it is therefore an instance of what Collingwood will 
later call the "overlap of classes" in his Essay on Philosoph-
ical Method (EPM, 26-53). Which brings us to our next ques-
tion. 
(5) Is there any way that absolute identity as the 
ideal for progressive reconciliation can be made intelligible? 
Unfortunately the suggestion from the last paragraph, i.e. 
that the concrete universal as an overlap-concept might be 
expanded to become the absolute object, runs headlong into 
the subject-object contradictions we have been at pains to re-
concile. On the one hand the concrete universal turns out to 
be the absolute object, thus accounting for the fact that the 
identity of history and philosophy, while a "barren abstrac-
tion" like all such identifications, is less misleading than 
the others (SM, 246). On the other hand the object of his-
tory fails to be the object of philosophy, because the his-
torical consciousness fails to be fully aware of the identity 
of subject and object. History as a separate form of con-
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sciousness fails to apprehend the concrete universal (an in-
finite whole of fact) because of a remnant of the original 
sin of the mind--the abstract separation of subject and ob-
ject (SM, 237-38); the historian simply cannot grasp an "in-
finite given whole of fact," and therefore in confronting the 
the panorama of history and the virtual infinite of histori-
cal evidence the historian must select his materials, arrange 
them into periods, etc.--all acts of abstraction. 21 
It is at this point that Collingwood introduces his 
hypothetical identity of subject and object by an act of ab-
solute consciousness: "If therefore the infinite given whole 
of fact is the nature of the knowing mind as such, our prob-
lem is solved, and the possibility of knowledge is vindicated" 
(SM, 241). Once again we are brought to the brink of complete 
disaster for Collingwood's voyaging vessel of consciousness: 
the fabric of his mainsail is, as we have seen, ripped from 
top to bottom by inner contradiction. 
In Religion and Philosophy, at least, he left an es-
cape route open in the form of the Absolute Mind as God, with 
whom men may contingently be united through identity of pur-
21 Collingwood's description of historical abstract-
ness is almost Heideggerian: "History, which seems to be es-
sentially remembrance, is only possible through forgetfulness, 
a forgetfulness which in destroying what it takes away makes 
it impossible for us ever to understand what is left" (SM, 
236). 
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pose with Jesus Christ. In Speculum Mentis this door also 
seems to be shut, both by his explicit assertion that the ab-
solute mind is the mind of individuals and not that of iome 
"world spirit" which he rejects as a "myth" (SM, 298-99), and 
his affirmation that the absolute mind is the mind of each of 
us (SM, 298). 22 
Fortunately, there is more than one way to reach ab-
solute knowledge, and while we have been preoccupied with a 
discussion of consciousness and its objects, we have lost 
sight temporarily of another approach to the subject--one 
which Collingwood himself, in his haste to reach the absolute 
22once again, in fairness to Collingwood it must be 
said that in this passage he says that "the mind of which we 
are speaking . . . must at least be the mind of each of us . 
. . . " (SM, 298), thus leaving the way open for the insertion 
of a higher mind which does not share the inherent failing of 
human nature. But in a passage where the life of absolute 
mind is described by means of the religious metaphor of the 
fall and redemption of man, he seems to reject this possibil-
ity. The metaphor likens the fall of man to the loss of ab-
solute knowledge through an act which forever separates sub-
ject and object, and redemption to the regaining of this know-
ledge through an act of divine transcendence--the incarna-
tion. In his fallen state man fails to achieve self-know-
ledge: "not knowing himself as he ought to be, he cannot 
know himself as he actually is. His error is implicit just 
because it is complete" (SM, 269). However Collingwood cri-
ticizes the metaphor as having one flaw: the "transcendence 
of God." He has also asserted that "no one can worship the 
absolute" (SM, 151), and furthermore that the point of entry 
of God into a philosophical system marks unerringly the point 
at which it breaks down (SM, 269). Finally, the reader might 
also recall that Collingwood maintains that there is no fixed 
human nature, so that the imagery of the fall is further 
flawed insofar as it is inapplicable to man. 
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standpoint, may have overlooked. We noted above (section 4) 
that in the beginning of the chapter on science Collingwood 
called art and religion "forms not of thought but of language" 
(SM, 154). We have also seen him carry out his analysis of 
the explication of implicit errors of successive forms of 
consciousness in terms of their linguistic forms--expression 
(art), assertion (religion), etc. Even his discussion of 
knowledge as question and answer tends to focus on the lang-
uage of conditionals, hypotheticals, assertions, and implica-
tions. In this di~cussion Collingwood drops an intriguing 
hint which is later picked up in his discussion of the nature 
of philosophical thinking. Discussing symbol and meaning in 
his chapter on religion, Collingwood writes: 
To distinguish a symbol from its meaning is to put one-
self in the way of explaining or translating the symbol. 
Now it is a matter of common observation that religion 
never explains itself . . . . To ask for explanations is 
the mark of extreme sophistication; in other words, it is 
the mark of the life of explicit thought .... Art is 
untranslatable, religion cannot translate itself. Art 
cannot be translated because it has no meaning except the 
wholly implicit meaning submerged, in the form of beauty, 
in the flood of imagery. Religion cannot translate itself 
not because it has no meaning ... but because, although 
it has a meaning and knows it has a meaning, it thinks it 
has expressed this meaning already. And so it has, but 
only metaphorically; and this metaphorical self-expressio~ 
this fusion of symbol and meaning, requires translation 
.... For literal language is only language recognizedly 
metaphorical .. (SM, 128-30). 
We have seen that in his apology in Speculum Mentis 
for the sins of Religion and Philosophy, Collingwood pointed 
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to the failure to recognize the distinction between symbol 
and meaning in religion as his major oversight in that ear-
lier work (SM, 108, n. 1). And we also noted that when he 
originally published Religion and Philosophy he deliberately 
declined to deal with the issue of religious language (RP, 
xvi). And we have seen that in Speculum Mentis the distinc-
tion appears as the singular way that the error implicit in 
religion is made explicit--religion "asserts the reality of 
what is only a symbol and thereby treats a symbol as though 
it were a concept" (SM, 153). The same might be shown for 
all the other forms of consciousness: each manifests its la-
tent error in the form of inadequate or self-contradictory 
expressions. Not only religion requires translation, it 
seems, but all the forms of consciousness: when science, for 
example, achieves explicit thought, it does so by means of 
its ability to express meaning in several ways, by means of 
overlapping metaphors in the form of alternative hypotheses 
and equivalent mathematical expressions, thus overcoming the 
fixed formulas of religious dogma (cf. SM, 155-57). 
In the chapter on philosophy this line of thought is 
picked up again, and provides us with a possible key to un-
scramble many of the paradoxes of absolute thought: 
We have hitherto allowed ourselves to say that in art, 
religion, and so forth the substance of truth was pre-
sent, but was concealed in an inadequate form: that, for 
instance, religion actually solved the riddle of life 
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but presented its solution in a mythological form. This 
implies that the task of philosophy, regarded as the phil-
osophy of religion, is the simple translation of this so-
lution of the riddle of life out of the language of_mytho-
logy into that of philosophy .... Translation itself is 
based on the fact that the meaning takes new colour and 
shines with a new light when we express it in different 
words. To set the meaning as an abstract self-identity 
over against the language makes translation pointless: to 
swamp it in a mere immediate union with the language it-
self makes translation impossible .... (T)hought in its 
concrete form is not indifferent to its own choice of 
language. It realizes that an unsuitable linguistic form 
affects its own inmost being, and that what we have called 
merely formal error is in reality material and essential 
error. Our distinction between formal error and material 
error was, in fact, only an abstract way of stating the 
very important fact that no error is wholly erroneous, but 
is always capable of a dialectical development into truth 
by simply bringing to light what is already implicit in 
it: what the thinker, as we paradoxically say, "really 
means," but "does not know that he means." This process 
of translation into progressively adequate language is 
simply the dialectical self-criticism of thought. (SM, 
252-53). 
I have quoted this passage at length because it is so 
important, so capable of being overlooked, 23 and so pregnant 
with possibilities. For (1) if philosophy is the process of 
making explicit what is implicit in other modes of thought, 
and (2) if the implicit errors of these modes of consciousness 
are only made explicit when expressed or translated into lang-
uage, and (3) if the dialectical development of error into 
23
collingwood himself seems to have overlooked its 
significance, both in the conclusion of Speculum Mentis, where 
the suggestion is not followed up, and later in The Principles 
of Art, where the significance of language for thought and the 
role of philosophy as translation appear as discoveries, 
rather than as a development of a line of thought already in-
itiated ten years earlier. Cf. PA, Chapter XI, pp. 225-69. 
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truth is a process of translation into progressively more ade-
quate language (the dialectical self-criticism of thought), 
then it is clear that (4) absolute knowledge in the form of 
philosophy is the translation, by dialectical self-criticism, 
of expressions of subordinate forms of consciousness, into in-
creasingly more adequate language. One is tempted to say (as 
Collingwood does not) that the object of philosophy is ex-
pressed in absolute language--i.e. language purged not of all 
error but only of its element of necessary and insurmountable 
error. 
What such a language would be like is a matter for 
speculation, although Collingwood's later writings provide us 
with a few clues. It would have a peculiar grammar and the 
Essay on Philosophical Method and the methodological chapters 
of the Essay on Metaphysics are attempts to provide us with 
an informal account of what that grammar is like. It will 
deal with problems of the sort provided by art, by science, 
and by history, and The Principles of Art, The Idea of Na-
ture, and The Idea of History are examples of what it would 
sound like when these problems are translated by philosophi-
cal consciousness into a more adequate language. And it 
would attempt to formulate an idea of what an object would be 
like that would totally satisfy the mind, and these reflec-
tions are presented in the Essay on Metaphysics--Collingwood's 
last word on the religious foundations of contemporary thought. 
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But aside from what an absolute language would be 
like, it is clear that the conception outlined in the quo-
tation above has the potentiality for clarifying some, if.not 
all, of the difficulties we found with the notion of absolute 
knowledge. (1) If the differentia of philosophy is taken to 
be the identification of subject and object, the difficulties 
with this conception arise when it is described in terms of 
consciousness and its object--the stumbling block always be-
ing self-consciousness. But if absolute knowledge or phil-
osophy is described not in terms of consciousnessbut of lang-
uage, then this particular difficulty disappears: language 
is quite capable of being self-referential, of discussing and 
describing itself, and of introducing modifications to over-
come errors in the expression of its more primary forms (e.g. 
"natural languages"). Not only are subject and object iden-
tified insofar as both are embraced within the same whole--a 
world of language in which pronouns, reflexive forms, and 
self-referential assertions are all possible; but the subject 
is also both a receiver of meaning and a creator of meaning 
in this world. Therefore a change in one part (e.g. the cre-
ation of a new meaning--a poetic metaphor, a new scientific 
hypothesis) necessitates a change in the whole (the inter-
connected world of meaning) and in all the other parts (re-
lated meanings). Since the subject here is a user of lang-
uage, he is identified with objects not immediately (he does 
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not actually "become" the object) but through the mediation 
of subordinate expressive acts--through the unreflective use 
of the language of art, religion, science, and history. He 
becomes one with his object not actually but virtually, sym-
bolically, by an identity of meaning. 
(2) As a world of language the "concrete universal" 
(as expressed judgment) could understandably be a "world of 
worlds" and a "system of systems." As an expressive form 
characteristic of philosophy it contains elements both hypo-
thetical (calling forth alternative possible meanings) and 
categorical (in its referential determination of a given mean-
ing); and in philosophical discourse the concrete universal 
can be engaged in questioning (like art), answering or as-
serting (like religion), abstracting (like science) or refer-
ring (like history). And it can claim adequacy at all these 
tasks without being "one stupendous whole," since not all en-
tities are linguistic. 24 And even though not all entities 
are linguistic, there would still be no externality, no ele-
ment of necessary and insurmountable error, insofar as there 
are no non-linguistic entities that are not capable of being 
24
rhe terms "linguistic" and "linguistic expression" 
must be taken as having the widest possible extension--includ-
ing not only the utterances of natural languages, but all 
sorts of artificial languages as well (including mathematics 
and logic) and even works of art (music, painting, dance, 
etc.). Cf. PA, 252-69. 
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described, referred to, or translated into linguistic enti-
ties. Therefore none are in principle "external to" or· "se-
parated from" a subject. Linguistic expression makes the 
whole world of objects, real and possible, actual and ficti-
tious, true and false, accessible to the user of language, 
the subject. 
(3) Philosophy as translational activity preserves 
the contingency (and hence the freedom) of the progressive 
movement of rapprochement insofar as there is no necessity to 
translate something erroneously expressed unless one is com-
mitted to the creation of, or preservation of, a higher mode 
of expression. Philosophy as translation aims at consistency, 
but not strictly speaking a formal consistency, but rather a 
consistency of coherent meanings--meanings which cannot help 
but overlap in specifiable ways, rather than abstract mean-
ings which are mutually exclusive. And even though it aims 
at consistency, there is no fixed set of rules which pre-
scribe a one-to-one translation of one set of terms into 
another. Translation must have a certain flexibility, aiming 
as it does at the transmission of meaning rather than at mi-
metic correspondence. Translation of meaning is impression-
istic rather than photographic: its rules are not necessar-
ily the rules of strict formal correspondence, but vary from 
loose metaphor to verbatim literal and grammatical transfor-
mational analysis. One cannot even say that the same ideal 
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is always adhered to, for in poetic translation a strict, 
word-by-word translation would be undesirable, even ridicu-
lous. But philosophy, if nothing else, interprets itsel~ as 
a guardian of meaning rather than a keeper of rules. As such 
the forward motion of philosophy is towards progressively 
more adequate meaning, and the means to achieving this is, if 
not the opposite of necessary inference, at least independent 
of it. Its resources are the resources of freedom rather than 
those of necessity. 
(4) The ultimate identity that would serve as a maxi-
mal ideal for a progressive rapprochement would therefore be 
an identity of meaning, where through an identification of 
meaning and meant, subject and object (knower and known) are 
identified. The world of experience thus reconciled is an ab-
solute built out of the differences of the world as it finds 
them, but not by a principle of abstraction (which leaves 
something always unsaid) but by the progressive consolidation 
of a world of expressed meanings, of articulated facts, 
bound together in such a way that the whole (itself a mean-
ing) could not be what it is without its parts (which them-
selves are, or have, meanings) and vice versa. 
But we have been allowing ourselves the license of an 
unrestricted flight of Collingwoodean fancy. How much of it 
Collingwood might have agreed with, we can only surmise. But 
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there is little doubt that his rapprochement philosophy is 
capable of the sort of flexibility that would include modi-
fications along the lines we have suggested here; for indeed, 
for two or more reconciliata to reach rapprochement means for 
them to have, and to be shown to have, not the same objects 
unaffected by the knowing of them, but the same meaning. 
